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Abstract 
The 2007-09 financial crisis highlighted the devastating impact of 
securitization on the stability of the banking system. However, studies on 
securitization are far from sufficient to show the impact on a bank’s performance. 
To better understand the impact of securitization in order to prevent such crisis 
to happen again, I study bank loan securitization in this Ph.D. thesis.  
This thesis aims to provide empirical explanations to answer two dilemmas 
in securitization literature. First, ambiguous results are presented in the impact 
of securitization on bank risk. Classic theories suggest that loan securitization 
allows securitizers to transfer the potential risk to outside investors and diversify 
the large exposure to a single shock by sharing this potential riskiness with all 
investors linked by securitized assets, which in turn decreases bank risk and 
increases the stability of financial system. However, recent evidence reveals that 
securitizers have the intention to ignore potential risk and take on more risk, 
introducing more risk into the financial system and increasing the level of bank 
riskiness. Second, securitization introduces a higher flexibility for banks to 
allocate their resources and increases bank efficiency accordingly. However, 
securitization process is closely linked to a large amount of upfront and managerial 
costs, which can lead to an additional burden to banks and decrease securitizers’ 
efficiency. This thesis develops a synthetic empirical analysis and shows a short- 
and long-term impact of securitization on bank risk, and a positive impact on a 
bank’s efficiency score. Details information are as follows. 
In the first chapter, I provide an introduction of the thesis. In chapter two, 
I present a comprehensive introduction on securitization, including both 
background history, literature, and related empirical issues. I also provide 
detailed information on securitization transaction in practice. In the empirical 
method review, this thesis highlights the self-selection problem in securitization. 
For example, the impact of securitization on bank performance may simply 
depend on a bank’s choice of whether to securitize their loans or not. In order to 
address such a problem, estimation methods including Heckman model, 
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instrumental variable analysis, propensity score matching and Difference-in-
Difference analysis, are discussed.  
From chapter three, I present empirical studies on the impact of bank 
securitization activities in the U.S. I first study the conflicts of the impact of 
securitization on bank risk. Risk transfer and diversification theories suggest that 
securitization reduce bank risk, while commentators blame the lending standard 
decrease as the main driver of the subprime crisis. Therefore, I conduct several 
methodologies to study the impact of securitization on bank risk in chapter three 
and the impact of securitization on the likelihood of bank failure in chapter four. 
The thesis studies the impact of securitzation on bank efficiency scores in Chapter 
five. The reported results suggest that bank loan securitization is associated with 
an efficiency increase effect. The reported results suggest that loan securitization 
allows banks to shift off undesirable risk through the true sale process, which in 
turn decreases bank’s capital requirement due to a decreased risk of capital. Bank 
liquidity can also be increased by transferring the illiquid loans into marketable 
securities. Both effects increase a bank’s financial flexibility and efficiency. The 
diversification of securitization also allows securitizers to allocate more of their 
resources efficiently. During the cross-variation analysis, results support the 
arguments above. 
In chapter six, I review all empirical results and provide explanations on 
the results. First, a short- and long-term explanation of the impact of loan 
securitization is provided.  That is, bank loan securitization could reduce bank risk 
within a short term through risk transfer and diversification effect but increases 
the likelihood of bank failure in the long run, because securitizers are more likely 
to lower the lending standard or pursue regulatory arbitrage. Recent development 
of the securitization studies and practice are also presented. 
The last chapter concludes the study and point out the possible extensions 
of the study. This thesis provides extensive empirical results that adds to the 
extant studies on securitization.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The standard problem of external financing for banks is resolved by either 
direct or indirect finance method. In the former case, fund suppliers support 
demand through ownership participation (acquisition of equity positions) and/or 
the acquisition of debt instruments (for example, bonds) directly issued by the 
agents demanding the funds. In the latter case, fund supply is funneled to “in-
between” agents, the financial intermediaries, which are then responsible for the 
allocation to demand. However, such intermediaries, e.g., commercial banks, 
may not able to satisfy the financing needs in the market due to the shortage of 
liquidity. 
Traditionally, commercial banks stick to the hold-to-maturity banking 
model which requires originators to hold the illiquid loans until maturity. Since 
banks may grant loans as many as possible to pursue higher profits, the proportion 
of liquidity on their balance sheets decreases significantly. Loan securitization is 
a financial innovation that allows banks to transfer their illiquid assets into 
marketable securities, which in turn increases bank’s liquidity on the balance 
sheet. Thus, securitization contributes to the so-called shadow banking model of 
financial intermediation (Pozsar et al., 2010), which decomposes the simple 
process of deposit-funded, hold-to-maturity lending conducted by banks into a 
more complex, wholesale-funded, securitization-based lending process that 
involves a range of shadow banks. Securitization also allows banks to decrease 
their cost of capital (Pennacchi, 1988), and increases the performance (Casu et 
al., 2013). Therefore, the development of securitization enjoyed a dramatic 
increase before the 2007-09 financial crisis, as shown in Figure 1-1 and 1-2.  
<Insert Figure 1-1 Here> 
<Insert Figure 1-2 Here> 
As shown in Figure 1-1, the proportion of held-for-sale loans (represented 
by the bars) reported increased substantially from the early 1990s. This proportion 
even reached the peak during the 2007-09 crisis. Since those banks accounted for 
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roughly 80 percent of total commercial bank loans (the solid line) over the same 
period, it suggests that banks increasingly shifted from the originate-to-hold to an 
originate-to-securitize model of lending. More specifically, reports from the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) provide details for the residential mortgage 
subset of these securitized assets, revealing that actual loan origination by 
commercial banks has grown over time (Figure 1-2). 
However, the development of securitization creates more possible 
problems. The 2007-09 financial crisis has been felt across virtually all economic 
sectors and in all parts of the world. Although the devastating impact of the crisis 
has been widespread, it roots originated from the financial sector and manifested 
itself first through disruptions in the system of financial intermediation. It is a 
common agreement among academics, practitioners and commentators that the 
crisis originated as a run on the liabilities of issuers of asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP), a short-term funding instrument used to finance asset portfolios of 
long-term maturities (e.g., Gorton, 2010; Covitz, Liang, and Suarez, 2009; 
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013; Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2010). In this sense, 
ABCP issuers (conduits) perform typical financial intermediation functions, but 
they are not banks. Certainly, in many instances banks were the driving force 
behind ABCP funding growth, sponsoring conduit activity and providing the needed 
liquidity and credit enhancements. But the main point is that ABCP financing shifts 
a component of financial intermediation away from the traditional location—the 
bank’s own balance sheet. Similarly, and concurrently with the ABCP disruptions, 
financial markets also witnessed a bank-like run on investors that funded their 
balance sheet through repurchase agreement (repo) transactions, another form of 
financial intermediation that grew rapidly but did not take place on bank balance 
sheets (Gorton 2010; Gorton and Metrick 2012). Additionally, in the aftermath of 
Lehman Brothers’ default, money market mutual funds, yet another class of 
nonbank entities that serve as financial intermediaries, experienced a run on their 
liabilities, an event that triggered in turn an even bigger run on ABCP issuers 
(Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013). However, the impact of securitization on 
bank’s risk and efficiency is far from conclusion.  
The first dilemma in the literature is the impact of loan securitization on 
bank risk. On the one hand, securitization includes a true sale process of the 
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underlying assets to SPVs, which confirms the ownership transferred to the 
security buyers (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Franke, Herrmann, and Webber; 
2011), leading to a risk transfer effect. The tranching process of securitization 
creates securities with different riskiness levels and allows investors to buy based 
on their risk preferences, attracting a large number of investors to share the 
potential risk within the securitization network. Therefore, the classic 
securitization theory suggests that loan securitization will decrease bank risk and 
increase financial system’s stability. However, the asymmetric information embed 
in the securitization process encourages securitizers to take this advantage and in 
turn take on more risk such as granting more risky loans without careful screening 
(Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008) and lack of monitoring incentives (Key 
et al., 2012; Wang and Xia, 2014). This is also considered as the main reason 
caused the 2007-09 subprime crisis in the U.S., supported by a number of studies 
during the aftermath of crisis (e.g., Agarwal, Chang and Yavas, 2012). The second 
dilemma falls into the topic of efficiency. By creating new external sources for 
securitizers, loan securitization increases a bank’s performance in allocating the 
financial resources, which in turn increases the efficiency. However, information 
asymmetry triggers the related financial costs such as credit ratings and extra 
monitoring from the third parties. Meanwhile, conducting a securitization process 
requires a large amount of upfront and legal costs, which will in turn decrease the 
available sources of finance and the efficiency score. This thesis aims to answer 
both questions and provide empirical evidence to explain the existed dilemmas 
using a step by step analysis strategy in each chapter.  
In Chapter two, a comprehensive discussion is provided to explain 
securitization including its background, process, and theories. To focus on the 
core topic of this thesis, the theories are closely related to the impact of 
securitization on bank’s performance, risk and efficiency. Securitization is related 
to self-selection problems. Therefore, methodological explanations on self-
selection bias, and the related empirical strategies, such as Heckman self-
selection model, and propensity score matching (PSM) approach are discussed in 
detail. 
The relationship between securitization and bank risk is the focus in 
chapter three. Bank risk measure using 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  and the OLS method as the 
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baseline framework is implemented in the study. To address the endogeneity 
problem, several identification strategies, e.g., the Heckman self-selection 
model, two-stage least squares approach, and PSM method are implemented. All 
methods yield consistent and robust results. The reported results suggest that 
bank loan securitization could decrease bank risk measured by 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 . This 
finding confirms the risk transfer theory of securitization. The breakout of the 
2007-09 financial crisis changes the liquidity in the market dramatically, which 
can, in turn, lead to fundamental variations in securitization. Hence, the sample 
period is divided into pre- and post-crisis subsamples. The split sample results 
show that the economic impact of securitization on bank risk decreases 
significantly after the breakout of the crisis, although the risk reduction effect 
still holds. It can be argued that the liquidity shortage in the secondary market 
broke down the chain in securitization which was meant to keep funding new 
projects, which in turn decreased its impact and magnitude. To shed more light 
on the risk transfer argument, securitization is decomposed into mortgage and 
non-mortgage categories. The results suggest that non-mortgage securitization is 
more significantly associated with risk reduction than mortgage securitization. It 
also suggests that non-mortgage loans are, on average, riskier than mortgage 
loans, which further confirms the risk transfer theory. In the additional analysis, 
a test of the impact of loan sale activities report similar impact with 
securitization.  
In Chapter four, a study of the impact of securitization on the likelihood of 
bank failure is investigated. Based on the survival analysis using Cox model, the 
reported results suggest that loan securitization increases the likelihood of bank 
failure. The robust test employs weighted-least-squares to address the 
endogeneity problem, which reports consistent results. Securitization is also 
decomposed into mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations, and the reported 
results suggest that the impact on the likelihood of bank failure is more significant 
for mortgage securitization. It can be argued that securitization of high quality 
mortgage loans is more attractive to investors, and a more standard process to 
securitize mortgages makes securitizers to easily securitize mortgage loans, which 
in turn increases the incentive of securitizers to be more reckless when granting 
loans. Loan quality is decreased and so as the likelihood of bank failure.  
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In Chapter five, the impact of loan securitization on bank efficiency is 
discussed. A measure of bank efficiency using efficiency scores which are 
estimated from the DEA model is implemented. The analysis is based on the 
Heckman self-selection model, panel Heckman self-selection model, propensity 
score matching method, and the Difference-in-Difference method which are used 
to address the possible endogeneity problem. All reported results are consistent 
and robust. Overall the results show that securitization increases bank efficiency. 
To find the possible channels through which securitization could impact on bank 
efficiency, a cross-variation regressions is run between securitization ratio and 
several bank-specific variables. The reported results show that the efficiency 
increase effect of securitization is more significant for those banks with higher 
capital ratio and bank risk, as well as lower liquidity and diversification levels.  
In Chapter six, the results of chapters three and four are reviewed and a 
short- and long-term explanation of the impact of securitization on bank risk is 
discussed. The overall conclusion is that loan securitization can reduce bank risk 
within a short term due to risk transfer and diversification effect but increases 
the likelihood of bank failure in the long run because securitizers are more likely 
to lower their lending standards and pursue regulatory arbitrage opportunities. 
The explanations on the mechanisms are as follows. Loan securitization allows 
securitizers to transfer the potential risk to outside investors and diversify the 
large exposure to a single shock by sharing this potential riskiness with all investors 
linked by securitized assets, which in turn decreases bank risk and increases the 
stability of financial system.Securitization can increase the likelihood of bank 
failure because securitizers have the intention to ignore potential risk and take 
on more risk, introducing more risk into the financial system and increasing the 
level of bank riskiness. A bank’s efficiency can be improved because securitization 
introduces a higher flexibility for banks to allocate their resources.  
Chapter seven discusses the limitations and possible future studies, as well 
as the conclusion of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
Introduction of securitization 
2.1 The development of securitization 
2.1.1 Background history 
Securitization refers to packaging and selling of a bank's illiquid assets 
backed by securities. Specifically, securitization is the financial practice of 
pooling various types of contractual debt, such as residential mortgages, 
commercial mortgages, auto loans, or credit card debt obligations, and selling 
said consolidated debt as pass-through securities, or collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs) to various outside investors. The cash collected from the 
financial instruments underlying the security is paid to the various investors who 
had advanced money for that right. There are mainly two different types of 
securities, residential-mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and asset-backed 
securities (ABS). RMBS are the securities which backed by residential mortgage 
receivables, while ABS are backed by other types of receivables. 
Securitizing practice can be found, at least, as far back as the 18th century 
in Netherland (Frehen et al., 2014). Early examples of mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) in the U.S. were the farm railroad mortgage bonds of the mid-19th century, 
which contributed to the panic of 1857 (Riddiough and Thompson, 2012). Regards 
to the first modern residential mortgage-backed securities, the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development created it in February, 1970 (Deutsche 
Bundesbank Monthly Report, 1997). Starting in the 1990s with some earlier private 
transactions, securitization was applied to a number of sectors of the reinsurance 
and insurance markets, including life and catastrophe. This activity grew to nearly 
15 billion U.S. Dollar of issuance in 2006.  
Modern securitization took off in the late 1990s and early 2000s, thanks to 
the innovative structures implemented across the asset classes, such as UK 
Mortgage Master Trusts (a concept imported from US credit cards), insurance-
18 
 
backed transactions, and more esoteric asset classes like the securitization of 
lottery receivables. The Bond Market Association (BMA) in the United States 
estimates that, the total amount outstanding at the end of 2004 was $1.8 trillion. 
This amount represented about 8% of total outstanding bond market debt ($23.6 
trillion), about 33% of mortgage-related debt ($5.5 trillion), and about 39% of 
corporate debt ($4.7 trillion) in the U.S. In nominal terms, the ABS amount 
outstanding grew, between 1995 and 2004, by about 19% annually, with mortgage-
related debt and corporate debt growing at about 9%. According to the data of 
Security Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA), the outstanding ABS in 
the U.S. has risen from $520 billion to $2972 billion between 1997 and 2007, an 
increase of nearly 500 percent. (see Figure 2-1) 
<Insert Figure 2-1 Here> 
Between the early 1990s and 2008, the scale of securitization market 
enjoyed a tremendous expansion around the world. In the U.S., the outstanding 
volume of mortgage-backed securities increased from $2.49 trillion in 1996 to $8.9 
trillion by the end of 2008, while the market for asset-backed securities reached 
$2.67 trillion by the end of 2008 compared with $0.4 trillion in 1996. In Europe, 
the outstanding volume of mortgage-backed securities reached €1.21 trillion at 
the end of 2008, while the market for asset-backed securities reached €0.19 
trillion (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)). According 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), between 20% and 60% of the funding for 
new residential mortgage loans originated in mature economies before the credit 
crisis of 2008. After this extended period of rapid expansion, securitization 
markets froze in late 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The impact 
of the crisis on securitization markets has since been well documented (see, for 
example, Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2010; BIS, 2011). 
2.1.2 The securitization transaction 
2.1.2.1 The off-balance-sheet activities 
Traditionally, banks are not closely linked with financial securities which 
can be easily transferred to liquidity. Those securities, e.g., stocks and bonds, are 
marketable because they are anonymous, in the sense that the identity of the 
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holder is irrelevant. Banks usually deal with specific financial contracts, e.g., 
loans and deposits, which cannot easily be resold. Therefore, banks typically must 
hold these contracts in their balance sheets until the contracts expire. Since 
granting only fully collateralized projects is not efficient, banks have to screen 
borrowers and monitor loans to control the credit risk. Also, when transforming 
maturities or when issuing liquid deposits guaranteed by illiquid loans, a bank 
takes a risk combined by interest rate risk and liquidity risk. Interest rate risk is 
due to the difference in maturity. Bank’s cost of funds depends on the level of 
short-term interest rates, which is determined by the contractual interest rates 
of the loans granted by the bank. It is reasonable that this predetermined interest 
rate may rise above the interest income. Even when no interest is paid on deposits, 
the bank still has the possibility to face unexpected withdrawals, which will force 
it to seek more expensive sources of funds. Thus, this difference between the 
marketability of the claims issued and that of the claims held creates the liquidity 
risk. 
Due to the disadvantages above of the traditional banking model, as well 
as the increased competition from financial markets, it is necessary for banks to 
shift to more value-added products, which were better adapted to the needs of 
customers. From the 1980s, banks started operating sophisticated contracts, such 
as loan commitments, credit lines, and guarantees. They also developed their 
offer of swaps, hedging contracts, and securities underwriting. From an 
accounting viewpoint, none of these operations corresponds to a genuine liability 
(or asset) for the bank but only to a conditional commitment. Those activities 
hence are classified as off-balance-sheet (OBS) operations. One of those off-
balance-sheet financial innovations is loan securitization. 
2.1.2.2 The “originate-to-distribute” model 
Traditionally, banks use deposits to fund loans that they will keep on their 
balance sheets until maturity. However, the development of securitization 
changes this traditional banking model from “originate-to-hold” to “originate-to-
distribute”. That is, banks are granting loans to securitize them in the market 
later on. In fact, the origination of loans is now just the first step in a longer 
sequence.  
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Securitization involves the following steps: (1) a sponsor or originator of 
receivables sets up the bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV), pools 
the receivables, and transfers them to the SPV as a true sale; (2) the cash flows 
are tranched into asset-backed securities, the most senior of which are rated and 
issued in the market; (3) the proceeds are used to purchase the receivables from 
the sponsor; (4) the pool revolves, in that over a period of time the principal 
received on the underlying receivables is used to purchase new receivables; and 
(5) there is a final amortization period, during which all payments received from 
the receivables are used to pay down tranche principal amounts.  
It is notable that credit card receivables are different from other pools of 
underlying loans because the underlying loan to the consumer is a revolving credit. 
For example, unlike automobile or student loans, credit card receivables have no 
natural maturity. Consequently, the maturity of the SPV debt is determined 
arbitrarily by stating that receivable payments after a certain date are “principal” 
payments.  
Figure 2-2 shows a schematic process of a typical securitization transaction 
(from Gorton and Souleles, 2007). The diagram shows the two key steps in the 
securitization process: pooling and tranching. Pooling and tranching correspond to 
different types of risk. Pooling minimizes the potential adverse selection problem 
associated with the selection of the assets to be sold to the SPV. Conditional on 
selection of the assets, tranching divides the risk of loss due to default based on 
seniority. Since tranching is based on seniority, the risk of loss due to default of 
the underlying assets is stratified, with the residual risks borne by the sponsor.  
<Insert Figure 2-2 Here> 
2.1.3 The role of banks in securitization 
To better understand securitization and the possible problems stem from 
this financial innovation, this section presents the specific structure of a 
securitization transaction and introduces the key players as well.  
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2.1.3.1 Types of asset securitization 
A. Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Securitization market started from the agency mortgage market, which 
began in the early 1970s when the Government National Mortgage Association 
(Ginnie Mae) used structured finance techniques to pool government-sponsored 
mortgage loans. These structures were later embraced by the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), which forms the agency securitization market. This 
agency securitization market provides a convenient platform for mortgage-backed 
securities to be passed through, which makes it possible for a seamless transfer of 
cash flows from the originators to security investors. 
In order to satisfy investors’ needs of more diversified mortgage securities 
with different maturities or interest rate characteristics, more complicated 
securitization products, such as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), are 
invented. Such collateralized mortgage obligations are used to transform or 
resecuritize existing agency mortgage-back securities. Simply speaking, they are 
the securitization on securitized assets. These financial innovations greatly 
expand the role of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to the secondary market and 
enhance the credit availability in the housing market (Fabozzi and Dunlevy 2001). 
B. Nonagency Asset-Backed Securities 
Apart from the traditional agency securitization structures, the nonagency 
securitization market began to become popular from the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
This act legally consents the creation of real estate mortgage investment conduits 
(REMICs), which is a watershed in the development of securitization market. Since 
this accounting vehicle, the REMICs, essentially allows originators to transfer their 
assets into a bankruptcy-remote trust that is insulated from the performance of 
the asset issuer, the development of the nonagency securitization market has 
been spurred from then. For example, benefited from alternative credit 
enhancement structures, the growth in the securitization of nonconforming 
mortgage-backed securities enjoyed an explosive jump. The nonconforming 
mortgage market, or the private-label securities market, consists of loans that are 
22 
 
too large to meet the agencies’ size limits. In 1995, the longstanding Community 
Reinvestment Act was modified to encourage the securitization of lower-credit-
quality loans. An environment of lower interest rates also made homeownership 
affordable, allowing borrowers to refinance and consolidate their debt. 
Other than policy change, technological innovations and advanced credit-
scoring systems also played a critical role in automating underwriting procedures 
and lowering borrowing costs. These financial innovations and lower underwriting 
standards spurred the rapid growth of the subprime mortgage market. According 
to the Inside Mortgage Finance, for example, the size of the subprime market 
increased from nearly $65 billion in 1995 to around $1.3 trillion in 2007 before the 
crisis. 
Of course, to decrease the potential risk, the construction of a REMIC 
requires the underlying collateral assets must be static. That is, the collateral of 
REMIC should be a real property or a real property derivative, which means the 
REMIC structure cannot be applied to a large subset of cash-flow-producing assets, 
such as car loans, revolving credit card receivables, lease receivables, student 
loans, corporate debt, and commercial real estate loans. To fill this gap, asset 
securitization has relied on several alternative bankruptcy-remote structures. The 
primary mechanisms for securitizing nonmortgage assets are provided by a variety 
of common-law trusts and revolving special-purpose entities such as master trusts 
and commercial paper conduits. 
C. Classification of Nonagency Securities 
The development of securitization creates a large amount of complicated 
structured derivatives. Therefore, it is helpful to clearly classify such financial 
tools in securitization market, especially those nonagency securities. The 
classification and terminology for nonagency asset-backed securities will follow 
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). 
First, though it is true that the term asset-backed security (ABS) is used to 
describe any structured security that is backed by an asset’s cash flows, SIFMA 
uses this definition more narrowly to refer to such asset receivables other than 
direct mortgage loans. Securities backed by mortgage loans are commonly 
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described as mortgage-backed securities. Therefore, the class of asset-backed 
securities represents a wide variety of consumer finance assets, including home 
equity loan, home equity lines of credit products, automobile loans, credit card 
receivables, student loans, consumer loans, and other lease financing receivable 
structures which can be more exotic.  
Within the category of mortgage-backed securities, there are two 
majorities of subgroups. The first subgroup is called the private-label MBS, which 
is based on prime or Alt-A nonagency mortgage products, while the second 
subgroup is the subprime MBS which derived from subprime mortgages. Also, there 
is another category named as commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), 
which are structures backed by commercial real estate loans.  
Last, another important asset-backed class is the collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO). CDOs backed by corporate loans are referred to as the 
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), while CDOs backed by corporate bonds are 
referred to as the collateralized bond obligations (CBOs). Many of the recent and 
complex multiclass CDO securities that are based on existing nonagency MBS are 
often referred to as “the CDO squared.” Over the last few years, an important 
category to emerge is synthetic CDOs. This class of CDOs relies on credit 
derivatives which are typically the credit default swaps to transfer asset risks and 
cash flow payments between investors and issuers. 
Arguably, CDO securities represent some of the most unique and intricate 
securitization structures. The typical MBS derives its cash flow from a large pool 
of homogenous mortgage loans. In contrast, the most basic CDO comprises a small 
number of corporate debt obligations. The CDO collateral may include business 
loans, e.g., leveraged loans, revolving credit facilities, and term loans, corporate 
bonds, and even other asset-backed securities.  
In addition to the usual benefits of securitization outlined previously, CDO 
sponsors may be motivated by arbitrage incentives, aiming to profit from 
purchasing and securitizing corporate debt or other assets at favourable prices. 
Such a CDO security is typically referred to as an arbitrage CDO. If the originator 
securitizes its own assets (corporate loans, bonds, and other large receivables), 
then the CDO is known as a balance sheet CDO (see Bond Market Association, 
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2004). Most of the earlier CDOs were static, meaning that the underlying collateral 
was held over the life of the security. Concerned by the rise in corporate distress 
during the 2000s, some investors preferred a managed CDO structure, in which 
the issuer was more proactive in managing credit exposure. 
2.1.3.2 Key players in securitization  
Although bank loan securitization is simply referred to an originator selling 
their loans to security buyers, the securitization process includes five main 
participants in the process, that is, the issuer, the underwriter, the rating agency, 
the servicer, and the trustee. A representative securitization deal is showed in 
Figure 2-3, according to Cetorelli and Peristiani (2012). 
<Insert Figure 2-3 Here> 
In a typical securitization process represented in the exhibit, all of the 
securitized assets are pooled together and sold to an external legal entity, often 
referred to as a special-purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV buys the assets from the 
issuer with funds raised from the buyers of the security tranches issued by the 
SPV. The transfer of the assets to the SPV has the legal implication of obtaining a 
true sale opinion that removes issuer ownership and insulates asset-backed 
investors in the event of an issuer bankruptcy. The SPV often transfers the assets 
to another special-purpose entity, which typically a trust. This second entity 
actually issues the security shares backed by those assets under GAAP sale rules 
outlined in the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Statement No. 125.  
It is notable that the securitization methods used in CMBS are similar to 
those employed in MBS, but with the difference that the underlying collateral 
consists of commercial mortgages that derive their principal and interest cash 
flows from property assets. However, there are some distinct operational and 
structural features in CMBS. First, CMBS do not burden the investor with significant 
interest rate risks because commercial mortgages do not generally have a 
prepayment feature. Commercial real estate lending is dominated by banks and 
life insurance companies. Banks typically lend shorter-term financing; in 
comparison, life insurance firms, motivated by the long-dated structure of their 
liabilities, prefer to provide longer-term real estate loans. Although investment 
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banks are not typically large providers of commercial real estate credit, they are 
important in the credit intermediation process of real estate finance as lead 
underwriters in the syndicated loan market. However, in any securitization 
process, such complicated process requires the collaborations of other 
institutions. The following paragraphs introduce those financial institutions. 
A. The issuer 
The first step in the securitization process is issuance, the process of 
assembling the underlying collateral creating the asset-backed security. The 
issuer, which is also referred to as the sponsor or originator, is the beginning of 
the entire process. The issuer brings together the collateral assets for the asset-
backed security. Issuers are often the loan originators of the portfolio of 
securitized assets because structured finance offers a convenient outlet for 
financial firms like banks, finance companies, and mortgage companies to sell 
their assets. 
The issuer is closely linked with the lender, and sometimes these two 
functions overlap. The structure therefore depends on the type of collateral. 
Consumer auto finance lenders and large retail banks would be expected to 
dominate auto securitizations, while banks, nonbank mortgage lenders, and thrifts 
would compete more effectively in the private-label and MBS sectors.  
Another important innovation in structured finance is the synthetic CDO, in 
which the cash flows stem from a credit default swap (CDS) derivative contract 
written on a reference portfolio of corporate bonds, loans, and CDS indexes. The 
role of the issuing SPV in a synthetic CDO is very different. In contrast to the more 
traditional asset-backed structure, in which the SPV draws cash flows from a pool 
of underlying assets, in a synthetic CDO the entity sells protection on the 
reference portfolio. The SPV and its investors derive cash flows from the premiums 
paid by the CDS protection buyers (typically a commercial or investment bank), 
but are liable for all credit events. 
These more complex managed or synthetic CDO structures are more 
demanding on issuers. Managed CDOs require expertise in corporate debt markets 
in order to deal with credit exposures. Issuers of synthetic CDOs need to properly 
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price the CDS protection of the reference portfolio. Providing such additional 
responsibilities, the role of the issuer in CDOs is typically referred to as collateral 
manager. 
B. The servicer 
The servicer is responsible for processing payments and interacting with 
borrowers, implementing the collection measures prescribed by the pooling and 
servicing agreements and, if needed, liquidating the collateral in the event of 
default. In cases in which the issuer is also the lender of the underlying assets, 
there is a greater likelihood that the issuer would retain these servicing rights. In 
addition to managing payment flows, servicers are expected to provide 
administrative help to the trustee. 
Throughout the life-span of the structured securities, the servicer has 
several fiduciary responsibilities. First, the servicer is responsible to collect 
payments generated from the underlying assets. Second, the servicer has to 
transfer payments to accounts managed by the trustee. Last, the servicer should 
to manage deposits and investments of the revenue streams on behalf of the 
trustee. All functions above are referred to as primary or master servicer. In 
addition to the traditional servicer function, some ABS transactions may involve 
variations of these responsibilities. Sometimes the primary or master servicer 
responsibility may be transferred to a special or backup servicer if the loan or 
other asset in the security defaults. 
Such specialized role requires the servicer to retain all loan or security- 
specific information in order to collect and divert cash flows as well as track 
performance. These duties are therefore easier to perform for an entity 
associated with the lender of the asset- backed-security collateral. The close links 
between servicing, issuing, and lending suggest that these roles are often 
combined.  
C. The underwriter 
The underwriter is the entity that assumes responsibility for structuring the 
asset-backed security (for example, designing the composition of tranches, and 
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the size and type of credit and liquidity enhancements) based on the 
characteristics of the collateral and existing market conditions. The role of 
underwriters in structured finance is similar to that in other methods of securities 
issuance. Asset-backed- security underwriters fulfil traditional arranger roles of 
representing the issuer (here, the SPV or trust). The primary job of the 
underwriter is to analyze investor demand and design the structure of the security 
tranches accordingly.  
Underwriters are also in charge of the actual securities sales, typically 
acquiring the securities from the special-purpose entities and therefore bearing 
some of the initial risks associated with the transactions. Consistent with 
traditional, negotiated cash-offer practices, underwriters of asset-backed bonds 
would buy at a discount a specified amount of the offer before reselling to 
investors. In addition to marketing and selling these securities, underwriters 
provide liquidity support in the secondary trading market. Because asset-backed 
securities trade in over-the-counter markets, the willingness of underwriters to 
participate as broker-dealers by maintaining an inventory and making a market 
enhances the issuance process. Working closely with the rating agencies, the 
underwriter helps design the tranche structure of the SPV to accommodate 
investors’ risk preferences. 
Investment banks have traditionally fulfilled this role in bond and equity 
financing, arranging and selling the offering for issuing firms. Commercial banks 
bring an additional dimension to the underwriting process by enhancing 
certification stemming from joint-production informational advantages (gathered 
primarily from screening and monitoring borrowers) that can be shared with 
investors. These certification benefits also are present in asset-backed securities 
such as CMBS or collateralized loan obligations, where the bank has private 
information on the credit quality of the borrower. Essentially, a bank is an 
information specialist that can bridge the certification gap between issuers and 
investors. 
D. The rating agency 
Rating agencies provide certification services to investors who need to carry 
out a due-diligence investigation of the underlying assets and evaluate the 
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structure of the security. Ratings are necessary because many large institutional 
investors and regulated financial firms are required to hold mostly investment-
grade assets. Under the guidance of rating agencies, the expected cash flows from 
securitized assets are redirected by the underwriter into multiple tranches. The 
rating agencies played a critical role in the rapid growth of structured finance in 
the United States over the past two decades. 
Although asset-backed-security ratings of subordination structures vary 
across product types, most of them rely on a common blueprint. These securities 
are typically structured notes, meaning that the collateral cash flows are 
distributed into several separate tranches. Asset-backed tranches usually have 
different risk ratings and different maturities derived from the same pool of 
assets. The diversity in tranches makes them more appealing to a heterogeneous 
pool of investors with various risk preferences and investment objectives. The 
core components of each security include a number of senior tranches rated AAA, 
a class of subordinate tranches with a rating below AAA, and an unrated residual 
equity tranche. The senior tranches receive overcollateralization protection, 
meaning that credit losses would initially be absorbed by these subordinate 
classes. Sometimes junior (mezzanine) below- AAA classes that are subordinate to 
senior classes may also have a buffer of protection from the residual tranche or 
receive other credit enhancements. The remaining cash flows are distributed to 
the residual (equity) certificateholders. The residual investors receive any 
leftover cash flows, but have no claim on the collateral until all obligations to the 
more senior classes of securities are fully met. 
In addition to overcollateralization cushions, several other ancillary 
enhancements are put in place to further protect investors from default and other 
risks (such as liquidity risk, currency fluctuation risk, and interest rate risk). In 
contrast to overcollateralization buffers that are built into the security internally, 
these credit enhancements are provided for a fee from a third party. For example, 
it was a common practice in the early years of nonagency mortgage securitization 
to buy credit bond insurance (often referred to as a wrap) from independent 
insurance providers. Foreign exchange and interest rate swaps are sometimes used 
to improve the overall risk profile of the security, making it more attractive and 
29 
 
easier to price for investors. In addition, the SPV may lower risk exposures by 
obtaining a letter of credit or an asset-swap agreement.  
Although a bank in the traditional model of intermediation performs all 
these roles, its compensation is determined implicitly by the asset-liability 
contracts. With asset securitization, however, the same roles can be played by 
multiple entities, each compensated separately for its services. This proliferation 
of markets and entities involved in the securitization process is perhaps the main 
reason why the modern system of intermediation seems so hard to decipher. We 
hope this study contributes to enhanced understanding of its main dynamics. 
E. The trustee 
The transactions of the special-purpose entity that buys the loans are 
typically handled by a trustee. The trustee is an independent firm with the 
fiduciary responsibility for managing the SPV/trust and representing the rights of 
the investors. The primary role of the trustee is to disperse payments to investors 
and to oversee the security on behalf of the investors by collecting information 
from the servicer and issuer while validating the performance of the underlying 
collateral. 
The trustee guarantees that the transactions are administered in 
accordance with the related documentation and, in a cost-effective manner, takes 
care of the physical delivery of the securities, follows compliance and 
performance-related matters, and handles cash and information processing for 
the noteholders. Significantly, a trustee must work closely with the issuer and 
servicer to protect the welfare of the investors. In contrast to the roles of issuer 
or servicer, which can be combined, a trustee should be an independent entity 
whose sole purpose is to represent the investor and thus eliminate any conflict-
of- interest problems. Given the administrative nature of the trustee business, 
this service is best suited to large custodian banks with a cost-effective back-
office infrastructure to process the information.  
Based on the arguments above, banks are the predominant force in the 
securitization market. For example, Cetorelli and Peristiani (2012) highlight the 
fact that trustee business in securitization is dominated by a small group of 
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custodian banks. Banks’ market share remained well over 90% before 2008. These 
trustee banks are best suited to processing information and acting on behalf of 
investors. Also, banks have issued about half of the nonagency asset-backed 
securities.  
2.1.3.3 Credit enhancements 
 It is notable that in the securitization process at a number of stages, the 
provision of credit enhancements is of crucial importance, especially to attract 
institutional investors (Pagano and Volpin, 2010). Credit enhancements are 
protection, in the form of financial support, to cover losses on securitized assets 
in adverse conditions (Standard and Poor’s, 2008). Thus, credit enhancements 
enable banks to convert pools of even poorly rated loans or mortgages into highly 
rated securities. Some enhancements, such as standby letters of credit, are very 
much in the spirit of traditional banking and are thus far from the world of shadow 
banking. The level of credit enhancements necessary to achieve a given rating is 
determined by a fairly mechanical procedure that reflects a rater’s estimated loss 
function on the underlying collateral in the securitization (Ashcraft and 
Schuermann 2008). If estimated losses are high, then more enhancements are 
called for to achieve a given rating. 
Credit enhancements might also be used to solve part of the asymmetric 
information problems that may plague the securitization process. If banks are 
better informed than outside investors about the quality of the assets they are 
securitizing, as they almost certainly are, banks that are securitizing higher-
quality assets may use enhancements as a signal of their quality. In other words, 
by their willingness to keep “skin in the game” to retain some risk, banks can 
signal their faith in the quality of their assets.  
Such signalling implies a positive relationship between the level of 
enhancements and the performance of securitized assets, just the opposite of the 
buffer explanation. Obviously, enhancements could, and probably do, serve both 
as a buffer against observable risk and a signal against unobservable (to outsiders) 
quality. However, since the buffer role is almost self-evidently true, we are 
interested in whether we can detect any evidence for the role of securitization 
enhancements as a signal. Others have also considered the hypothesis that 
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enhancements might play a signalling role. Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) 
observe that asymmetric information about prepayment risk in the government-
sponsored-enterprise (GSE) mortgage-backed-security market should motivate the 
use of signalling devices. Albertazzi et al. (2011) note the potential centrality of 
asymmetric information to the securitization process and conjecture that a 
securitizing sponsor can keep a junior (equity) tranche “as a signalling” device of 
its (unobservable) quality or as an expression of a commitment to continue 
monitoring. James (2010) comments that if asset-backed securities include a 
moral hazard (or “lemons”) discount due to asymmetric information, issuers have 
an incentive to retain some risk “as a way of demonstrating higher underwriting 
standards.”  
A variant of the question we are asking about credit enhancements showed 
up in earlier literature on the role of collateral in traditional (on-the-books) bank 
lending. A theoretical literature in the 1980s predicted that in the context of 
asymmetric information, safer borrowers were more likely to pledge collateral to 
distinguish themselves from riskier ones (Besanko and Thakor 1987; Chan and 
Kanatas 1985). However, an empirical study by Berger and Udell (1990) found 
strong evidence against the signalling hypothesis: that is, collateral was associated 
with riskier borrowers and loans. In other words, when it comes to loans on the 
books, collateral seems to serve more as a buffer against observable risk than as 
a signal of unobservable quality. 
While credit enhancements can take many forms, this research refers to 
the Schedule HC-S from FR-Y-9C report. Schedule HC-S is a sector of FR-Y-9C form 
reporting activities of “Servicing, Securitization, and Asset Sale Activities”. Three 
types of credit enhancements are provided. 
The first type of credit enhancement is credit-enhancing, interest-only 
strips. Schedule HC-S instructions define these strips as: an on-balance-sheet asset 
that, in form or in substance, a) represents the contractual right to receive some 
or all of the interests due on the transferred assets; and b) exposes the bank to 
credit risk that exceeds its pro-rata share claim on the underlying assets whether 
through subordination provisions or other credit-enhancing techniques.  
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The HC-S instructions also note that the field for credit-enhancing, interest-
only strips can include excess spread accounts. Excess spread is the monthly 
revenue remaining on a securitization after all payments to investors, servicing 
fees, and charge-offs. As such, excess spread—a measure of how profitable the 
securitization is—provides assurance to investors in the deal that they will be paid 
as promised. Excess spread accounts are the first line of defence against losses to 
investors, as the accounts must be exhausted before even the most subordinated 
investors incur losses.  
The second class of credit enhancements is subordinated securities and 
other residual interest, which is a standard-form credit enhancement. By holding 
a subordinated or junior claim, the bank that securitized the assets is in the 
position of being a first- loss bearer, thereby providing protection to more senior 
claimants. In that sense, subordination serves basically as a buffer or collateral. 
However, in the asymmetric information context, holding a subordinate claim 
gives the bank the stake that can motivate it to screen the loans carefully before 
it securitizes them and to continue monitoring the loans after it securitizes them. 
The bank’s willingness to keep some risk may serve as a signal that it has screened 
loans adequately and plans to monitor diligently. 
The last form of credit enhancements is standby letters of credit, which 
obligates the bank to provide funding to a securitization structure to ensure that 
investors receive timely payment on the issued securities (e.g., by smoothing 
timing differences in the receipt of interest and principal payments) or to ensure 
that investors receive payment in the event of market disruptions. The facility is 
counted as an enhancement if and only if advances through the facility are 
subordinate to other claims on the cash flow from the securitized assets. Although 
not technically classified as an enhancement, a fourth item on Schedule HC-S that 
we consider is unused commitments to provide liquidity. Unused commitments 
represent the undrawn balance on previous commitments.  
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2.1.4 The impact of securitization 
A comprehensive literature review on the impact of securitization is 
provided in this section, including the pros and cons, determinants and restrictions 
of securitization. 
2.1.4.1 The advantage of securitization 
The reason why securitization has enjoyed a dramatic growth before the 
2007-09 financial crisis is due to the following benefits. First, securitization 
improves bank’s liquidity by transforming the illiquid loans into marketable 
securities. Traditionally, banks tend to hold their loan portfolios until maturity. 
Since liquid funds and loans are two core components of bank assets, the increase 
in loan proportions indicates a decrease in the liquid funds holdings. In this case, 
the insufficient liquidity may prevent banks from pursuing other profitable 
investment opportunities or finance new credit based on their own willingness. 
Although loan sale can be considered as an alternative option for banks requiring 
additional liquidity, loan portfolios are identified as too cumbersome and 
expensive to sell by traditional literature (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1998; Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2002). With securitization, banks are 
able to liquidate loans to finance their liquidity need by removing some of the 
illiquid assets off their balance sheets (Pennacchi, 1988; Jiangli et al., 2007; 
Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008; Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Martin-Oliver and 
Saurina, 2007), making themselves less dependent on the traditional sources of 
funds (e.g., deposits).  
Second, by removing some of the risky assets off the balance sheet, a 
securitized bank is able to transfer the credit risk associated with the securitized 
assets to outside security investors. Under the risk transfer hypothesis, banks can 
use securitization to shed undesirable risks and rebalance their credit portfolios 
and achieve a different combination of risk and return. Moreover, the risk transfer 
of securitization may also lower the capital requirements. Banks are required to 
maintain a certain proportion of capital to absorb potential risk they are facing 
due to the regulations. Higher bank risk thus is associated with higher regulatory 
capital requirements, which in turn restricts banks’ abilities to optimize their 
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investment portfolios by holding a higher amount of liquidity. With securitization, 
banks are able to adjust their capital level by securitizing some risky assets.  
Third, securitization could positively impact on bank’s balance sheet. On 
one hand, the liability book or the funding comes from borrowing in most banks 
and financial sectors, which often at a high cost. Securitization allows these 
institutions to create a self-funded asset book, which in turn lower the funding 
costs. On the other hand, securitization could help banks to lock in profits on the 
balance sheet. Although holding the loans until maturity generates streams of 
interest income, the total profits are not yet known, and also, remain uncertain 
due to the possibility of borrowers’ default. However, securitization allows issuers 
to record an earning bounce as soon as the loans have been securitized without 
any real additional burden to the banks. 
2.1.4.2 The disadvantage of securitization 
Although securitization could provide originators with many benefits, the 
costs of securitization means that not all banks are active securitizers, based on 
the following arguments. On the one hand, securitizations involve substantial one-
off costs, including consultancy and organizational costs related to the bundling 
and tranching of loan portfolios, payments to the agencies responsible for 
assigning a rating to the different tranches, underwriting fees, and legal expenses. 
According to Davidson et al. (2003), the upfront costs of a typical securitization 
can easily exceed $1 million U.S. dollars, mainly from legal fees and from those 
responsible for structuring and arranging the operation. Thus, the fixed-costs 
hypothesis suggests small banks are not likely to be active securitizers, because 
the fixed costs of setting up securitization transactions could be a heavy burden 
for those banks. 
On the other hand, since banks have private information on the quality of 
their loan portfolios, this information equality leads to a lemon discount that is 
required by the outside security investors (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). Under 
this lemon discount hypothesis, the securitized assets are likely to be underpriced 
during the transactions. Hence, banks that pay a lower lemon discount are more 
likely to securitize their loans. Previous studies show that the lemon discount is 
likely to be lower if: (i) the bank can credibly certify the quality of the assets it is 
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selling (Focarelli et al., 2008); (ii) private information is less relevant because the 
loans are less opaque or more standardized; (iii) the loss given default is lower, 
for example because the loans are collateralized.  
According to this hypothesis, banks with higher reputations built up in 
previous years had a lower level of charge-offs and problem loans are more likely 
to be active securitizers. Since mortgage loans, credit card receivables, and 
automobile loans enjoy a higher degree of standardization in practice, those loans 
are less subject to asymmetric information. Thus, banks with larger proportions 
of such loans are more likely to be active securitizers. Listed banks might also pay 
a lower lemon discount and are more likely to securitize their assets, due to the 
fact that, their balance sheets are typically under close scrutiny by external 
analysts. 
Most importantly, the 2007-09 financial crisis highlights that securitization 
could encourage securitizers to take on more risk and lower the credit standards. 
The idea of securitization to reduce bank risk is to share the potential credit risk 
with a large number of security investors. Since securitizers realize that the 
potential losses are able to be diversified, they become more aggressive to grant 
loans without sufficient screening and monitoring efforts. Loan quality is in turn 
decreased.  
2.1.5 Loan sales vs. securitization 
Both loan sales and securitization are active and popular off-balance-sheet 
activities in practice. It would be useful and informative to distinguish between 
securitization and loan sales. First, although loan sales also enjoy rapid growth 
which is similar to securitization, this off-balance-sheet practice is actually a 
traditional banking activity (see Gorton and Haubrich, 1990). Loan sale involves 
the sale of a participation, or the totality of an originated loan, and the sale is 
usually affected without recourse. In those transactions, the originating bank 
serves as a pure broker. However, securitization involves qualitative asset 
transformation. The pooling process allows the originating bank to provide 
investors with diversification benefits. The asset pools, in practice, are often 
enhanced with augmented collaterals or other recourses. The credit 
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enhancement, provided by the originating bank or a third party, is usually pivotal 
in obtaining an investment-grade rating for the new claim. Therefore, 
securitization may enhance originator’s liquidity, reduces credit risk, and 
restructures the cash flows. Loan sales can merely separate funding from 
originator and the asset originated is to all intents and purposes identical to the 
asset purchased by the investor. Moreover, the sold loans are no more tradeable 
than the originated loan. 
2.2 Empirical issues on securitization 
2.2.1 Sample selection issue 
An important issue that should be considered when estimating the effect of 
securitization is the choice to securitize may be endogenous. Banks determine 
whether and when they should access the securitization realm, which will then 
impact the available samples in the real world, that is, those non-securitized 
banks are the “missing samples” in the dataset of securitized banks. Although it 
is possible to add those “missing samples” simply into the dataset, the unobserved 
influences of this decision factor still exist (Heckman, 1979). 
There are two common approaches in the previous literature to address the 
endogeneity problem of the decision to securitize, the instrument variables (IV) 
and Heckman selection estimators. The former method requires the existence of 
at least one instrumental variable that determines the treatment and is unrelated 
to unobserved heterogeneity, but this choice of instrument might create new 
potential issues. Therefore, the Heckman self-selection model will be a better 
choice as it is more robust than the instrument variables method (Casu et al., 
2013). However, few of the prior literatures consider this selection bias, and none 
of them employed Heckman self-selection model to the author’s best knowledge. 
Among the few studies which considered sample selection issue is Casu et 
al. (2013), who in their working paper, use a propensity score matching approach 
to analyze whether individual banks did improve their performance through 
securitization. This methodology is known as a difference-in-difference matching 
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strategy, which contains a two-step difference method. The first difference 
removes the unobserved heterogeneity and restoring conditional independence 
and the second difference produces the impact estimate. 
2.2.2 Heckman self-selection model 
As discussed before, Heckman Self-Selection Model could be a cure for the 
self-selection bias, which had been employed already in the economic field to 
investigate the wage issue in previous literature. However, it is not that popular 
in the financial realm, so a short review and explanation of this methodology 
should be necessary.  
Theoretically, this methodology contains two equations, where, 𝒊 =
 𝟏, … , 𝑰: 
𝒀𝟏𝒊 = 𝑿𝟏𝒊𝜷𝟏 + 𝑼𝟏𝒊                                                                             (2.1) 
𝒀𝟐𝒊 = 𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐 + 𝑼𝟐𝒊                                                                             (2.2) 
In this couple-equation, 𝑿𝒋𝒊  is a 𝟏 × 𝑲𝒋  vector of exogenous regressors, 
while 𝜷𝒋 is a 𝑲𝒋 × 𝟏 vector of parameters. In the general case, suppose that data 
are available on 𝒀𝟏𝒊 if 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎, while if 𝒀𝟐𝒊 < 𝟎, there are no observations on 𝒀𝟏𝒊. 
To be simplified, Equation (2.1) is the equation or regression of interest, and 
Euqation (2.2) is the selection equation or selection rule which impacts on 
Equation (2.1) and causes the bias. Therefore, considering the selection bias, the 
expected regression model is now as follows: 
𝑬(𝑼𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆 𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒖𝒍𝒆) = 𝑬(𝑼𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎) =
𝑬(𝑼𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐)                                                                             (2.3) 
In the case of independence between 𝑼𝟏𝒊 and 𝑼𝟐𝒊, so that the data on 𝒀𝟏𝒊 
are missing randomly, the conditional mean of 𝑼𝟏𝒊  is zero, which means the 
subsample regression function is then: 
𝑬(𝒀𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎) = 𝑿𝟏𝒊𝜷𝟏 + 𝑬(𝑼𝟏𝒊| 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐)                            (2.4) 
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As a result, the selected sample regression function depends on 𝑿𝟏𝒊 and 
𝑿𝟐𝒊, which means those unobserved samples should have impact on the equation 
of interest. 
To address this selection bias issue, a Heckman Self-Selection methodology 
is introduced (Heckman, 1979), which based on several assumptions (Wooldridge, 
2002): 
Assumption 1: (𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝒀𝒊 ) are always observed, but 𝒀𝟏𝒊 is only observed  when 
𝒀𝟐𝒊 = 𝟏. 
Assumption 2 (𝑼𝟏𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ) is dependent of 𝑿𝟏𝒊 with zero mean. 
Assumption 3 𝑼𝟐𝒊~𝑵(𝟎, 𝟏). 
Assumption 4 𝑬(𝑼𝟏𝒊|𝑼𝟐𝒊) = 𝝂𝟐𝑼𝟐𝒊.  
Then from the Equation (2.4), using the well-known results from Johnson 
(1972): 
𝑬(𝑼𝟏𝒊|𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) =
𝝈𝟏𝟐
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝟏/𝟐 𝝀𝒊                                                            (2.5) 
𝑬(𝑼𝟐𝒊|𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) =
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝟏/𝟐 𝝀𝒊                                                            (2.6) 
where, 
𝝀𝒊 =
𝝓(𝒁𝒊)
𝟏−𝚽(𝒁𝒊)
=
𝝓(𝒁𝒊)
𝚽(−𝒁𝒊)
                                                                           (2.7) 
𝒁𝒊 = −
𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝟏/𝟐                                                                                       (2.8) 
𝝀𝒊  is the inverse of Mill's ratio, while 𝝓  and 𝚽  are the density and 
distribution function for a standard normal variable, respectively. 
Then the full statistical model for normal population disturbances can now 
be developed, as the conditional regression function for selected samples may be 
written as: 
𝑬(𝒀𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎) = 𝑿𝟏𝒊𝜷𝟏 +
𝝈𝟏𝟐
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝟏/𝟐 𝝀𝒊                                                   (2.9) 
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𝑬(𝒀𝟐𝒊|𝑿𝟐𝒊, 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎) = 𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐 +
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝝈𝟐𝟐
𝟏/𝟐 𝝀𝒊                                                 (2.10) 
Therefore, 
𝒀𝟏𝒊 = 𝑬(𝒀𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎) + 𝑽𝟏𝒊                                                         (2.11) 
𝒀𝟐𝒊 = 𝑬(𝒀𝟐𝒊|𝑿𝟐𝒊, 𝒀𝟐𝒊 ≥ 𝟎) + 𝑽𝟐𝒊                                                         (2.12) 
where, 
𝑬(𝑽𝟏𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝝀𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) = 𝟎                                                     (2.13) 
𝑬(𝑽𝟐𝒊|𝑿𝟐𝒊, 𝝀𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) = 𝟎                                                     (2.14) 
𝑬(𝑽𝒋𝒊𝑽𝒋′𝒊′|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝑿𝟐𝒊, 𝝀𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) = 𝟎                                          (2.15) 
Further, for 𝒊 ≠ 𝒊′, 
𝑬(𝑽𝟏𝒊
𝟐 |𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝝀𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) = 𝝈𝟏𝟏[(𝟏 − 𝝆
𝟐) + 𝝆𝟐(𝟏 + 𝒁𝒊𝝀𝒊 − 𝝀𝒊
𝟐)]       (2.16) 
𝑬(𝑽𝟏𝒊𝑽𝟐𝒊|𝑿𝟏𝒊, 𝑿𝟐𝒊, 𝝀𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) = 𝝈𝟏𝟐(𝟏 + 𝒁𝒊𝝀𝒊 − 𝝀𝒊
𝟐)                   (2.17) 
𝑬(𝑽𝟐𝒊
𝟐 |𝑿𝟐𝒊, 𝝀𝒊, 𝑼𝟐𝒊 ≥ −𝑿𝟐𝒊𝜷𝟐) = 𝝈𝟐𝟐(𝟏 + 𝒁𝒊𝝀𝒊 − 𝝀𝒊
𝟐)                             (2.18) 
where, 
𝝆𝟐 =
𝝈𝟏𝟐
𝟐
𝝈𝟏𝟏𝝈𝟐𝟐
                                                                                      (2.19) 
𝟎 ≤ 𝟏 + 𝒁𝒊𝝀𝒊 − 𝝀𝒊
𝟐 ≤ 𝟏                                                                      (2.20) 
All the results above indicate that, if one knew 𝒁𝒊 hence the inverse Mill's 
ratio, then 𝝀𝒊  could be added as a regressor in Equation 2.11, which could 
overcome the selection bias. In practice, it is notable that there should exist 
variables in 𝑿𝟐𝒊 but not in 𝑿𝟏𝒊, which is also important for this methodology. 
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2.2.3 Heckman self-selection model applied in panel data 
Unfortunately, the classic Heckman methodology fails when applied in 
panel data case, as it cannot address the individual effects in the samples 
(Kyriazidou, 1997). Therefore, several researchers address this failure 
theoretically. Wooldridge (1995) proposed the use of first estimator to address 
the sample selection bias in panel data, which then generates the Mundlak-
Chamberlain approach that will be used in this paper. This methodology relies on 
a full parameterization of the sample selection mechanism, and requires 
specifying the functional form of the conditional mean of the individual effects in 
the equation of interest. However, this methodology does not impose 
distributional assumptions about the error terms and the individual effects in the 
equation of interest. Another group of researches mainly followed Kyriazidou 
(1997), which is more similar to difference-in-difference method. The idea of this 
estimator is to match observations within individuals that have the same selection 
effect in two periods, and to difference out both the individual heterogeneity 
term, and the selection term. Another estimator proposed by Rochina-Barrachina 
(1999) is similar to Kyriazidou, but with distributional assumptions to derive an 
explicit expression for the selectivity correction term. The following paragraphs 
will briefly review these methodologies. 
2.2.3.1 Methodolgy from Kyriazidou 
Kyriazidou (1997)’s methodology follows the familiar two-step approach of 
Heckman. In the first step, the unknown coefficients of the selection equation are 
consistently estimated, while in the second step, these estimates are used to 
estimate the equation of interest by a weighted least squares regression. 
Moreover, the fixed effect from panel data will be eliminated by taking time 
differences on the observed selected variables, and the weights come from the 
first step. 
Specifically, Kyriazidou considers the following model similar to Heckman, 
where 𝒊 =  𝟏, … , 𝑰;  𝒕 =  𝟏, 𝟐: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝒅𝒊𝒕 ∙ 𝒚𝒊𝒕
∗ = 𝒅𝒊𝒕 ∙ (𝒙𝒊𝒕
∗ 𝜷+ 𝜶𝒊
∗ + 𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ ) = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕                     (2.21) 
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And, 
𝒅𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏{ 𝒛𝒊𝒕𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊 − 𝜹𝒊𝒕 ≥ 𝟎}                                                             (2.22) 
Here, 𝜷 ∈ 𝕽𝒌  and 𝜸 ∈ 𝕽𝒒  are unknown parameter vectors aiming to 
estimate, 𝒙𝒊𝒕
∗  and 𝒛𝒊𝒕  are vectors of explanatory variables, 𝜶𝒊
∗  and 𝜼𝒊  are 
unobserved time-invariant individual-specific effects, 𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗  and 𝜹𝒊𝒕 are unobserved 
disturbances, while 𝒚𝒊𝒕
∗ ∈ 𝕽 is a latent variable whose observability depends on 
the outcome of the indicator variable 𝒅𝒊𝒕 ∈ {𝟎, 𝟏}. In particular, it is assumed that, 
while (𝒅𝒊𝒕, 𝒛𝒊𝒕) is always observed, (𝒚𝒊𝒕
∗ , 𝒙𝒊𝒕
∗ ) is observed only if 𝒅𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏. Therefore, 
the problem is to estimate 𝜷  and 𝜸  from a sample consisting of quadruples 
(𝒅𝒊𝒕, 𝒛𝒊𝒕, 𝒚𝒊𝒕, 𝒙𝒊𝒕) . The vector of explanatory variables is denoted by 𝝇𝒊 ≡
(𝒛𝒊𝟏, 𝒛𝒊𝟐, 𝒙𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝒙𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝜶𝒊
∗, 𝜼𝒊). 
In this two-period twin-equation, when 𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏, the time differences 
can be eliminated by a “fixed-effects” approach, using a first-differenced 
subsample: 
𝑬(𝒚𝒊𝟏 − 𝒚𝒊𝟐|𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏, 𝝇𝒊) = (𝒙𝒊𝟏
∗ − 𝒙𝒊𝟐
∗ )𝜷 + 𝑬(𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ − 𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ |𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝒅𝒊𝟐 =
𝟏, 𝝇𝒊)      (2.23) 
In general, there is no reason to expect 𝑬(𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ |𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏, 𝝇𝒊) = 𝟎 , 
which means the sample selection effect 𝝀𝒊𝒕, similar in Heckman (1997), also 
depends on the unknown joint conditional distribution of (𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟏, 𝜹𝒊𝟐). Therefore, 
this effect may differ across individuals, as well as over time for the same 
individuals, based on an unknown function 𝚲:  
𝝀𝒊𝒕 ≡ 𝑬(𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ |𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏, 𝝇𝒊) = 𝑬(𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ |𝜹𝒊𝟏 ≤ 𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝜹𝒊𝟐 ≤ 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝝇𝒊) =
𝚲(𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊; 𝑭𝒊𝒕(𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟏, 𝜹𝒊𝟐|𝝇𝒊)) = 𝚲(𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝝇𝒊))          (2.24) 
Then, the main equation of interest can be re-wrote as a “partially linear 
regression” as below, where 𝝂𝒊𝒕 ≡ 𝒖𝒊𝒕 − 𝝀𝒊𝒕  is a new error term, which by 
construction satisfies:𝑬(𝝂𝒊𝒕|𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝟏, 𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏, 𝝇𝒊) = 𝟎: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝝀𝒊𝒕 + 𝝂𝒊𝒕                                                               (2.25) 
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Then the idea of this methodology is to “difference out” the nuisance term 
𝜶𝒊𝒕 and 𝝀𝒊𝒕 in this equation. 
An advantage of the “difference out” methodology comes from much 
weaker distributional assumptions, since it is not required (𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝒕) to be i.i.d. 
across individuals not that it be independent of the individual-specific vector 𝝇𝒊. 
In other word, this methodology allows the functional form of the unknown 
function 𝚲 to vary across individuals, and it is also possible to allow for serial 
correlation in the errors. 
From this point, under a conditional exchange ability assumption, 
𝑭(𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟏, 𝜹𝒊𝟐|𝝇𝒊) = 𝑭(𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟐, 𝜹𝒊𝟏|𝝇𝒊), it is easy to see that for an individual 
𝒊 that has 𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 = 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸, which means, 
𝝀𝒊𝟏 = 𝑬(𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ |𝜹𝒊𝟏 ≤ 𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝜹𝒊𝟐 ≤ 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝝇𝒊) = 𝑬(𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ |𝜹𝒊𝟐 ≤ 𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 +
𝜼𝒊, 𝜹𝒊𝟏 ≤ 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸 + 𝜼𝒊, 𝝇𝒊) = 𝝀𝒊𝟐                                                                        (2.26) 
The above discussion presents a possibility of estimating 𝜷 by OLS from a 
subsample that consists of those observations that have 𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 = 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸 and 𝒅𝒊𝟏 =
𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏. Defining 𝚿𝒊 ≡ 𝟏{𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 = 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸} and 𝚽𝒊 ≡ {𝒅𝒊𝟏 = 𝒅𝒊𝟐 = 𝟏} ≡ 𝒅𝒊𝟏𝒅𝒊𝟐  , with ∆ 
denoting first differences, the estimator form is as follows: 
𝜷𝒏
′ = [∑ ∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝒙𝒊𝚿𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ]
−𝟏[∑ ∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝒚𝒊𝚿𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 ]                                     (2.27) 
However, this estimation scheme cannot be implemented directly in 
practice as 𝜸  is unknown. Therefore, Kyriazidou (1997) proposes a two-step 
estimation procedure. In the first step, 𝜸 will be estimated consistently based on 
the selection equation alone. In the second step, the estimate 𝜸𝒏
′   will be used to 
estimate 𝜷, relying on the pairs of observations for which 𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸𝒏
′   and 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸𝒏
′ are 
“close”. Specifically, in this method, 𝜷 is proposed as: 
𝜷𝒏
′ = [∑ 𝚿𝒊𝒏
′ 𝚫𝐱𝒊
′𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 𝚫𝒙𝒊𝚽𝒊]
−𝟏[∑ 𝚿𝒊𝒏
′ 𝚫𝐱𝒊
′𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 𝚫𝒚𝒊𝚽𝒊]                                (2.28) 
where 𝚿𝒊𝒏
′  is a weight that declines to zero as the magnitude of the 
difference |𝒛𝒊𝟏𝜸 = 𝒛𝒊𝟐𝜸| increases. Here they choose “kernel” weights of the form 
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of 𝚿𝒊𝒏
′ ≡
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
∆𝒛𝒊𝜸𝒏
′
𝒉𝒏
), and 𝑲 is a “kernel density” function, while 𝒉 is a sequence 
of “bandwidths” which tends to zero as 𝒏 → ∞ . Thus, for a fixed nonzero 
magnitude of difference, the weight shrinks as the sample size increases, while 
for a fixed 𝒏, a larger magnitude corresponds to a smaller weight. 
This result could be extended to a longer panel easily, as when 𝑻 ≥ 𝟐, 
𝜷𝒏
′ = [∑
𝟏
𝑻𝒊−𝟏
∑ 𝚿𝒊𝒏
′
𝒔<𝒕
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 (𝒙𝒊𝒕 − 𝒙𝒊𝒔)
′(𝒙𝒊𝒕 − 𝒙𝒊𝒔)𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒅𝒊𝒔]
−𝟏
×
[∑
𝟏
𝑻𝒊−𝟏
∑ 𝚿𝒊𝒏
′
𝒔<𝒕
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 (𝒙𝒊𝒕 − 𝒙𝒊𝒔)
′(𝒚𝒊𝒕 − 𝒙𝒊𝒔)𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒅𝒊𝒔]                                             (2.29) 
where, 
𝚿𝒊𝒏
′ ≡
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
(𝒛𝒊𝒕−𝒛𝒊𝒔)𝜸𝒏
′
𝒉𝒏
)                                                                      (2.30) 
Then, define scalar index 𝒁𝒊 ≡ ∆𝒛𝒊𝜸 and its estimated counterpart 𝒁𝒊
′ ≡
∆𝒛𝒊𝜸𝒏
′ , along with the following quantities: 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
{
𝑺𝒙𝒙 ≡
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
𝒁𝒊
𝒉𝒏
) ∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝒙𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝑺𝒙𝒙
′ ≡
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
𝒁𝒊
′
𝒉𝒏
) ∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝒙𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
{
𝑺𝒙𝒗 ≡
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
𝒁𝒊
𝒉𝒏
)∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝒗𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝑺𝒙𝒗
′ ≡
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
𝒁𝒊
′
𝒉𝒏
)∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝒗𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
{
𝑺𝒙𝝀 ≡
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
𝒁𝒊
𝒉𝒏
)∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝝀𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝑺𝒙𝝀
′ ≡
𝟏
𝒏
∑
𝟏
𝒉𝒏
𝑲(
𝒁𝒊
′
𝒉𝒏
)∆𝒙𝒊
′∆𝝀𝒊𝚽𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
                                                     (2.31) 
The first difference of estimator could be written as: 
{
?̃?𝒏 − 𝜷 = 𝑺𝒙𝒙
−𝟏(𝑺𝒙𝒗 + 𝑺𝒙𝝀)
𝜷𝒏
′ − 𝜷 = 𝑺𝒙𝒙
′−𝟏(𝑺𝒙𝒗
′ + 𝑺𝒙𝝀
′ )
                                                               (2.32) 
where ?̃?𝒏 is the denotian of the construction of the kernel weights of 𝜸. 
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From this point, under the following assumptions, the real estimator which 
overcoming the sample selection bias and individual effect of panel data can be 
presented. 
The assumptions are: 
Assumption 1: (𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟏, 𝜹𝒊𝟐) and (𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟐, 𝜹𝒊𝟏) are identically distributed 
conditional on 𝝇𝒊, which is 𝑭(𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟏, 𝜹𝒊𝟐|𝝇𝒊) = 𝑭(𝒖𝒊𝟐
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝟏
∗ , 𝜹𝒊𝟐, 𝜹𝒊𝟏|𝝇𝒊). 
Assumption 2: An i.i.d sample, {(𝒙𝒊𝒕
∗ , 𝒖𝒊𝒕
∗ , 𝜶𝒊
∗, 𝒛𝒊𝒕, 𝜹𝒊𝒕, 𝜼𝒊); 𝐭 = 𝟏, 𝟐}𝒊=𝟏
𝒏  is drawn from 
the population. That is, for each i=1, …, n, and each t=1, 2, we observe 
(𝒅𝒊𝒕, 𝒛𝒊𝒕, 𝒚𝒊𝒕, 𝒙𝒊𝒕). 
Assumption 3: 𝑬(𝚫𝒙′𝚫𝐱𝚽|𝒁 = 𝟎) is finite and non-sigular. 
Assumption 4: The marginal distribution of the index function 𝒁𝒊 ≡ ∆𝒛𝒊𝜸 is 
absolutely continuous, with density function 𝒇𝒛(𝟎) > 𝟎 . In addition, 𝒇𝒛  is 
almost everywhere r times continuously differentiable and has bounded 
derivatives. 
Assumption 5: The unknown function satisfies: 𝚲(𝒔𝒕, 𝒔𝝉, 𝝇) − 𝚲(𝒔𝝉, 𝒔𝒕, 𝝇) = ?̃?(𝒔𝒕 −
𝒔𝝉) for t, 𝝉=1, 2, where ?̃? is a function of (𝒔𝒕, 𝒔𝝉, 𝝇). 
Assumption 6.a: 𝒙𝒕
∗ and 𝒖𝒕
∗ have bounded 4+2m moments conditional on Z, for 
any 0<m<1; 
Assumption 6.b: 𝑬(𝚫𝒙′𝚫𝐱𝚽|𝒁)  and 𝑬(𝚫𝒙′𝚫𝐱𝚫𝝂𝟐𝚽|𝒁)  are continuously at Z=0 
and do not vanish; 
Assumption 6.c: 𝑬(𝚫𝒙′?̃?𝚽|𝒁)  is almost everywhere r times continousle 
differentiable as a function of Z, and has bounded derivatives. 
Assumption 7: 𝒉𝒏 → ∞ and 𝒏𝒉𝒏 → ∞ as 𝒏 → ∞. 
The estimated parameter of interest, where 𝜷′ is the weighted estimated 
parameter of equation of interest: 
𝜷′′ ≡
𝜷𝒏
′ −𝒏−(𝟏−𝜹)(𝒓+𝟏)/(𝟐(𝒓+𝟏)+𝟏)𝜷𝒏,𝜹
′
𝟏−𝒏−(𝟏−𝜹)(𝒓+𝟏)/(𝟐(𝒓+𝟏)+𝟏)
                                                           (2.33) 
However, although this methodology is direct, it provides only a calculation 
methodology of the real estimator that interested, which means it help little in 
empirical field. Specifically, as empirical researches encounter missing variables 
inevitably, and the empirical models cannot be perfect as in theory, it is 
unreasonable just using dataset in hand to calculate the estimator directly. 
Therefore, other methodology should be employed. 
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2.2.3.2 Mundlak-Chamberlain Approach 
In practice, previous methodologies are divided mainly in two branches to 
address selection bias and calculate inverse Mill’s ratio, the traditional random 
effects probit/logit model and the fixed effects logit model. However, the former 
one requires strict exogeneity and zero correlation between the explanatory 
variables and 𝒖𝒊, while it is impossible to obtain consistant estimates of 𝒖𝒊 in the 
latter one. Therefore, a middle way to address this issue named Mundlak-
Chamberlain Approach is more useful and convenient. 
To be distinguished from the equations before, we can rewrite the equation 
of interest as: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕
∗ = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝜺𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                                         (2.34) 
where 𝒄𝒊 stands for an explicit function of the unobserved sample selection 
bias: 
𝒄𝒊 = 𝝋 + ?̅?𝒊𝝁 + 𝝊𝒊                                                                            (2.35) 
In this equation, ?̅?𝒊  is an average of 𝒙𝒊𝒕 over time for individual 𝒊, while 𝝊𝒊 
is assumed uncorrelated with ?̅?𝒊. 
Under the assumption of 𝒗𝒂𝒓(𝝊𝒊) = 𝝈𝝊
𝟐  is constant and 𝒆𝒊 is normally 
distributed, this model could then result in Chamberlain’s random effects probit 
model, that is: 
𝐏𝐫(𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏|𝒙𝒊𝒕, 𝒄𝒊) = 𝐏𝐫(𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝟏|𝒙𝒊𝒕, ?̅?𝒊, 𝝊𝒊) = 𝚽(𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷 +𝝋 + ?̅?𝒊𝝁 + 𝝊𝒊)   (2.36) 
After adding the mean variables, this probit model then becomes a 
traditional random effects probit model: 
𝑳𝒊(𝒚𝒊𝟏, ⋯ , 𝒚𝒊𝑻|𝒙𝒊𝟏, ⋯ , 𝒙𝒊𝑻; 𝜷, 𝝈𝝊
𝟐) = ∫∏ [𝚽(𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷+ 𝝋+ ?̅?𝒊𝝁 + 𝝊)]
𝒚𝒊𝒕 × [𝟏 −𝑻𝒕=𝟏
𝚽(𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷+ 𝝋 + 𝒙𝒊𝝁 + 𝝊)]
(𝟏−𝒚𝒊𝒕) (𝟏/𝝈𝝊)𝝓(𝝊/𝝈𝝊)𝒅𝝊                                   (2.37) 
Simply speaking, adding ?̅?𝒊 as control variables allows for some correlation 
between the random effect and the regressors. In sample selection issue when 
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employing in Heckman model, we should estimate 𝑻 different selection probits 
and compute 𝑻  different inverse Mill’s ratios. Then estimate the following 
equation on the selected sample: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝒙𝒊𝒕𝜷 + ?̅?𝒊𝝋+ 𝝆𝒕?̂?𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                                            (2.38) 
This yields consistant estimates of 𝜷, which will be the methodology this 
research following. 
2.2.3 Propensity score matching 
Apart from Heckman self-selection model, the propensity score matching 
(PSM) is an alternative method to address the selection bias. The matching idea 
and methodology can be applied in any study where it is possible to identify: (i) a 
treatment; (ii) a group of treated units; and (iii) a group of untreated units 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In this study, securitization is considered as the 
treatment, securitizers as the treatment group, and non-securitizers as the non-
treatment group. A brief review of the PSM methodology is described below. 
To estimate the causal effect of the treatment, i.e., securitization, the 
main aim is to estimate the outcomes if the securitizers chose not to securitize 
their loans. Let 𝑺𝒊,𝒕 to be a variable indicating securitization activity, which equals 
to one if bank 𝒊 conducts a securitization transaction for the first time in year 𝒕. 
Let ∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏  to be the performance gain achieved by bank 𝒊 at time 𝒕 + 𝟏 after 
having securitized assets in period 𝒕  and let ∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎  be the hypothetical 
performance gain of the same bank 𝒊 at the same time 𝒕 + 𝟏 had it not securitized 
assets in period 𝒕. The effect of securitization on bank 𝒊’s performance, which is 
also well-known as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), can be 
specified as: 
?̂? = 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏) − 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏)                                       (2.39) 
 In Equation 2.39, 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏) represents the counterfactual mean or 
the hypothetical performance gain of a securitizer had it not securitized, which 
in practice is unobservable. 
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Therefore, we need to find a proxy for this counterfactual mean. Let the 
mean outcome for non-securitizers, 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎) , as a proxy for the 
counterfactual mean. Equation 2.39 becomes to: 
?̂? = 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏) − 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎)                                       (2.40) 
Equation 2.40 yields biased estimation unless 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏) =
𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎). To apply PSM approach to the case of securitization, we build 
a control group from non-securitizers that are similar to the securitizers in all 
relevant pre-securitization characteristics. Thus, the causal effect of 
securitization could be presented as: 
?̂? = 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) − 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)                    (2.41) 
Where 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) is the mean performance change of a bank 
choose to securitize assets, (∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎,𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)  is the weighted mean 
performance change of the control group at the same time, and 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is a vector 
of conditioning covariates observed. 
A propensity score is the probability of a unit being assigned to a particular 
treatment given a set of observed covariates. Propensity scores are used to reduce 
selection bias by equating groups based on these covariates. Using propensity 
score, the equation for the average securitization effect becomes: 
?̂? = 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟏, 𝒑(𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)) − 𝑬(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 |𝑺𝒊,𝒕 = 𝟎, 𝒑(𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏))           (2.42) 
Where 𝑝 is a propensity score conditional on 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏. Therefore, the average 
securitization effect is estimated as the difference between the mean 
performance change of securitizers and non-securitizers.  
For consistent estimates of the securitization effect, two key assumptions 
must hold: the unconfoundedness assumption and the common support 
assumption. The unconfoundedness assumption, also referred to as the 
“conditional independence assumption” or “selection on observables,” requires 
the mean outcomes to be independent of the treatment after conditioning on a 
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set of observable covariates (Imbens 2004, Smith and Todd 2005) and can be 
formally stated as: 
(∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 , ∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 ) ⊥ 𝑺𝒊,𝒕|𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏  𝒐𝒓  (∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟎 , ∆𝒚𝒊,𝒕+𝟏
𝟏 ) ⊥ 𝑺𝒊,𝒕|𝒑(𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏)         (2.43) 
In other words, it assumes that there are no unobservable differences 
between securitizers and non-securitizers after conditioning on 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏, so that any 
systematic differences in outcomes can be attributed to the securitization effect. 
The unconfoundedness thus assumes away the potential bias arising from the 
selection on observables (Sianesi, 2004). To link the unconfoundedness assumption 
with standard exogeneity assumptions, it could be written as: 
∆𝒚𝒊 = 𝜶 + ?̂?𝑺𝒊 + 𝜷𝑿𝒊
′ + 𝜺𝒊                                                                 (2.44) 
2.2.4 Instrumental variable approach 
Another important empirical strategy is the instrumental variable 
approach, or the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. The advantages of using 
2SLS over the more conventional maximum likelihood (ML) method for structural 
equation models (SEM). First, the 2SLS approach does not require any 
distributional assumptions for RHS independent variables, which means they can 
be non-normal, binary, etc. Second, in the context of a multi-equation non-
recursive SEM it isolates specification errors to single equations, see Bollen (2001). 
Third, it is computationally simple and does not require the use of numerical 
optimisation algorithms. Fourth, it easily caters for non-linear and interactions 
effects, see Bollen and Paxton (1998). Last, it permits the routine use of often 
ignored diagnostic testing procedures for problems such as heteroscedasticity and 
specification error, see Pesaran and Taylor (1999).  
To understand the 2SLS estimation, let us start with a simple regression 
model: 
𝒚 = 𝜶 + 𝜷𝒙 + 𝒖                                                                               (2.45) 
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Where, 𝒚 is the dependent variable 𝒙 is the independent variable, 𝜶 and 
𝜷 are estimable parameters 𝒖 is the error term.  
If 𝒙 and 𝒖 are correlated then this violates an assumption of the regression 
framework. Applying standard ordinary least squares (OLS) to Equation (2.45) 
under these circumstances results in inconsistent estimates. That is, even as the 
sample size approaches infinity the estimates of the parameters on average will 
not equal the population estimates. To remedy this problem one can apply 2SLS, 
also called the instrumental variables (IV) procedure. 
To implement 2SLS we need to identify one or more instruments for 𝒙. 
These instruments (call them 𝒛 ) must satisfy two conditions: 1) 𝒛  must be 
uncorrelated with 𝒖; and 2) 𝒛 must be correlated with 𝒙. To get the parameter 
estimates is to run two OLS regressions: 1) OLS regression 𝒙  on 𝒛  and get 
predictions for 𝒙, say ?̂?; 2) OLS regression 𝒚 on ?̂?. 
The rationale is presented as follows. Consider the following latent variable 
model: 
𝜼𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝝃𝟏 + 𝒖𝟏                                                                                                 (2.46) 
Where, 𝜼𝟏  is the latent dependent variable with three indicators 
(𝒚𝟏, 𝒚𝟐, 𝒚𝟑), 𝝃𝟏 is the latent independent variable with three indicators (𝒙𝟏, 𝒙𝟐, 𝒙𝟑), 
𝜷𝟎 and 𝜷𝟏 are the estimated parameters, 𝒖𝟏 is the disturbance error term. 
Assume that the measurement models for 𝜼𝟏 and 𝝃𝟏 are: 
{
𝒚𝟏 = 𝝀𝒚𝟏𝜼𝟏 + 𝜺𝟏
𝒚𝟐 = 𝝀𝒚𝟐𝜼𝟏 + 𝜺𝟐
𝒚𝟑 = 𝝀𝒚𝟑𝜼𝟏 + 𝜺𝟑
                                                                                                        (2.47) 
{
𝒙𝟏 = 𝝀𝒙𝟏𝝃𝟏 + 𝜹𝟏
𝒙𝟐 = 𝝀𝒙𝟐𝝃𝟏 + 𝜹𝟐
𝒙𝟑 = 𝝀𝒙𝟑𝝃𝟏 + 𝜹𝟑
                                                                                                       (2.48) 
Where 𝝀 are factor loadings, 𝜺 and 𝜹 are measurement errors. 
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Bollen (1996) suggests the following procedure. Choose a scaling or 
reference variable for each latent variable, say 𝒚𝟏  for 𝜼𝟏  and 𝒙𝟏  for 𝝃𝟏 , this 
implies the corresponding loadings are set to unity. These scaling variables should 
be those that best reflect the constructs theoretically or empirically. This allows 
us to write: 
𝒚𝟏 = 𝜼𝟏 + 𝜺𝟏                                                                                                                  (2.49) 
𝒙𝟏 = 𝝃𝟏 + 𝜹𝟏                                                                                                                  (2.50) 
Combining the two equations together allows us to write the basic equation 
in observable variables terms only: 
𝒚𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝒙𝟏 + 𝒖                                                                                                    (2.51) 
Where 𝒖 = 𝒖𝟏 + 𝜺𝟏 − 𝜹𝟏𝜷𝟏, and 𝒖 is the new composite error term. 
Clearly 𝒙𝟏 is correlated with 𝒖 since both and 𝒖 and 𝒙𝟏 depend upon 𝜹𝟏. 
This mimics the basic equation and therefore OLS cannot be applied to the 
equation above, so instead a 2SLS procedure is needed. To identify suitable 
instruments we need to find variables which are not correlated with 𝒖, but are 
highly correlated with 𝒙𝟏. The non-scaling items for 𝝃𝟏(𝒙𝟐, 𝒙𝟑) are suitable as they 
are expected to be highly correlated with 𝒙𝟏 given that they are all indicators of 
the same construct and they are not correlated with 𝒖  (as we assume that 
measurement errors are uncorrelated.). Note, 𝒚𝟐, 𝒚𝟑 are not suitable instruments 
as they are correlated with 𝒖, since 𝒖, 𝒚𝟐, 𝒚𝟑 all depend upon 𝒖𝟏.  
Therefore, the general principle is that non-scaling item indicators of the 
independent variable can be used as instruments, but not non-scaling items of the 
dependent variable as they correlate with the composite error term. Effectively, 
any variable that has either a direct or indirect effect on the dependent variable 
is not a candidate as an instrumental variable as it will be correlated with the 
composite error term. That is, if a causal chain exists between the composite error 
term and a variable then that variable is not a valid instrument. 
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In some situations, it is difficult to determine whether an instrument is 
valid. To ascertain the validity of an instrument you need to explicitly determine 
if the covariance between the instrument and composite error is zero.  
2.2.5 Difference-in-difference analysis 
Apart from the empirical strategies above, another popular estimation 
method is called the Difference-in-Difference analysis. The simplest set up is one 
where outcomes are observed for two groups for two periods. One of the groups 
is exposed to a treatment in the second period but not in the first period. The 
second group is not exposed to the treatment during either period. In the case 
where the same units within a group are observed in each time period, the average 
gain in the second (control) group is substracted from the average gain in the first 
(treatment) group. This removes biases in second period comparisons between the 
treatment and control group that could be the result from permanent differences 
between those groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the 
treatment group that could be the result of trends. To understand the Difference-
in-Difference analysis, it would be better to start from the basic fixed-effects 
model. In the fixed effects models, if a researcher is interested whether 𝒀𝒊𝒕 is 
affected by 𝑫𝑖𝑡 which is assumed to be randomly assigned. There are also time 
varying covariates 𝑿𝑖𝑡 and unobserved but fixed confounders 𝑨𝒊. Therefore, 
𝑬[𝒀𝟎𝒊𝒕|𝑨𝒊, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝒕] = 𝜶 + 𝝀𝒕 + 𝑨𝒊
′𝜸 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷.                                                              (2.52) 
Assuming that the causal effect of individuals is additive and constant so 
the following equation is also true: 
𝑬[𝒀𝟏𝒊𝒕|𝑨𝒊, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝒕] = 𝑬[𝒀𝟎𝒊𝒕|𝑨𝒊, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝒕] + 𝝆                                              (2.53) 
Taken together, we will have: 
𝑬[𝒀𝟏𝒊𝒕|𝑨𝒊, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝒕] = 𝜶 + 𝝀𝒕 + 𝝆𝑫𝑖𝑡 + 𝑨𝒊
′𝜸 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷                                   (2.54) 
This equation implies the following regression equation: 
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𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝝀𝒕 + 𝝆𝑫𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                      (2.55) 
Where 𝜺𝒊𝒕 = 𝒀𝟎𝒊𝒕 − 𝑬[𝒀𝟎𝒊𝒕|𝑨𝒊, 𝑿𝑖𝑡, 𝒕], and 𝜶𝒊 = 𝜶 + 𝑨𝒊
′𝜸. 
Suppose we simply estimate this model with OLS without fixed effects, then 
the estimation is: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 + 𝝀𝒕 + 𝝆𝑫𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                    (2.56) 
As 𝜶𝒊 is correlated with the individual status 𝑫𝑖𝑡, there is a correlation of 
𝑫𝑖𝑡 with error term. This will lead to biased OLS estimations. A fixed effect model 
would address this problem because 𝜶𝒊 would be included in the regression. 𝑫𝑖𝑡 
with error term would therefore be uncorrelated and the regression would obtain 
an unbiased estimator 𝝆. 
In practice, there are two ways of estimating the fixed effects model: i) 
demeaning, or the within estimator, and ii) first differencing. With demeaning we 
should first calculate individual averages of the dependent variable and all 
explanatory variables. The we should substract the averages from the regression 
to obtain: 
𝒀𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊 = 𝝀𝒕 − ?̅? + 𝝆(𝑫𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝒊) + (𝑿𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝒊)
′𝜷+ 𝜶𝒊 + (𝜺𝒊𝒕 − ?̅?𝒊)           (2.57) 
Thus 𝜶𝒊 drops out and therefore the error and the regressor would no longer 
be correlated. 
In the first differencing way, we can also get rid of the 𝜶𝒊 by: 
𝚫𝒀𝒊𝒕 = 𝚫𝝀𝒕 + 𝝆𝚫𝑫𝑖𝑡 + 𝚫𝑿𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 + 𝚫𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                   (2.58) 
The Difference-in-Difference method is first introduced by Card and 
Krueger (1994) who analyse the effect of a minimum wage increase in New Jersey. 
Taken securitization as an example, we can obtain a bank securitizes loans or not. 
We can only observe one situation or the other, that is, at a time point, a bank 
can only be a securitizer or a non-securitizer, but cannot be both. 
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If we assume that: 1) 𝒀1𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the performance indicator of bank 𝒊 which has 
securitized assets at state 𝒔 and time 𝒕, and 2) 𝒀0𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the performance indicator 
of bank 𝒊 which does not have securitized assets at state 𝒔 and time 𝒕. We the 
assume that: 
𝑬[𝒀𝟎𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔, 𝒕] = 𝜸𝒔 + 𝝀𝒕                                                                      (2.59) 
In the absence of the securitization activities, a bank’s performance is 
determined by the sum of a time-invariant state effect 𝜸𝒔 and a time effect 𝝀𝒕. 
Let 𝑫𝑠𝑡 be a dummy for securitized banks after an endogenous shock, e.g., the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Assuming 𝑬[𝒀𝟏𝒊𝒔𝒕 − 𝒀𝟎𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔, 𝒕] = 𝜹 is the 
treatment effect, observed bank performance thus can be written as: 
𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕 = 𝜸𝒔 + 𝝀𝒕 + 𝜹𝑫𝑠𝑡 + 𝜺𝒊𝒔𝒕                                                              (2.60) 
For example, for banks with securitization activities, the performance 
before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is: 
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] = 𝜸𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓 + 𝝀𝒑𝒓𝒆𝟎𝟖       (2.61) 
And the performance after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is: 
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] = 𝜸𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓 + 𝝀𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝟎𝟖         (2.62) 
Therefore, the difference between the securitizers’ performance before 
and after 2008 is: 
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] −
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] = 𝝀𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝟎𝟖 − 𝝀𝒑𝒓𝒆𝟎𝟖 + 𝜹                 (2.63) 
Similarly, for non-securitized banks, the performance before the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is: 
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] = 𝜸𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓 + 𝝀𝒑𝒓𝒆𝟎𝟖      (2.64) 
And the performance after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 is: 
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𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] = 𝜸𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓 + 𝝀𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝟎𝟖       (2.65) 
Therefore, the difference between the securitizers’ performance before 
and after 2008 is: 
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] −
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] = 𝝀𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕𝟎𝟖 − 𝝀𝒑𝒓𝒆𝟎𝟖                (2.66) 
Finally, the Difference-in-Difference strategy allows us to compare the 
change in the performance of securitizers with the change in the performance of 
non-securitizers. The population Difference-in-Difference is: 
{𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] −
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖]} −
{𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒂𝒇𝒕𝒆𝒓 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖] −
𝑬[𝒀𝒊𝒔𝒕|𝒔 = 𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓, 𝒕 = 𝒃𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟖]} = 𝜹                                              (2.67) 
The advantages of the Difference-in-Difference method are stated as 
follows. First, it is easy to calculate standard errors under this framework. Second, 
it allows researchers to control for other variables which may reduce the residual 
variance, which could also lead to smaller standard errors. Third, it is also easy to 
include multiple periods. Last, researchers can study treatments with different 
treatment intensity. 
A typical regression model that can be estimated under the Difference-in-
Difference framework is presented as follows: 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑻𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊 +𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑(𝑻𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 ×
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺                                                                                      (2.68) 
Where 𝑻𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 is the dummy if a bank confirmed as a securitizer, while 
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒄𝒌 is the post shock dummy. 
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Chapter 3  
Securitization and bank risk 
3.1 Introduction 
There are conflicting arguments regarding the impact of securitization on 
bank risk. Classic theories suggest that securitization could decrease bank risk. On 
one hand, the risk transfer and diversification effects of securitization allow banks 
to substitute large potential risk exposures to direct borrowers with smaller and 
more diversified exposures, smooth out the risk among many investors (Duffie, 
2007), and, absorb potential losses through the tranching process (Fender and 
Mitchell, 2005). The liquidity increase effect provides originators with the ability 
to face potential shocks (Gorton and Souleles, 2007) and income shocks (DeYoung 
and Rice, 2004). However, commentators cite the remarkable growth of 
securitization in recent years as a major contributor to the rise of the real estate 
bubble and the ensuing crisis. Part of the argument is that securitization creates 
additional layers of agency problems in loan origination. It leads to lax 
underwriting and thus higher default rates (Rajan, Seru, and Vig, 2011), or 
inefficiency in screening borrower and monitoring loans (Keys et al., 2010), which 
in turn can contribute to a lowering of lending standards and a gradual 
deterioration in the credit quality of assets (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2011). This 
chapter thus intend to study the impact of bank loan securitization on bank risk. 
Using data from commercial banks in the U.S. during the period from 2002 
to 2012, this chapter reports that the involvement of securitizations by 
commercial banks (measured as the ratio of total securitized assets over total 
assets) is positively associated with bank’s 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆. The results show that an 
average of 10.99% standard deviation increase of 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  due for each one-
standard-deviation increase in total securitization ratio. The explanations are as 
follows. Securitization provide originators with the opportunity to share potential 
risk, because it permits a bank to originate loans and then transfer their interest 
rate and credit risks to outside investors (Benveniste and Berger, 1987; Franke, 
Herrmann and Webber, 2012). Creating a separate SPV isolates the cash flow 
generating assets and/or collateral so that securities issued by the SPV are not a 
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general claim against the issuer, just against those assets. This effect then 
increases bank’s ability to face the possible liquidity shock (Calomiris and Kahn, 
1991). Securitization also provides a safety net for originators to confront the 
potential shocks from a more stable income stream (DeYoung and Rice, 2004), and 
a more diversified portfolio combination (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2002). Bank risk 
is in turn decreased. 
This study first uses OLS as the baseline framework to estimate the impact 
of loan securitization on bank risk. There is a concern that the relationship 
identified by the baseline framework could be endogenous. On the one hand, small 
banks may not prefer securitizing loans due to substantial large amount of upfront 
fixed costs. On the other hand, banks with higher reputation are more likely to be 
frequent securitizers because of a lower lemon discounts (Campbell and Kracaw, 
1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). This study utilizes several 
methods to address this issue. First, the Heckman self-selection model is used to 
estimate the causal effect of securitization on 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆, using three exogenous 
instruments. The first instrument is the state-level corporate tax rate. On the one 
hand, the corporate-tax-exempt benefit of securitization may increase banks’ 
incentive to securitize assets (Han, Park, and Pennacchi, 2015), and on the other 
hand, state-level corporate tax itself is not directly related to bank risk. Secondly, 
a peer liquidity index based on Loutskina’s (2011) liquidity index is constructed, 
which captures banks’ incentive to securitize. It is also unlikely that a bank’s 
industry peers’ securitizing behaviour can directly affect its own risk (other than 
through the channel of securitization). The third instrument is the interaction of 
the two above mentioned instruments, which captures both instruments’ 
characteristics.  
A two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation is implemented to check the 
robustness of the Heckman self-selection results by introducing the same sets of 
instruments. Finally, a propensity score matching based on weighted-least-squares 
estimation method, where the weights are inversely proportional to the 
probability of a bank being a securitizer is implemented. A propensity scores 
(represented by ?̂?) estimated by a probit regression using the following control 
variables: bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense 
ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local market power index, bank holding 
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company (BHC) dummy, and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) dummy is then 
assigned. A securitizer receives a weight of 𝟏/?̂?, while a non-securitizer receives 
a weight of 𝟏/(𝟏 − ?̂?). A matched subsample including unique pairs of securitizer 
and non-securitizer with a difference of propensity score within 1% is used. All the 
results are consistent with the main results. 
The 2007-09 financial crisis suddenly dried out the liquidity in the market. 
Securitization activities significantly rely on the liquidity in the market, so the 
withdrawal of repurchase agreements may trigger a securitized-banking run 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Thus, there is the expectation that the impact of 
securitization will decrease because of a significant shrunk in the scale of 
securitization in the market. The sample period is divided into pre- and post-crisis 
subsamples in all estimations above. The pre-crisis period covers years from 2002 
to 2007, while post-crisis period starts from 2007 to 2012. The reported results 
show that the impact of securitization on bank’s Z-scores is positive and 
statistically significant in both periods, but the economic significance decreases 
after the breakout of the financial crisis. Overall, the sub-sample results still 
support the main findings. 
Main transmission mechanisms from securitization to bank riskiness are 
through capital relief, favourable liquidity and risk transfer. To shed some more 
light on risk transfer, the possible differences between mortgage and non-
mortgage securitizations are examined. Mortgage loans are widely considered to 
be safer than non-mortgage loans because the collaterals (i.e., real estates) of 
mortgage loan are not easily depreciated (Campbell and Cocco, 2015). Mortgage 
securitization is in turn not significantly related to risk transferring (Martín-Oliver 
and Saurina, 2007). Securitizing risky assets (e.g., non-mortgage loans), however, 
is found to be a more efficient risk transferring to decrease expected losses 
(Minton et al., 2004; Bannier and Hansel, 2008). Thus, non-mortgage securitization 
ratios are expected to be more significantly related to the increase of bank’s Z-
scores. To test the hypothesis, securitization is partitioned into mortgage and non-
mortgage groups. The results show that while the increase of non-mortgage 
securitization ratios responds to higher Z-scores, mortgage securitization ratios 
are not significantly related to changes in Z-scores.  
58 
 
In practice, banks may choose loan sales rather than securitization because 
of a lower level of fixed upfront costs (Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995). The final 
test thus focuses on loan sales. Loan sales involve the totality of an originated 
loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1987) and are affected without recourse (Greenbaum 
and Thakor, 1987). Loan sellers can also reduce their risk by separating the 
ownership of riskier assets from their balance sheet (Berger and Udell, 1993). 
Thus, it is expected that loan sale ratios are positively related to bank’s Z-scores. 
Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012), loan sales are partitioned by the difference 
between: 1) the outstanding principal balance of assets owned by others, with 
servicing retained by the bank, and, 2) the outstanding principal balance of assets 
sold and securitized by the bank. Using similar estimating methods in the present 
study the results show that loan sales also reduce bank risk. 
This study provides direct empirical evidence on the impact of 
securitization on bank risk. Previous studies on securitization and bank risk pay 
more attention on the theoretical basis, providing both risk reduction (Benveniste 
and Berger, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988) and risk increase theories (Kobayashi and 
Osano, 2012; van Oordt, 2014). Empirical examinations of securitization provide 
evidence on the impact of bank performance (Guner, 2006; Casu et al., 2012), or 
specific on the impact of CMBS (Titman and Tsyplakov, 2010; An, Deng, and 
Gabriel, 2011), CLOs (Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012), subprime 
mortgage loans (Keys, Seru, and Vig, 2012), and ABCPs (Acharya, Schnabl, and 
Suarez, 2013) on bank performance and managerial efforts. To my best 
knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
securitization on bank risk. This study provides such direct evidence.  
3.2 Hypothesis development 
Bank loan securitization may lead to risk reduction through several 
channels. According to the risk sharing theory, securitization permits a bank to 
originate loans and then transfer their interest rate and credit risks to mortgage- 
and asset-backed security investors (Affinito and Tagliaferri, 2010; Franke, 
Herrmann, and Webber; 2011). In this case, securitization could reduce the burden 
on the balance sheet (Cumming, 1987; Flannery, 1994; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008), 
or decrease expected losses that related to the potential default of borrowers 
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(Dahiya et al., 2003; Marsh, 2006). The tranching process of securitization creates 
classes of securities with different levels of credit quality from the underlying 
collateral asset pool, which could absorb potential losses of the underlying assets. 
This is accomplished through the use of credit support specified within the 
transaction structure, with the priority ordering of payments being a key example. 
Equity/first-loss tranche absorbs initial losses up to the level where it is depleted, 
followed by mezzanine tranches which absorb some additional losses, again 
followed by more senior tranches (see Fender and Mitchell; 2005 for details). 
Securitization helps originators to confront the potential liquidity shocks 
caused by the riskiness of demandable-debt. The mismatch between the maturity 
of assets and liabilities of demandable-debt leave banks exposed to the possibility 
that depositors would attempt to withdraw more funds than they could supply on 
short notice. When this occurs, the consequences are dangerous and costly. 
Individual banks that do not meet their obligations are forced into expensive 
procedures, such as liquidation or receivership (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991).  
Securitization decreases this riskiness by isolating the assets from the 
originators and improving originators’ liquidity situation. On the one hand, 
securitization typically involves pooling the cash flows from a number of similar 
assets and selling the pool to a separate legal entity known as a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV). Creating this separate SPV isolates the cash flow generating assets 
and/or collateral so that securities issued by the SPV are not a general claim 
against the issuer, just against those assets. This process may reduce financial 
distress costs and thus increase debt capacity (Gorton and Souleles, 2005).  
On the other hand, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that higher liquidity 
level could partially ease the liquidity shock. The liquidity improving theory 
suggests securitization could improve the liquidity of bank’s balance sheet 
(Greenbuam and Thakor, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988), reducing financing frictions. 
This effect could help bank’s asset liability management, and increases bank’s 
ability to effectively respond to negative economic environment (Stein, 1998; 
Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Schuermann, 2004; Diamond and Rajan, 2006), such as 
the case in demandable-debt. 
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Securitization could also provide a safety net for originators to face the 
income and undiversified portfolio shocks. It decreases the possibility of bank’s 
income shock through capital relief effect. This theory suggests that securitization 
allows banks to adjust their capital ratios, as they may securitize loans instead of 
raising deposits. It allows issuers to hold less non-performing assets in the 
portfolios, and the fee-based income structure after securitization provides a 
more stable income stream (e.g., DeYoung and Rice, 2004). In practice, loan 
originators are often not best loan holders, since they end up being over-
concentrated in certain industries and certain obligors because of the pressure to 
maintain client relationships (Berndt and Gupta, 2008). It could lead to higher 
undiversified risk which related to the rate of fluctuation or change that takes 
place in a given investment market. With securitization, issuers could restructure 
loan portfolios effectively to reduce such risk (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2002).  
Empirical evidence also supports the negative impact of securitization on 
bank risk. Based on the quarterly data between June 1988 and June 1993 of 
commercial banks in the U.S., Cebonoyan and Strahan (2004) suggest that 
securitization helps banks to manage their credit risk. Jiangli, Pritsker and 
Raupach (2007) conduct analysis of how asset securitization affects bank’s 
insolvency and risk profile by testing U.S. bank holding company data from second 
quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2006. They develop a stylized model of a 
bank that originates and finances loans, and report that securitization can serve 
as an insurance against bank’s insolvency in the real world. Jiangli and Pritsker 
(2008) also examine the effect of mortgage loan securitizations and other forms 
of asset securitizations on insolvency risk, profitability and leverage, using U.S. 
bank holding company data from 2001 to 2007. The empirical results also show 
that securitization could play a positive role by reducing insolvency risk. 
Therefore, my hypothesis is as follows: 
Bank loan securitization could decrease bank risk. 
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3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Data 
Securitization and bank-specific data are obtained from the Reports of 
Income and Condition for commercial banks (the Call Report). Because U.S. banks 
are only required to provide detailed information on their securitization activities 
from June 2001, the annual data used in this study covers the period from 2002 to 
2012. The final sample is an unbalanced panel including 342 banks with securitized 
loans and 8,483 banks without, accounting for 77,598 total bank-year 
observations. 
3.3.2 Variables 
While the following paragraphs provide detailed discussion on the variables 
used in this chapter in terms of variable construction, expectations on the 
regressions signs, and etc., a summary of variable definitions is presented in 
Appendix 1.A. The correlation matrix is reported in Appendix 1.B. 
3.3.2.1 Dependent variable: 𝑳𝒏𝒁 
It is widely accepted that 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 could be employed to measure a bank’s 
overall risk, the theory discussion of which can rely on Boyd and Graham (1986). 
Theoretically, 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  is an indicator that measures the probability of 
banks or bank holding companies to fail. The 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 comes from a profitability 
indicator (𝒓) and another risk indicator (𝑺), the standard deviation of 𝒓, which 
measures the variability of profit. Let 𝒊 denote an individual bank, 𝒋 denote a 
year, and 𝒏 denote the length (in years) of the sample period, then the empirical 
mean rate of return can be specified as: 
?̅?𝒊 = ∑ (?̃?𝒊𝒋 𝒏⁄ )
𝒏
𝒋=𝟏                                                                                (3.1) 
Thus, ?̅?𝒊 is a sample estimate of the true mean of ?̃?𝒊𝒋 distribution. 
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Therefore, the estimated standard deviation of 𝒓 for the 𝒊th bank is: 
𝑺𝒊 = {∑ [(?̃?𝒊𝒋 − ?̅?𝒊)
𝟐
(𝒏 − 𝟏)⁄ ]𝒏𝒋=𝟏 }
𝟏/𝟐
                                                    (3.2) 
Finally, for 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 , which measures the probability of a consolidated 
bankruptcy, should be: 
𝒑(?̃? < −𝑬) = 𝒑(?̃? < 𝒌) = ∫ 𝝓(𝒓)𝒅𝒓
𝒌
−∞
                                                 (3.3) 
where 𝝓 is the probability density function of ?̃?, 𝝅  is the consolidated 
profits, 𝑬 is consolidated equity, and 𝒌 = −𝑬/𝑨, in which 𝑨 is the consolidated 
asset. Normal distributions are completely characterized by a location and a 
dispersion parameter, which means Euqation (3.3) may be simplified by changing 
coordinates. Therefore, if ?̃? is normally distributed, then  
𝒑(?̃? < 𝒌) = ∫ 𝑵(𝟎, 𝟏)𝒅𝒛
𝒁
−∞
    and   𝒛 = (𝒌 − 𝝆)/𝝈                         (3.4) 
where 𝝈 is the standard deviation of rate of return on assets. Here 𝒛 is the 
principal risk measure, except that the sample estimate S is substituted for 𝝈 and 
the sample estimate ?̃? is substituted for 𝝆, and −𝒛 is the risk variable that stands 
for overall risk, 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆. This Zscore is an estimate of the number of standard 
deviations below the mean that consolidated profits would have to fall to make 
consolidated equity negative, which means it is an indicator of the probability of 
a consolidated bankruptcy. 
To be simplified, the specific calculation of z-score could then could be 
transferred into: 
𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 =
𝑹𝑶𝑨+𝑬/𝑨
𝒔𝒅𝑹𝑶𝑨
                                                                             (3.5) 
where 𝑹𝑶𝑨  is bank's net income after tax as a percentage of average 
assets, 𝑬/𝑨 is equity capital and minority interests to total assets, and 𝒔𝒅𝑹𝑶𝑨 is 
the standard deviation of 𝑹𝑶𝑨. A higher level of 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 corresponds to a lower 
upper bound of insolvency, which means a lower probability of default.  
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𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 has been widely employed in banking literature because it reflects 
many parts of the potential risk. Firstly, Boyd and Graham (1986) indicate that 
𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  is strongly associated with commercial paper ratings as reported by 
Moody's Investors Service. Secondly, this measurement contains bank profitability 
(𝑹𝑶𝑨, return on assets), bank risk (standard deviation of 𝑹𝑶𝑨) and bank safety 
(𝑬/𝑨, equity to assets ratio), which has a synthetic explanation of the overall risk. 
In the research of exploring the relationship between ownership structure and 
overall risk, Barry et al. (2011) employ 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 and find a significant association 
between them. (More empirical literatures about z-score can refer to: Boyd et al., 
1993; Altman and Saunders, 1997; Konishi and Yasuda, 2004; Demirguc-Kunt et 
al., 2008; Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernandez, 2008; Graham et al., 2008; Lepetit 
et al., 2008; Santos and Winton, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009; 
Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Houston et al., 
2010) 
Theoretically, the distribution of dependent variable should follow the 
normality assumption, which means a new dependent variable 𝑳𝒏𝒁  will be 
employed here. According to the basic mathematics knowledge, considering the 
feature of natural logarithm, the trends of 𝑳𝒏𝒁 should follow 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆, which 
means a higher 𝑳𝒏𝒁 value still stands for a lower probability of default, or to say, 
overall risk. Following the methodology of Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2011), 
Michalak and Uhde (2012), as well as Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt and Zhu (2013), this 
study also employs a three- and five-year rolling 𝑳𝒏𝒁.1 
3.3.2.2 Securitization measures 
Researches on securitization so far can be categorized in the following 
groups. Some researchers prefer to discuss the general influence of securitization, 
where they mainly define the regressor of securitization as total securitized assets 
to total assets, as in Mandel et al. (2012). Recently, more studies began to focus 
on the differences among securities. For example, Solano et al. (2006), when 
discussing the effects of securitization on the value of banking institutions, 
distinguish mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS). 
Moreover, another group of researches classify detailed categories of 
                                         
1 The results are robust with different rolling windows, from four to six years, when calculating 
the standard deviation of ROA. 
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securitization. For example, Cheng et al. (2008) employ four different 
securitization variables, ABSt (total securitized assets divided by total assets), 
MBSt (securitized 1-4 family residential mortgages scaled by total assets), CONSBSt 
(securitized consumer loans scaled by total assets) and COMMBSt (securitized 
commercial loans scaled by total assets) to study the relationship between 
securitization and opacity of banks. The key independent variable in this research 
is 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐, which is defined as the ratio of the outstanding principal 
balance of assets securitized over total assets for a given type (i.e., mortgage or 
non-mortgage loans). 
3.3.2.3 Control variables 
This study controls for several bank specific characteristics. 
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐  is defined as the total amount of retained interest 
divided by the total amount of securitization assets of a given type, including the 
aggregate retained interests into credit enhancements, liquidity provisions, and 
seller’s interest. The incentive of securitizers to carefully monitor loans could 
increase by providing enhancements which may decrease bank risk (Downing, 
Jaffee, and Wallace, 2009). 
𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 is the natural logarithm of total assets. DeMiguel et al. argue 
that size plays a significant role in the performance of banks. Haan and Poghosyan 
(2012) prove bank size reduces return volatility. However, the factor of scale 
could have negative impacts, which means banks do better by reducing their size 
(Gennotte and Pyle, 1991). Recently, papers also support this point of view, that 
larger companies tend to have riskier portfolios, which could increase the overall 
risk (Demzets, 1999). The relationship between bank risk and bank size, Hakenes 
and Schnabel (2011), Haan and Poghosyan (2012), and DeMiguel et al. (2013) 
suggest a negative relationship, while Gennotte and Pyle (1991) support a positive 
relationship.  
𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 indicates the diversification level of banks, which is 
calculated as noninterest income divided by total operation income, following the 
approach of Stiroh (2004). Previous research on diversification of portfolios shows 
positive influence, as the investors are more likely to be better off when holding 
a large number of low quality stocks than a smaller number of high quality stocks, 
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and the return on the former portfolio will be higher (Wagner and Lau, 1971). 
Recently, empirical research on large Austrian commercial banks over the period 
of 1997-2003 also provides a decline of banks' realized risk, as well as increases 
profit efficiency when regarding to diversification effects, though it may impact 
cost efficiency negatively.  
𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐  is an indicator for banks' liquidity, specified as liquid 
assets divided by total assets. Liquidity impacting on banks is not a one-way 
method, in fact, it sometimes could help managers to weaken the potential risks. 
Bolton et al. (2011) propose a dynamic model of investment, financing and risk 
management for financial institutions, and then find that liquidity significantly 
associated with banks' performance. Meanwhile, this model also supports the 
opinion that liquidity management is one of the complementary risk management 
tools. 
𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 is an indicator of banks’ efficiency, defined 
as non-interest expenses divided by total assets. Non-interest expenses are usually 
not associated with targeting customers to deposit funds; therefore, they are 
more likely to increase risk level (Lepetit et al., 2008).  
𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐, computed as the amount of loans past due 
90 days divided by total assets, reflects the risk management situation. Because 
non-performing loans are either in default or close to being in default, bank risk 
level can be positively related to the proportion of non-performing loans. For 
example, Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) define non-performing loans as “bad 
loans” in their research to estimate the motivations of banks to choose 
securitization in Italian banking industry. Other researches which employ this 
control variable could refer to Calomiris and Mason (2004), Cardone-Riportella et 
al. (2010), Jiangli and Prisker (2008), and Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) for 
examples. 
Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), I also control for banks’ 
𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 as the deposit concentration for the local markets in which 
the bank operates. The larger the local market power, the greater a bank’s market 
power and concentration in its surroundings. This is a standard measure of 
competition used in antitrust analysis and research in the U.S. (Berger and 
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Bouwman, 2013). Moreover, using deposits for this purpose because it is the only 
vairbale for which location is known. Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), this 
research uses the new local market definitions based on Core Based Statistical 
Area (CBSA) and non-CBSA county.  
This study uses a bank holding company dummy (𝑩𝑯𝑪 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚) to control 
for whether it belongs to a bank holding company. 𝑩𝑯𝑪 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 equals one if the 
bank belongs to a bank holding company, and zero otherwise. Within a short-time 
window, banks belonging to a BHC are more likely to take more risk, as they have 
this “backup” (Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010).  
Finally, a metropolitan statistical area dummy (𝑴𝑺𝑨 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 ), which 
equals one if the bank is located in a metropolitan area, and zero otherwise, is 
used to identify individual banks’ locations. Competition may be fiercer in 
metropolitan areas, and banks in suburban areas are more likely to have a more 
stable environment. 
3.3.3 Empirical strategy 
In order to test the impact of bank loan securitization on bank risk, this 
chapter starts with the following OLS model: 
𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜹𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊,𝒕 (3.6) 
where 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕 is the dependent variable, 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is the 
vector of total securitization ratio, 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is the vector of bank-specific control 
variables, 𝜶𝒊 is the individual difference, 𝜹𝒕 is the time variation that not related 
to individual charateristics, and 𝝁𝒊,𝒕 is the disturbance term.  
The relationship identified by the OLS model could be biased since self-
selection problem exists in the decision of securitizing loans. First, securitization 
involves substantial upfront fixed costs including consultancy and organizational 
costs, payments to rating agencies, underwriting fees, and legal expenses. Small 
banks thus may not prefer securitizing loans. Second, the lemon discount required 
on the underlying assets suggests that securitized assets are likely to be 
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underpriced (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 
1986). Thus, banks with higher reputation are more likely to enjoy a lower 
discount during securitization process. The existence of self-selection problem in 
securitization is, therefore, a rational conjecture.  
This study uses three methods to address this endogeneity issue. First, a 
Heckman self-selection model using three instrument variables is implemented. 
The first instrument is the state-level corporate tax rate 2, because higher 
corporate tax rates may increase a bank’s incentive to securitize assets due to the 
corporate tax exemption of securitized assets (Han, Park, and Pennacchi, 2015). 
The second instrument is peer liquidity index. Liquidity index is proposed by 
Loutskina (2011) to effectively capture banks’ ability to sell loans. Following 
Loutskina (2011), a bank’s loan portfolio is broken down into six groups: 1) home 
mortgages, 2) multi-family residential mortgages, 3) commercial mortgages, 4) 
agricultural loans, 5) commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, and 6) consumer 
credit.3 Liquidity index is defined as: 
𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 = ∑ (
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒕
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒋𝒕
) × (𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒋,𝒊𝒕)
𝟔
𝒋=𝟏  (3.7) 
In this equation, 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒕 is the total securitized 
loans of type j at time t in the whole economy, 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒋𝒕 is 
the total loans outstanding of type j at time t in the whole economy, and 
𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒋,𝒊𝒕  is the share of type j loans in bank i at time t in the whole 
economy.  
Finally, bank i’s peer liquidity index is constructed by calculating the 
average liquidity index of bank i’s peers.4 The herd effect (Chari and Kehoe, 2004) 
implies that an individual bank’s incentive to securitize loans can be stimulated 
by its industry peers, but it is unlikely that a bank’s industry peers’ securitizing 
behaviour can directly affect this bank’s risk.  
                                         
2  The data are available from the U.S. Tax Foundation website at: 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html. 
3 The data used to construct liquidity index comes from the “Financial Accounts of the United 
States” (Z.1) data release. 
4 Bank i itself is excluded.  
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State-level corporate tax rate only provides information on the impact of 
securitization incentives of a state’s “average” bank, while peer liquidity index 
captures no state-level difference. A third instrument is constructed by 
interacting the above two instruments. After using the instruments to determine 
the incentives to securitize loans in the first-step regression, a self-selection 
control variable is added which is the inverse Mills ratio, into the following main 
regression: 
𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝜷𝟑𝒊𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒆 𝑴𝒊𝒍𝒍𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜹𝒕                                                                 (3.8) 
Second, an instrumental variable approach is used, which is similar to the 
same set of instruments and control variables as the Heckman model.  
Finally, there is a concern about potential biases caused by the unbalanced 
samples with the sample of securitizer (342) being significantly smaller than that 
of non-securitizers (8,483). Following Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2015), this 
study uses the propensity score matching based weighted square regression. First, 
propensity scores (represented by ?̂?) is assigned to banks using the following bank-
specific characteristics: bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-
interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local market power index, 
bank holding company (BHC) dummy, and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
dummy. A securitizer receives a weight of 1/ ?̂?, while a non-securitizer receives 
a weight of 1/(1- ?̂?). The sample is refined by constructing a subsample consisting 
of securitizers and their most similar non-securitizer counterparties. A 1:1 
matching which imposes a 1% tolerance on the difference of propensity scores of 
each securitizer and matched non-securitizer is adopted. The sample is divided 
into pre- and post-crisis periods to check the differences between them. The 
reported results are also robust when a simple propensity score matching method 
is used.  
The breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis significantly changes the 
macroeconomic environment, e.g., it suddenly dried out the liquidity in the 
market. Securitization activities rely heavily on the liquidity in the market, so the 
withdrawal of repurchase agreements may trigger a securitized-banking run 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The significant dive of the securitization market may 
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in turn decrease the impact of securitization. Thus, it is expected that the impact 
of securitization on bank’s risk may decrease after the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
Therefore, the hypothesis here is as follows: 
The impact of securitization on bank risk before the breakout of the 
2007-09 financial crisis is likely to be more significant. 
The sample period is thus divided into pre- and post-crisis periods. Pre-
crisis period start from 2002 to 2006, while post-crisis period covers the years from 
2007 to 2012. All regressions are rerun using the before and after 2007 subsamples. 
3.4 Empirical results 
3.4.1 Preliminary analysis 
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics on all variables used in this study 
for both securitizers and non-securitizers. Panel A, Table 3.1 first reports the 
descriptive statistics of securitizers and non-securitizers.5 It is also interesting to 
see the differences between pre- and post-crisis periods. Thus, statistics of mean, 
median, and standard deviation (SD) are reported under each subgroup. The 
average value of 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 decreased from 1.05 before 2007 to 0.63 after 2007, 
and the standard deviations of 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 for both securitizers and non-securitizers 
also increased significantly after 2007. These results reflect the severe impact of 
crisis on bank risk. Since values of securitization related variables for non-
securitizers are all zero, only statistics for securitizers on variables of 
𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐%  and 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐%  are 
reported. There was a significant dive of the securitization market scale after the 
breakout of crisis (average securitization of 13.24% before 2007 vs. 7.08% from 
2007), which could be caused by a sudden erosion of liquidity in the capital market 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The average credit enhancements level increases 
from 4.28% to 5.26%, suggesting investors become more cautious after realizing 
the crisis. Small banks are rare securitizers due to a large amount of upfront costs, 
                                         
5 Percentage values of ratio variables are reported in Table 3.1. 
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and Table 3.1 shows that the average size of securitizers (nearly $596 million) in 
the sample is over four times than non-securitizers (nearly $134 million). 
Literature show that securitization allows banks to achieve more diversified 
portfolios (DeMarzo, 2005), and a lower liquidity level (Lourtskina, 2011). The 
costs of deposits are lower for bank holding companies that located in a 
metropolitan area with higher market power, so they are more likely to be able 
to maintain the “originate-to-distribute” funding model (Loutskina and Strahan, 
2009). The empirical results support all theories above. 
<Insert Table 3.1 Panel A Here> 
The differences between securitizers and non-securitizers and changes for 
the before and after the 2007-09 financial crisis sub-periods are presented in Panel 
B, Table 3.1. Student's t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test are applied for the 
means and medians of the differences, respectively. The 2007-09 financial crisis 
significantly decreases bank risk, since the average 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 of securitizers and 
non-securitizers decreases by 0.42 and 0.43, respectively. However, 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 of 
securitizers are higher than non-securitizers in both periods (i.e., before and after 
2007), suggesting securitization could decrease bank risk. In the line with the 
previous findings, significant differences between securitizers and non-
securitizers regarding to the rest of control variables are also reported.  
<Insert Table 3.1 Panel B Here> 
3.4.2 The impact of bank securitization on 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 
Results on the baseline model of the impact of loan securitization on bank’s 
𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 using OLS are reported in Table 3.2. Results on 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔, 3-year rolling 
and 5-year rolling 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 are reported in column (1), (2), and (3), respectively.  
<Insert Table 3.2 Here> 
Coefficients of key variable, 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐%, are all positive 
and significant, indicating that loan securitization is associated with a decrease in 
bank risk. Column (1) shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in total 
securitization ratio is associated with an increase of 10.99% of a standard deviation 
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in bank’s Z-scores. 10.99% is calculated by standardizing the coefficient, which is 
coefficient × SD_securitization ratio/SD_Zscore. Results are similar on economic 
impacts using 3-year rolling and 5-year rolling 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔, where a one-standard-
deviation increase in total securitization ratio is associated with an average 
increase of 7.13% and 6.33% of a standard deviation in bank’s 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 , 
respectively. These results are in line with the hypothesis that securitization could 
help banks to reduce their risk in the short run by substituting large potential 
exposures to direct borrowers with smaller and more diversified exposures and 
smoothing out the risks among many investors (Duffie, 2007). This diversification 
effect allows securitizers to share the large and entire risk exposure to a single 
possible shock with a large number of investors, which in turn decreases this 
exposure, leading to a risk reduction effect. 
Results on the control variables are largely in the line with the expectations 
and previous literature. Literature suggests that providing credit enhancements 
could decrease bank risk by forcing securitizers to retain long-term economic 
exposure. The findings of the regressions support this argument by presenting a 
positive relationship between total retained interest ratio% and 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔.  The 
negative correlation between bank size and 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 can be explained by the too-
big-to-fail theory that larger banks are more likely to take on more risk. As 
expected, a higher level of diversification and liquidity decreases bank risk, while 
less efficient banks are likely to be riskier. 
To address the endogeneity problem, several identification strategies are 
applied in this chapter. Results using Heckman self-selection analysis are reported 
in Table 3.3. Coefficients and standard errors, using instrument of state-level 
corporate tax rate, peer liquidity index, and state-level corporate tax rate ×  
peer liquidity index, are reported in column (1), (2), and (3), respectively. 
Inverse Mills ratios are significant in all specifications, suggesting that self-
selection bias is controlled by the empirical model. Similar economic impacts of 
loan securitization ratios on bank’s 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 are reported, where a one-standard-
deviation increase in total securitization ratio is associated with an average 
increase of 6.49% of a standard deviation in bank’s 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔, respectively. This 
result confirms the baseline findings. 
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<Insert Table 3.3 Here> 
Second, a 2SLS estimation is employed to address the endogeneity problem, 
where the same set of instruments are used. Results again show a positive and 
significant association between securitization ratio and bank’s 𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔 . The 
results are reported in Table 3.4. The findings are consistent using Heckman self-
selection and 2SLS methods, confirming that the results are robust. More 
interestingly, the implements of Heckman self-selection and 2SLS estimation 
improve R-squares in both regressions, suggesting that those models are more 
accurate than the OLS estimation. 
<Insert Table 3.4 > 
Analysis so far ignores the presence of the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
Therefore, the sample is divided into pre- and post-crisis periods, in order to 
examine whether securitization activities impact differently on bank risk. The 
OLS, Heckman, and instrumental variable regressions are reviewed using the 
subsamples. Results are presented in Table 3.5, Panel A, B, and C, respectively. 
<Insert Table 3.5 Panel A Here> 
<Insert Table 3.5 Panel B Here> 
<Insert Table 3.5 Panel C Here> 
Consistent with the results on full sample, the coefficients of total 
securitization ratio are all significant and positive in all specifications. However, 
the split-sample results show a decreased economic impact of securitization ratio 
on Z-score after the breakout of the financial crisis. For example, in column (1), 
Panel A, a one-standard-deviation increase in total securitization ratio is 
associated with an increase of 13.48% of a standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores 
before 2007 when estimated by OLS, while this economic impact significantly 
decreases to 8.06% (column (2)) after 2007. Similar declines of economic 
significance are also found in Heckman and instrumental variable estimations. The 
explanations are as follows. After June 2007, the securitization market suffered 
significant dive in total scale since insufficient information to price and quality of 
securities (Pagano and Volpin, 2012), which increased the overhang of illiquid 
assets on banks’ balance sheets (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Bank risk in 
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turn cannot be sufficiently transferred through securitization process. Another 
explanation could be the motivation change after 2007. Bedendo and Bruno (2012) 
argue that the principal incentive behind credit risk transferring activities is to 
raise financial resources rather than transferring risk during severe times. In this 
case, securitizers are more likely to use securitization to address their funding 
shortage rather than transferring potential risk. 
Another concern in this empirical study is the unbalanced observations 
between securitizers (3,132) and non-securitizers (74,466). Therefore, a 
propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares estimation is used to 
address this problem using a full sample and 1:1 matched sample. Results on full 
sample, 1:1 matched sample are reported in column (1) to (2), Table 3.6, 
respectively. Results again show a positive and significant association between 
securitization ratio and bank’s Z-scores. After dividing the full sample into pre- 
and post-crisis periods, results in column (3) and (4) are consistent with the 
expectation and the main results. Taken together the results above, the results 
show that bank loan securitization could decrease bank risk measured by Z-score, 
which is in the line with the main hypothesis. 
<Insert Table 3.6 Here> 
3.5 Additional analysis 
3.5.1 The impact of mortgage and non-mortgage securitization on 
bank’s Z-score 
Main transmission mechanisms from securitization to bank riskiness are 
through capital relief, favourable liquidity and risk transfer. To shed some more 
light on this risk transfer argument, this study focuses on mortgage securitization 
vs non-mortgage securitization. Mortgage loans are widely considered to be higher 
quality due to the underlying real estates are not easily depreciated (Campbell 
and Cocco, 2015). Mortgage securitization is in turn not significantly related to 
risk transferring (Martín-Oliver and Saurina, 2007). Non-mortgage securitization, 
however, allows banks to remove riskier asset out of their balance sheet and share 
potential risk with a larger number of investors, decreasing the expected losses 
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(Minton et al., 2004; Bannier and Hansel, 2008). Therefore, the hypothesis here is 
as follows: 
The impact of non-mortgage securitization on bank risk is more 
significant than mortgage securitization. 
To test this hypothesis, bank’s total securitization is broken down 
securitization activities into mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations. 
Mortgage loans include 1-4 home mortgages, while non-mortgage loans contain all 
other types of loans, including home equity lines, credit card receivables, auto 
loans, commercial and industrial loans, other consumer loans, and all other loans.  
replace Then total securitization ratios are replaced by mortgage and non-
mortgage securitization ratios in all specifications, respectively. The OLS results 
are reported in Panel A, Table 3.7, while results on mortgage and non-mortgage 
securitizations using Heckman self-selection model are reported in Panel B and C, 
Table 3.7, respectively.  
<Insert Table 3.7 Here> 
In the line with the hypothesis, mortgage securitization ratio is not 
significantly related to Z-score, while non-mortgage securitization is found to have 
a significant and positive impact on Z-score. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
non-mortgage securitization ratio is associated with an increase of 6.73% of a 
standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores, and this economic impact is 11.93% and 
2.88% before and after 2007, respectively. This finding is in the line with the 
evidence of no risk transfer in mortgage securitization (Acharya, Schnabl, and 
Suarez, 2013).  
3.5.2 The impact of loan sales on bank Z-score  
The final test focuses on loan sales. Similar to securitization, loan sales also 
allow sellers to transfer potential risk to the buyers. However, loan sales involve 
the totality of an originated loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1987) and are affected 
without recourse and bank serves as a pure broker (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987). 
In practice, banks may choose to use total loan sale rather than securitization as 
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their funding strategy (Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995). Loan sellers can also reduce 
potential risk by separating the ownership of riskier assets from their balance 
sheet (Berger and Udell, 1993), which in turn transfers the potential risk to the 
loan buyers. Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012), loan sales are defined by the 
difference between 1) the outstanding principal balance of assets owned by 
others, with servicing retained by the bank, and 2) the outstanding principal 
balance of assets sold and securitized by the bank. Loan sales data are collected 
from the Call Report, and the regression results are reported in Table 3.8. 
<Insert Table 3.8 Here> 
The results show a similar positive impact of loan sale on bank’s Z-score. 
The coefficients of loan sale ratio are all positive and statistically significant at 
1% level across all specifications. A one-standard-deviation increase in loan sale 
ratio is associated with an increase of 7.51% and an average increase of 7.47% of 
a standard deviation in bank’s Z-scores when estimated by OLS and Heckman 
models, respectively. This finding holds after dividing the sample into pre- and 
post-2007 periods, where the economic impact is around 8% before 2007, and 6% 
after 2007. 
 3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies how securitization affects bank risk measured by Z-
score. To address the endogeneity problem in securitization, identifications such 
as a Heckman self-selection model and an instrumental variable approach, are 
employed. The empirical structure also includes three instruments, i) state-level 
corporate tax rate; ii) peer liquidity index; and, iii) state-level corporate tax rate 
× peer liquidity index; in both analyses. Among all specifications, empirical results 
are consistent and robust. Therefore, the findings show that the involvement of 
securitization decreases bank risk measured by Z-score.   
Concerning the severe economic environmental change before and after 
the 2007-09 financial crisis, it is interesting to study the possible change. The 
sample period is thus divided into pre- and post-crisis periods. Although the results 
are generally consistent with the main findings, that securitization ratios are 
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positively and significantly correlated to bank’s Z-scores, a significant economic 
significance change after the breakout of the 2007-09 crisis is spotted. In addition, 
the additional tests show disparate impacts between mortgage and non-mortgage 
securitizations. Mortgage securitization is not likely to help banks to reduce bank 
risk, while non-mortgage securitization could provide efficient risk transferring. 
Finally, the empirical results suggest that loan sale activities respond to a similar 
positive impact on bank risk.  
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Statistics are based on the panel data including 342 secuiritizers and 8,483 non-securitizers during the period of 
2002 to 2012, accounting for total bank-year observations of 77,598. Previous periods are not included because U.S. banks are only required to provide detailed information on their securitization 
activities from June 2001. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.A. Concerning the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the time period is divided into before- and after-2007 to check the 
difference. Panel A reports the statistics of securitizers and non-securitizers, respectively. Statistics of mean, median, and standard deviation are reported. Panel B shows the comparative statistics of: 
1.the difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods, where the difference is calculated by the value after 2007 minus the value before 2007; and, 2.the difference between securitizers and non-
securitizers, where the difference is calculated by the value of securitizers minus the value of non-securitizers. Differences in the number and proportion of failed banks are showed with regards to 
variable of bank failure, while differences in means and medians are showed for the rest of variables. Information on t-test on means and medians are also showed in Panel B. 
Panel A: Statistics for securitizers and non-securitizers 
           
  
 Securitizers  Non-securitizers 
  before 2007 after 2007  before 2007 after 2007 
Dependent variable                                
 mean median SD Obs. mean median SD Obs.  mean median SD Obs. mean median SD Obs. 
Z-score 1.05 0.96 0.45 1,534 0.64 1.04 1.01 1,598  1.05 1.02 0.34 36,221 0.61 0.96 0.98 38,245 
Securitization regressors                   
Total securitization ratio% 13.24 4.00 56.54 1,534 7.08 1.46 30.78 1,598  - - - - - - - - 
Bank-specific control variables                  
Total retained interest ratio% 4.28 1.75 14.33 1,534 5.26 0.00 20.00 1,598  - - - - - - - - 
Bank size 13.23 12.68 2.01 1,534 13.36 12.97 1.86 1,598  11.65 11.54 1.19 36,221 11.94 11.84 1.19 38,245 
Diversification ratio% 25.55 14.24 25.56 1,534 24.44 14.04 25.28 1,598  12.55 10.56 10.10 36,221 11.97 9.99 10.78 38,245 
Bank liquidity ratio% 22.60 21.01 12.84 1,534 20.65 18.77 12.15 1,598  23.33 21.06 14.63 36,221 22.15 19.46 14.92 38,245 
Non-interest expense ratio% 3.38 2.86 1.96 1,534 3.34 2.93 1.69 1,598  3.07 2.88 1.20 36,221 3.13 2.93 1.23 38,245 
Non-performing loans ratio% 1.89 0.48 3.58 1,534 2.55 0.36 4.63 1,598  1.53 0.23 3.02 36,221 1.54 0.09 3.30 38,245 
Local-market power 2.29 0.02 5.42 1,534 2.47 0.03 5.82 1,598  0.46 0.01 2.40 36,221 0.51 0.01 2.50 38,245 
Bank holding company dummy 0.86 1.00 0.34 1,534 0.90 1.00 0.30 1,598  0.82 1.00 0.39 36,221 0.83 1.00 0.38 38,245 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummy 
0.79 1.00 0.41 1,534 0.78 1.00 0.41 1,598   0.61 1.00 0.49 36,221 0.61 1.00 0.49 38,245 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics (continued) 
Panel B: Difference between securitizers and non-securitizers         
 Difference with the reference of 2007/2008 financial crisis   Difference between securitizers and non-securitizers 
 difference = value after 2007 - value before 2007  difference = value of securitizer - value of non-securitizer 
  Securitizers Non-securitizers  Before 2007 After 2007 
Dependent variable               
statistic Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means  Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means 
Bank failure 4.84% a* 6.21% a  0.04% a -1.33% a 
statistic 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Dif 
mean 
Dif 
med. 
t-test on mean and 
med. 
Z-score -0.42 0.08 a -0.43 -0.05 a, b  0.01 -0.06 a, b 0.03 0.07 a 
Securitization regressor               
Total securitization ratio% -6.16 -2.54 a, b - - -  - - - - - - 
Bank-specific control variables              
Total retained interest 
ratio% 
0.98 -1.75 b - - -  - - - - - - 
Bank size 0.14 0.29 a, b 0.29 0.29 a, b  1.58 1.14 a, b 1.42 1.13 a, b 
Diversification ratio% -1.10 -0.20 - -0.58 -0.57 a, b  13.00 3.68 a, b 12.47 4.05 a, b 
Bank liquidity ratio% -1.95 -2.25 a, b -1.18 -1.60 a, b  -0.73 -0.05 a -1.49 -0.69 a, b 
Non-interest expense ratio% -0.04 0.07 b 0.06 0.05 a, b  0.31 -0.01 a 0.21 0.01 a 
Non-performing loans ratio% 0.66 -0.12 a, b 0.01 -0.14 b  0.36 0.25 a, b 1.01 0.27 a, b 
Local-market power 0.19 0.01 b 0.04 0.00 a, b  1.82 0.02 a, b 1.97 0.03 a, b 
Bank holding company 
dummy 
0.04 0.00 a 0.01 0.00 a  0.05 0.00 a 0.08 0.00 a 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummy 
-0.01 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 -   0.17 0.00 a 0.17 0.00 a 
NOTE: * the letter "a" and "b" indicate a significant difference of means and medians at 1% level, respectively.        
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Table 3.2: Baseline results – OLS estimation 
Table 3.2 shows the baseline results on the impact of total loan securitization ratio on bank's 
Z-scores. The sample period is 2002-2012. Control variables include retained interest ratio, 
bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing 
loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan 
statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.A. The baseline 
results based on Z-score, three years rolling Z-score, and five years rolling Z-score are reported 
in column (1) to (3), respectively. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable Z-score   
3-year rolling 
Z-score 
5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Total securitization ratio%t-1 0.066***  0.058**  0.035*** 
 
(0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)       
Total retained interest ratio%t-1 0.017  0.004  -0.009 
 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)       
Bank sizet-1 -0.100***  -0.079***  -0.055*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)       
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.140**  0.145***  0.137*** 
 (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
      
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.623**  -0.472**  -0.390** 
 (0.29)  (0.20)  (0.16) 
      
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.179  0.020  0.027 
 (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
      
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.145***  0.131***  0.120*** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
      
Local-market powert-1 0.022  0.027  0.024 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
      
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.043***  -0.038***  -0.030*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
      
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.030  -0.013  -0.009 
 
(0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)       
Constant 1.571***  1.311***  1.020*** 
 
(0.12)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
Bank fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 69,258  69,258  69,258 
Adjusted-R² 0.2446   0.2534   0.2504 
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Table 3.3: Heckman self-selection estimation 
Table 3.3 shows results on the impact of total loan securitization ratio on bank's Z-scores using 
Heckman self-selection model. The sample period is 2002-2012. Control variables include 
retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense 
ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy 
and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.A. 
The regression introduces three instruments: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer 
liquidity index; and 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. Only the second-
step results are reported in columns (1) to (3), respectively. The first-step results are reported 
in Appendix 3.C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score  
 Heckman self-selection model 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Instrument 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Total securitization ratio%t-1 0.218***  0.213***  0.247** 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.09)       
Total retained interest ratio%t-1 0.280***  0.280***  0.322* 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.14)       
Bank sizet-1 -0.055**  -0.129***  -0.356*** 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.26)       
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.131  0.142***  0.502*** 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.29) 
      
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -14.734  -1.335**  -0.351*** 
 (10.76)  (1.25)  (0.31) 
      
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.221  0.052  -4.421*** 
 (0.31)  (0.29)  (2.52) 
      
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 -0.006  -0.026**  -0.484*** 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.86) 
      
Local-market powert-1 0.484***  -0.446***  -0.226** 
 (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
      
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.067*  -0.075*  -3.238*** 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (2.86) 
      
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-
1 -0.099***  -0.091***  -16.79* 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (8.69)       
Constant 1.616***  3.204***  1.671*** 
 (0.48)  (0.80)  (1.34)       
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.235***  -0.243***  -0.488*** 
  (0.07)   (0.08)   (0.13) 
Bank fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes 
Observations 69,258   69,258   69,258 
Adjusted-R² 0.4346   0.3446    0.3418  
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Table 3.4: 2SLS estimation 
Table 3.4 shows results on the impact of total loan securitization ratio on bank's Z-scores using 
2SLS estimation. The sample period is 2002-2012. Control variables include retained interest 
ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-
performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and 
metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.A. 
The regression introduces three instruments: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer 
liquidity index; and 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. Only the second-
step results are reported in columns (1) to (3), respectively. The first-step results are reported 
in Appendix 3.C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 2SLS model 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Instrument 
(Corporate tax 
rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Total securitization ratio%t-1 0.233***  0.202***  0.287*** 
 (0.08)  (0.27)  (0.10)       
Total retained interest ratio%t-1 1.674**  1.927***  3.047*** 
 (0.71)  (0.72)  (4.08)       
Bank sizet-1 -0.054***  -0.058***  -0.074*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)       
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.090***  0.096***  0.142*** 
 (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.04) 
      
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.344  -0.318  -0.212 
 (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.54) 
      
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 -1.273  -1.020**  -1.513** 
 (0.86)  (1.89)  (0.97) 
      
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 -0.304  -0.367**  -0.606** 
 (0.32)  (0.34)  (1.10) 
      
Local-market powert-1 0.041  0.037  -0.126 
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.30) 
      
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.056***  -0.024  -0.050*** 
 (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.01) 
      
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummyt-1 -0.017**  -0.015*  -0.007 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)       
Constant 1.074***  1.284**  1.119*** 
 (0.09)  (0.63)  (0.08) 
Bank fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes   Yes   Yes 
Observations 69,258   69,258   69,258 
Adjusted-R² 0.4579   0.4928    0.4579  
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Table 3.5: Split sample analysis 
Table 3.5 shows the baseline results using split samples referring to the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. The full sample is divided into before- and after-2007 periods. Control variables include 
retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense 
ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy 
and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.A. 
Results on before and after 2007 subsamples using OLS estimators are reported in Panel A. 
Heckman self-selection model and 2SLS are employed as two additional identifications to 
address the endogeneity problem, where three instruments are introduced: 1) state-level 
corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; and 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer 
liquidity index. The second-step results of Heckman model are reported in Panel B, while 
results using 2SLS estimations in Panel C, respectively. The first-step results are reported in 
Appendix 3.C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Split sample analysis, OLS 
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 OLS 
 (1) (2) 
Time period before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t-1 0.347** 0.442* 
 (0.33) (0.33) 
Total retained interest ratio%t-1 0.034 0.000 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.007** -0.112*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.066 0.110* 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.446*** -1.025* 
 (0.10) (0.61) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.012 -0.073 
 (0.11) (0.08) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.762** 0.133*** 
 (0.49) (0.04) 
Local-market powert-1 0.026 0.035 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.003** -0.035* 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.404*** 1.708*** 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 29,638 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2185 0.2781 
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Table 3.5: Split sample analysis (continued) 
Panel B: Split sample analysis, Heckman model     
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 Heckman self-selection model 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Time period before 2007  after 2007 
Total securitization 
ratio%t-1 0.182*** 0.179*** 0.194***  0.212*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Total retained interest 
ratio%t-1 0.269*** 0.275*** 0.264***  0.278*** 0.272*** 0.276*** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.149*** -0.188*** -0.118***  -0.005 -0.045 -0.023 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.268** 0.254* 0.287**  0.011 0.026 -0.017 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -4.143 -39.553 -18.738*  -14.110 -12.982 -13.476* 
 (57.67) (51.49) (60.52)  (10.70) (11.16) (10.85) 
Non-interest expense 
ratio%t-1 0.362 0.283 0.366  0.160 0.113 0.116 
 (0.35) (0.31) (0.36)  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Non-performing loans 
ratio%t-1 0.005 -0.187 0.078  -0.030 -0.061 -0.042 
 (0.79) (0.91) (0.71)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Local-market powert-1 0.598*** 0.383* 0.596***  0.443*** 0.462*** 0.445*** 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19)  (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Bank holding company 
dummyt-1 0.066 0.054 0.051  -0.145*** -0.159*** -0.150*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Metropolitan statistical 
area dummyt-1 -0.017 -0.024 -0.030  -0.119*** -0.116*** -0.117*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 3.182*** 3.997*** 2.591***  0.669 1.592** 1.080* 
 (0.80) (1.03) (0.72)  (0.64) (0.71) (0.58) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.430*** -0.084** -0.348***  -0.541*** -0.246** -0.155** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,638 29,638 29,638   39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.4374  0.3029  0.4444   0.3294  0.3712  0.3544 
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Table 3.5: Split sample analysis (continued) 
Panel C: Split sample analysis, 2SLS estimation     
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Instrument 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
(Corporate 
tax rate) 
(Peer liquidity 
index) 
(Interaction 
term) 
Time period before 2007  after 2007 
Total securitization 
ratio%t-1 0.080** 0.078** 0.118**  0.265** 0.228** 0.285** 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.12)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.14) 
Total retained interest 
ratio%t-1 4.137** 3.497 3.532**  0.465 -10.883 0.045** 
 (1.82) (11.56) (1.71)  (0.32) (11.70) (0.35) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.059**  -0.025*** -0.128*** -0.030*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.34)  (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.177** 0.164** -0.053  -0.022 0.428 -0.009 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.56)  (0.03) (0.46) (0.03) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 0.039 -0.123 -2.727*  -0.399* -0.942* -0.341** 
 (1.50) (1.39) (6.63)  (0.22) (1.53) (0.21) 
Non-interest expense 
ratio%t-1 2.651* -2.223 2.922  1.071*** 0.434 -4.945 
 (1.59) (1.36) (8.65)  (0.40) (0.44) (5.39) 
Non-performing loans 
ratio%t-1 -1.228 -1.035 2.180  2.588 -36.289 -0.673 
 (0.94) (0.84) (8.03)  (1.89) (46.85) (1.60) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.020 0.204*** -0.012  0.121*** 0.115*** 0.723*** 
 (0.17) (0.73) (0.15)  (0.04) (0.04) (1.10) 
Bank holding company 
dummyt-1 -0.001*** -0.213*** -0.011  -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.098*** 
 (0.03) (0.48) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.20) (0.01) 
Metropolitan statistical 
area dummyt-1 -0.004 -0.077 -0.008  -0.024*** 0.023 -0.021*** 
 (0.02) (0.17) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Constant 1.505*** 1.398*** 1.228***  0.678*** 1.856* 0.745*** 
 (0.17) (0.19) (3.84)  (0.05) (1.12) (0.06) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,638 29,638 29,638   39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2719 0.3932 0.4754   0.4648 0.3022 0.4819 
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Table 3.6: Weighted least squares estimation 
Table 3.6 reports the results of the impact of securitization ratios on bank's Z-scores using a 
propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares estimator. To test the consistency of 
the results, this regression uses a full sample and a 1:1 matched subsample including 
securitizers and non-securitizers with a propensity score distance within 1%. Within each 
sample, the propensity scores are used as the weights to conduct a least squares estimation. 
The sample period is from 2002 to 2012.The sample period is also divided into pre- and post-
crisis subsamples. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 3.A. Control variables 
include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest 
expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company 
dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full sample 1:1 sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.209*** 0.196*** 0.172*** 0.220*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Total retained interest ratio%t 0.238*** 0.126*** 0.307*** 0.163*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Bank sizet -0.033*** -0.016*** -0.046*** -0.030*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Diversification ratio%t 0.036*** 0.112* -0.014 0.085*** 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t -0.400 8.398 -0.651 0.969 
 (0.54) (8.73) (0.61) (1.38) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t -0.600*** -0.394*** -0.675*** -0.562*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -0.150*** -0.047*** 6.109*** 0.111*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.87) (0.01) 
Local-market powert 0.073*** 0.292*** 0.103*** 0.024 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.116*** -0.159*** -0.125*** -0.105*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummyt -0.020*** -0.070*** -0.006* -0.027*** 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.766*** 0.225*** 0.913*** 0.725*** 
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 77,598 6,264 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2658 0.1726 0.2046 0.2429 
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Table 3.7: Mortgage and non-mortgage securitization 
Table 3.7 presents regression results on the impact of mortgage and non-mortgage securitization on bank 
Z-scores, using OLS and Heckman self-selection estimations. Results using OLS are reported in Panel A. 
Second-step results using Heckman model on mortgage and non-mortgage are reported in Panel B and C, 
respectively. The first-step results are reported in Appendix 3.C. The sample period is 2002-2012. The 
full sample is also divided into before- and after-2007 periods to explore the differences referring to the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification 
ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, 
bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. Instrumental variables include: 
1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; and, 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer 
liquidity index. All independent variables are lagged in OLS regressions. Bank and year fixed effects are 
controlled in OLS regression. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 3.A. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: OLS estimation  
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
Mortgage securitization 
ratio%t-1 0.109 -0.045 -0.206    
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.20)    
Mortgage retained interest 
ratio%t-1 0.008 0.034 0.243***    
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)    
Non-mortgage securitization ratio%t-1  0.247*** 0.310*** 0.198*** 
    (0.15) (0.91) (0.04) 
Non-mortgage retained interest ratio%t-1 0.007 0.007 -0.008 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.079*** -0.007 -0.195*** -0.079*** -0.007 -0.146*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.163*** 0.180** 0.107 0.145*** 0.066 0.284** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.469** -0.446*** 8.222 -0.472** -0.442*** 5.414 
 (0.20) (0.10) (53.37) (0.20) (0.10) (58.03) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-
1 0.037 0.013 1.634*** 0.024 0.011 0.273 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.25) (0.08) (0.11) (0.35) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-
1 0.131*** 0.757 0.263 0.128*** 0.725 0.251 
 (0.03) (0.48) (0.96) (0.03) (0.47) (0.80) 
Local-market powert-1 0.027 0.026 0.543** 0.027 0.026 0.624*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.19) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.038*** 0.003 0.014 -0.038*** 0.003 0.062 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummyt-1 -0.013 -0.012 -0.008 -0.013 -0.012 -0.024 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
Constant 1.317*** 0.404*** 4.144*** 1.312*** 0.403*** 3.189*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.87) (0.09) (0.12) (0.82) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 29,638 39,620 69,258 29,638 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.4533 0.4781 0.4308 0.4120 0.4253 0.4187 
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Table 3.7: Mortgage and non-mortgage securitization 
Panel B: second-step results on mortgage securitization      
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Instrument (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) 
Time period full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Mortgage securitization ratio%t-1 0.154 0.149 0.151 0.115 0.102 0.089 0.178 0.177 0.178 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Mortgage retained interest ratio%t-1 0.088* 0.083* 0.081* 0.079 0.081 0.070 0.107* 0.101 0.100 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.063*** -0.085*** -0.081*** -0.061*** -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.051*** -0.051** -0.064*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.338*** 0.347*** 0.349*** 0.407*** 0.408*** 0.421*** 0.257*** 0.266*** 0.266*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -13.167 -12.492 -12.538 -5.110 -5.709 -5.124 -13.372 -13.381 -12.608 
 (8.16) (8.49) (8.39) (13.63) (13.40) (13.32) (10.31) (10.32) (10.54) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 -0.891** -0.924*** -0.858** 0.203 0.335 0.347 -2.572*** -2.741*** -2.564*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.058 0.025 0.035 0.612 0.308 0.429 -0.000 -0.004 -0.018 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.47) (0.62) (0.59) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.010 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.018 -0.004 -0.017 0.005 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.095*** -0.116*** -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.121*** -0.114*** -0.094** -0.101** -0.098** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.050*** -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.032 -0.042* -0.042* -0.054** -0.052* -0.059** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 1.550*** 2.101*** 1.983*** 1.250*** 2.201*** 2.218*** 1.503*** 1.511*** 1.812*** 
 (0.32) (0.49) (0.30) (0.44) (0.79) (0.45) (0.43) (0.57) (0.40) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.190*** -0.301*** -0.279*** -0.091 -0.282* -0.286*** -0.208** -0.208* -0.273*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2542 0.2643 0.2356 0.3343  0.3225  0.3214 0.3446  0.3645  0.3574  
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Table 3.7: Mortgage and non-mortgage securitization 
Panel C: second-step results on non-mortgage securitization     
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Instrument (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) (Corporate tax rate) (Peer liquidity index) (Interaction term) 
Time period full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Non-Mortgage securitization ratio%t-1 0.137*** 0.125*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.130*** 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Non-Mortgage retained interest ratio%t-1 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.010 0.106* 0.105 0.105 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.049* -0.055** -0.048* -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.092*** 0.010 -0.014 0.006 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 -0.470*** -0.479*** -0.474*** -0.546*** -0.551*** -0.550*** -0.451*** -0.456*** -0.450*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.427 -0.438 -0.415 -0.269 -0.274 -0.246 -9.996 -10.033 -9.910 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.76) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (12.06) (12.28) (12.10) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.476 0.550*** 0.475 0.612 0.568*** 0.577 0.558 0.577 0.559 
 (0.31) (0.17) (0.31) (0.39) (0.15) (0.39) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 -0.066 -0.066 -0.065 -0.562 -0.569 -0.545 -0.116** -0.113* -0.115** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Local-market powert-1 0.544*** 0.520*** 0.548*** 0.764*** 0.660*** 0.775*** 0.409*** 0.412*** 0.407*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.239*** -0.239*** -0.241*** -0.100** -0.107** -0.102** -0.357*** -0.355*** -0.358*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.102*** 0.015 0.010 0.017 -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 1.918*** 2.064*** 1.914*** 2.474*** 2.515*** 2.450*** 1.021 1.493** 1.101 
 (0.54) (0.51) (0.53) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.73) (0.67) (0.72) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.306*** -0.330*** -0.305*** -0.376*** -0.383*** -0.372*** -0.185* -0.257** -0.197* 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258 29,638 29,638 29,638 39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2212 0.2173 0.2206 0.2965  0.3005  0.2964 0.3001  0.2964  0.3157  
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Table 3.8: Loan sale estimation, full sample 
Table 3.8 presents regression results of the impact of loan sales on bank Z-scores, using OLS 
and Heckman self-selection models in Z-score regression. The sample period is 2002-2012. The 
full sample is also divided into before- and after-2007 periods to explore the differences 
referring to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Results using full sample, sample before 2007 and 
after 2007 are reported in Panel A, B, and C, respectively. Control variables include bank size, 
diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, 
local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area 
dummy. All independent variables are lagged in OLS and Heckman models. Bank and year fixed 
effects are controlled in OLS and Heckman models. All variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix 3.A. In Heckman regressions, only second-step results are reported in Table 3.8 and 
the first-step results in Appendix 3.C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: full sample    
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample 
 OLS Heckman 
Loan sale ratio%t-1 0.240*** 0.171*** 0.273*** 0.272*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.079*** -0.022*** -0.016 -0.015** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.146*** 0.032 0.026 0.026 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.469** -0.344 -0.371** -0.359 
 (0.20) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.011 -0.215** -0.214** -0.205 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.132*** 0.058 0.055** 0.055** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Local-market powert-1 0.027 0.096** 0.090** 0.088* 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 -0.038*** -0.120*** -0.113*** -0.110*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.013 -0.019** -0.020*** -0.021*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 1.309*** 0.780*** 0.659*** 0.623*** 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.21) (0.13) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.086*** -0.060*** -0.053** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258 69,258 
Adjusted-R² 0.4650 0.4506 0.4302 0.3968 
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Table 3.8: Loan sale estimation, before 2007 
Panel B: before 2007    
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Before 2007 
 OLS Heckman 
Loan sale ratio%t-1 0.192*** 0.179*** 0.218*** 0.217*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.120*** -0.022*** -0.050*** -0.038*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.299** 0.084** -0.049 -0.055 
 (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -8.018 -5.379 -0.289 -0.252 
 (60.77) (6.64) (0.54) (0.54) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.431 -0.710*** 0.379* 0.454** 
 (0.36) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.119 0.046 0.877* 0.936** 
 (0.73) (0.04) (0.46) (0.43) 
Local-market powert-1 0.647*** 0.066 0.139** 0.149** 
 (0.19) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 0.046 -0.141*** -0.114*** -0.106*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.033 -0.024** -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 2.687*** 0.819*** 1.277*** 1.044*** 
 (0.74) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.088** -0.182*** -0.139*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 29,638 29,638 29,638 29,638 
Adjusted-R² 0.4898 0.3548 0.3433 0.3295 
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Table 3.8: Loan sale estimation, after 2007 
Panel C: after 2007    
Dependent Variable 5-year rolling Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 After 2007 
 OLS Heckman 
Loan sale ratio%t-1 0.201** 0.209*** 0.276*** 0.278*** 
 (0.61) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.007 -0.059*** -0.037*** -0.020** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio%t-1 0.066 -0.043 0.086** 0.081** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t-1 -0.439*** -0.199 -5.334 -5.508 
 (0.10) (0.53) (6.76) (6.62) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t-1 0.016 0.434** -0.687*** -0.699*** 
 (0.11) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t-1 0.744 0.825* 0.044 0.046 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.04) (0.04) 
Local-market powert-1 0.026 0.157** 0.087 0.062 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Bank holding company dummyt-1 0.003 -0.118*** -0.173*** -0.136*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt-1 -0.012 0.003 -0.019* -0.024** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.405*** 1.463*** 1.147*** 0.762*** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.24) (0.17) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.221*** -0.164*** -0.076** 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 39,620 39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.5425 0.3606 0.3488 0.3344 
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Chapter 4 
Bank securitization and the likelihood of 
failure 
4.1 Introduction 
Further to the evidence provided in Chapter 3 regarding bank risk reduction 
effect of securitization, this chapter is concerned with shedding further light as 
to whether the risk reduction effect is temporary.  The 2007-09 financial crisis 
highlighted the gradual deterioration in the credit quality of assets (Demyanyk 
and Hemert, 2011) due to the lower standard in lending encouraged by 
securitization. Therefore, the question arises as to whether, securitization could 
decrease bank risk in the short term, but increase the long-term risk, or even 
leading to the likelihood of bank failure.  
For example, the main argument of supporters of securitization is that it 
could increase a bank’s potential risk due to information asymmetry (An, Deng 
and Gabriel, 2011). In the case of securitization, information asymmetry theory 
suggests that the issuers could hide or take advantage of their private information, 
bringing about moral hazard or adverse selection problems (Acharya, Schnabl and 
Suarez, 2013). In securitization, moral hazard problem refers to the situation 
where issuers lack the  incentive to carefully monitor loans or screen borrowers 
(Kahn and Winton, 2004; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Hartman-Glaser, 
Piskorski, and Tchistyi, 2012; Chemla and Hennessy, 2014), while adverse 
selection is the situation where issuers hideg  hard or soft information, in order to 
earn higher reputations or ratings by ignoring the potential risk (An, Deng, and 
Gabriel, 2011; Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas, 2012; Benmelech, Dlugosz, and 
Ivashina, 2012). Both these problems would lead to the “illusion of risk 
transferring”; that is, the risk stays inside the institutions but are not transferred 
to outside investors. Therefore, securitization activities can in turn increase the 
likelihood of bank failure. 
This chapter investigates the likelihood of bank failure using data on U.S. 
banking industry during the period 2002 to 2012. The dependent variable in the 
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analysis is bank failure dummy and a logit regression is used to estimate the 
association between securitization ratio and the bank failure dummy. There is the 
concern that the relationship identified by the baseline framework could be 
endogenous. On the one hand, small banks may not prefer securitizing loans due 
to substantial large amount of upfront fixed costs. On the other hand, banks with 
higher reputation are more likely to be frequent securitizers because of a lower 
lemon discounts (Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 
1986). Therefore, several methods are used to address this issue. First, a 
proportional hazards function is employed to estimate the relationship between 
bank loan securitization and the likelihood of bank failure. This method could 
provide the possibility of bank failure based on the estimated survival time 
through the entire sample period. The results suggest that bank loan securitization 
by commercial banks is positively associated with the likelihood of bank failure. A 
1% increase in total securitization ratio increases the possibility of bank failure by 
an average of 0.57%. A propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares 
estimation method is also used in the investigation, where the weights are 
inversely proportional to the probability of a bank being a securitizer. An assigned 
propensity scores (represented by ?̂?) estimated by a probit regression using the 
following control variables: bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-
interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local market power index, 
bank holding company (BHC) dummy, and metropolitan statistical area (MSA) 
dummy is utilised in the study. A securitizer receives a weight of 1/ ?̂?, while a 
non-securitizer receives a weight of 1/(1 − ?̂?). A matched subsample including 
unique pairs of securitizer and non-securitizer with a difference of propensity 
score within 1% is also implemented in the study. All the results are consistent 
with the main results. 
The 2007-09 financial crisis suddenly dried out the liquidity in the market, 
as well as the securitization activities (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Thus, it is 
reasonable to expect the impact of securitization to decrease because of a 
significant reduction in scale of the securitization market. Therefore, the sample 
period is divided into pre- and post-crisis subsamples in all estimations. The pre-
crisis period cover the years from 2002 to 2007, while the post-crisis period is from 
2007 to 2012. The reported results show that the impact of securitization on the 
likelihood of bank failure are positive and statistically significant in both periods, 
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but the economic significance decreases after the start of the financial crisis. 
Overall, the sub-sample results still support the main results. 
This study also investigates the potential differences between mortgage 
and non-mortgage securitizations. Mortgage loans are also easier to be securitized 
thanks to the higher quality and stronger degree of commoditisation (Altunbas, 
Gambacorta, and Marques-Ibanez, 2009). Mortgage securitizers are expected to 
more aggressive to take on more risk and lower their lending standards considering 
their potential risk can be easily shifted to the third parties. Thus, mortgage 
securitization is criticized more severely for deteriorating loan qualities and 
leading to potential problems (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). Therefore, mortgage 
securitization is expected to be more strongly related to the likelihood of bank 
failure than non-mortgage securitization. To test the hypothesis, a breakdown of 
securitization into mortgage and non-mortgage groups is performed. The results 
show that mortgage securitization ratios are more significantly related to the 
likelihood of bank failure. 
Finally, a test of the impact of loan sales on the likelihood of bank failure 
is investigated. Similar to securitization, loan sales without recourse also increase 
sellers’ incentives to apply weaker managerial standards (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 
2004). It is expected that loan sale ratios will significantly be related to the 
likelihood of bank failure. Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012), loan sales are 
defined by the difference between 1) the outstanding principal balance of assets 
owned by others, with servicing retained by the bank, and 2) the outstanding 
principal balance of assets sold and securitized by the bank. The reported results 
suggest that loan sales also increase the likelihood of bank failure in the long run. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops 
the empirical hypotheses. Section 3 explains the main methodologies used in the 
study and their theoretical underpinnings, the variables and samples, and provide 
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the main results. Section 5 includes the 
robustness tests and section 6 provides the summary and conclusions. 
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4.2 Hypothesis development 
Information asymmetry theory suggests that securitization could increase 
bank risk, as there naturally exists unequal information between issuers and 
investors in their transaction. Houston et al. (2010) argue that lower information 
sharing leads to higher riskiness of banks.  In this case, demandable-debt has an 
important advantage as part of an incentive scheme for disciplining the banker. 
In effect, demandable-debt permits depositors to “vote with their feet” (Calomiris 
and Kahn, 1991): withdrawal of funds is a vote of no-confidence in the activities 
of the banker. However, securitization introduces moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems by hiding hard or soft information. Hard information is more 
likely to be made public, and difficult to cover up, while soft information, in most 
cases, is private and easily hidden.  
Moral hazard problem refers to the situation where there is asymmetry in 
information between issues and investors and issuers can choose to hide their hard 
information advantage. In this case, issuers could securitize good assets as an 
indicator of the entire portfolio, and take advantage of it to retain the lower 
finance cost. As issuers’ rating is based on the characteristics that are reported to 
investors, in fact, they cover up the unreported, possibly negative, hard 
information of other tranches. It could result in a reduced incentive of issuers to 
carefully screen borrowers and monitor the loans. The logic here is 
straightforward: lenders that sell loans they originate to dispersed investors may 
bear less of the cost when they default, hence issuers may have less incentive to 
screen borrowers carefully.  
Key et al. (2012) argue that lenders have an incentive to originate loans 
that rate high, but loans that are easier to securitize suffer from more relax 
screening. Wang and Xia (2014) suggest that banks exert less effort on ex post 
monitoring loans when they can securitize them. Ahn and Breton (2014) also argue 
that when securitized banks, or the issuers, retain only insufficient skin in the 
game, the incentives will get distorted along the securitization chain, leading to 
lax monitoring and screening, even intentional sales of low quality loans (similar 
ideas can refer: Morrison, 2005; Parlour and Plantin, 2008).  
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However, as the potential risk is not transferred, hiding hard information 
results in the “illusion of risk transferring” (Murray, 2001). Agarwal, Chang and 
Yavas (2012) find banks in prime mortgage market are more likely to sell low-
default-risk loans while retaining higher-default-risk ones in their portfolio and 
argue that issuers could purchase better rating by doing this.  
Adverse selection problem refers to the situation of asymmetry in 
information prior to the deal, which could happen if issuers took advantage of 
their private soft information. In this case, issuers choose to securitize those loans 
which would become worse as good ones. Duffee and Zhou (2001) find that issuers 
have an incentive to sell the loans of the borrowers whose private information is 
negative. Downing, Jaffee and Wallace (2009) also show that Freddie Mac sells 
lower-credit-quality mortgage-backed securities than it retains in its portfolio. 
Although securitizing bad loans out seems to reduce bank risk, it will increase bank 
risk eventually. 
The explanations are as follows. Adverse selection theory suggests that as 
investors’ best guess for a given asset in securitization market is of average quality 
because of the possibility of private information, a lemon market exists. In this 
case, investors with insufficient information would be unwilling to pay high price. 
Lenders, in turn, would not willing sell their high-quality loans in the market. This 
effect could cause a market level bank risk, as the entire asset quality could 
deteriorate to a level that the market would cease to exist (Akerlof, 1970). 
Apart from the individual effect of positive impact of securitization on bank 
risk, contagion theory considers this issue at an industrial level. A large number 
of studies investigate the contagion effect in banking, which suggests that the 
risk, initially an idiosyncratic shock on one entity, spills over to other entities 
(Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas et al., 2000; Diamond and 
Rajan, 2005). Specifying on securitization, Baur and Joossens (2006) argue that 
securitization would increase systemic risk of the entire banking sector, though it 
may transfer potential risks of individual banks to others. They provide two 
explanations. First, if the risks are transferred to unregulated market participants, 
there is less capital in the economy to cover these risks. Second, if other banks 
invest in the asset-backed securities in the market, the transferred risk would 
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cause interbank linkages to grow. Both these effects would eventually negatively 
impact on other individuals in the market. 
Fiordelisi and Marques-Ibanez (2013) suggest that this systemic risk is 
related to contagion among banks due to securitization. Similarly, Nijskens and 
Wagner (2011) also argue that while securitized banks may individually look less 
risky because of the volatility declines, they pose more risk to other individuals 
and the entire system. Managerial and regulatory policies may improve this 
situation, but securitization could also weaken the benefits. Akhigbe and Madura 
(2001) argue that a bank’s exposure to possible contagion effects due to bank 
failure can be partially controlled by those two types of policies, but securitization 
activities have been shown to soften the ability of authorities. 
Another industrial level impact of securitization comes from the so-called 
“shadow banking system”. Securitization has been suggested as one of the most 
significant contributors to this unregulated system (Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny 
(GSV), 2013). As intermediaries expand their balance sheets by buying risky 
projects, they increase the systematic risk of their portfolios, raise their leverage, 
and endogenously become interconnected by sharing each other’s risks. Although 
the expansion of the shadow banking system may be Pareto-improving, as in 
standard models of risk sharing (Ross, 1976; Allen and Gale, 1994), GSV (2013) 
argue that things will change dramatically when investors and intermediaries 
neglect tail risk, because they may not believe in truly bad outcomes during quiet 
times. In this case, securitization activities could create extreme financial 
fragility, undermining the regulated banking sector and leading to the financial 
crisis. Therefore, my main hypothesis is as follows: 
Bank loan securitization is likely to increase the likelihood of bank 
failure. 
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4.3 Data and methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
Securitization and bank-specific data were collected from the Reports of 
Income and Condition for commercial banks (the Call Report). Because U.S. banks 
are only required to provide detailed information on their securitization activities 
from June 2001, the annual data covers the period from 2002 to 2012. The final 
sample is an unbalanced panel made up of 342 banks with securitized loans and 
8,483 banks without totalling 77,598 bank-year observations. 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Bank failure dummy 
Bank failure dummy is denoted as one if a bank failed or is acquired by 
another bank under government assistance and zero otherwise. 
4.3.2.2 Securitization measures 
Studies on securitization are based on several different perspectives of the 
various authors. Some researchers prefer to investigate the general influence of 
securitization, where they mainly define the regressor of securitization as total 
securitized assets over total assets, as in Mandel et al. (2012). Recently, more 
studies focus on the differences among securities. For example, Solano et al. 
(2006), when discussing the effects of securitization on the value of banking 
institutions, distinguish mortgage-backed securities (MBS) from asset-backed 
securities (ABS). Other group of researches classify detailed categories of 
securitization. For example, Cheng et al. (2008) employ four different 
securitization variables, ABSt (total securitized assets divided by total assets), 
MBSt (securitized 1-4 family residential mortgages scaled by total assets), CONSBSt 
(securitized consumer loans scaled by total assets) and COMMBSt (securitized 
commercial loans scaled by total assets) to study the relationship between 
securitization and opacity of banks. The key independent variable in this research 
is 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐, which is defined as the ratio of the outstanding principal 
99 
 
balance of assets securitized over total assets for a given type (i.e., mortgage or 
non-mortgage loans). 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒅 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐  is defined as the total amount of retained 
interest divided by the total amount of securitization assets of a given type. It 
includes the aggregate retained interests into credit enhancements, liquidity 
provisions, and seller’s interest (similar definition can refer Casu and Sarkisyan, 
2014). A number of recent studies have considered the hypothesis that providing 
retained interests is a signalling mechanism which could partially solve 
information asymmetry problem when structuring securitization transactions 
(Downing, Jaffee and Wallace, 2009; Albertazzi et al., 2011). By the willingness 
to keep “skin in the game” to retain some risk, banks can signal their faith in the 
quality of their assets.  
Such signalling implies a positive relationship between the level of 
enhancements and the performance of securitized assets. Offering this 
contractual design features could also influence issuers’ effort to carefully screen 
borrowers when they plan to securitize loans (Fender and Michell, 2009). 
Albertazzi et al. (2011) conjecture that a securitizing sponsor can keep a junior 
(equity) tranche as a signaling device of the unobservable quality or as an 
expression of a commitment to continue monitoring the assets. Therefore, 
retained interests should decrease bank risk. including the aggregate retained 
interests into credit enhancements, liquidity provisions, and seller’s interest. The 
incentive of securitizers to carefully monitor loans could increase by providing 
enhancements which may decrease bank risk (Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace, 
2009). 
𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆  is the natural logarithm of total assets. The scale of banks 
matters much in the issue of risk taking. Based on Basel II Capital Accord, Hakenes 
and Schnabel (2011) analyze particularly the relationship between bank size and 
risk-taking behaviours and then discovered significant association. Using a model 
with imperfect competition and moral hazard, the results indicate that the right 
for banks to choose between standardized and internal ratings based approach 
pushes smaller banks to take higher risks, while gives larger banks a competitive 
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advantage. Therefore, the likelihood of bank failure can be higher for those larger 
banks.  
𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 indicates the diversification level of banks, which 
calculated as noninterest income divided by total operation income, as the 
approach of Stiroh (2004). The impact of diversification seems to be complicated 
sometimes, and even better diversification may not ensure it could translate into 
reduction in risk (Demsetz and Stranhan, 1999). Wagner (2010), presenting a two-
bank and three-period model, prove it theoretically that diversification is more 
likely to increase the crises, though it may reduce each institution's individual 
failure possibility. Because even full diversification helps little as systemic crises 
induce extra costs. This paper also shows the ability of extension, which can be 
employed in the insurance and securitization fields. 
𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐  is an indicator for banks' liquidity, specified as liquid 
assets divided by total asset. Higher liquidity could increase the chance of a bank 
to survive during liquidity shock but may also increase the likelihood of risk taking.  
𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒔𝒆 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 is an indicator of banks’ efficiency, defined 
as non-interest expenses divided by total assets. Non-interest expenses are usually 
not associated with targeting customers to deposit funds, which means they are 
more likely to increase the likelihood of failure (Lepetit et al., 2008).  
𝑵𝒐𝒏 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐, computed as the amount of loans past due 
90 days divided by total assets, reflects the risk management situation. Because 
non-performing loans are either in default or close to being in default, bank’s 
likelihood of failure can be positively related to the proportion of non-performing 
loans.  
Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), this study controls for banks’ 
𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓 which is defined as the deposit concentration for the local 
markets in which the bank operates. The larger the local market power, the 
greater a bank’s market power and concentration in its surroundings. This is a 
standard measure of competition used in antitrust analysis and research in the 
U.S. (Berger and Bouwman, 2013).  
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A bank holding company dummy (𝑩𝑯𝑪 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚) is used to control for 
whether it belongs to a bank holding company. 𝑩𝑯𝑪 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 equals one if the 
bank belongs to a bank holding company, and zero otherwise. A bank belonging to 
a bank holding company is expected to be more likely to survive, because the 
holding company is required to act as a source of strength to all the banks it owns 
(Houston and James, 1998; Paligorova and Xu, 2012). Finally, this study uses a 
metropolitan statistical area dummy (𝑴𝑺𝑨 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚), which equals one if the bank 
is located in a metropolitan area, and zero otherwise, to identify individual banks’ 
locations. Competition may be fiercer in metropolitan areas, and banks in 
suburban areas are more likely to have a more stable environment. 
4.3.3 Empirical strategy 
4.3.3.1 Baseline model 
To estimate the impact of loan securitization on the likelihood of bank 
failure, the logit regression is used as the baseline model: 
𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜹𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊,𝒕   (4.1) 
where 𝑷𝒓(𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒇𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕)  is the probability of bank failure, 
𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is the vector of total securitization ratio, 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is the 
vector of bank-specific control variables, 𝜶𝒊 is the individual difference, 𝜹𝒕 is the 
time variation that not related to individual charateristics, and 𝝁𝒊,𝒕  is the 
disturbance term. 
 4.3.3.2 Survival function 
In order to estimate the long-term effect of securitization, a survival 
function is employed. Theoretically, survival analysis is a branch of statistics 
which deals with analysis of time to events, such as death in biological organisms 
and failure in mechanical systems. This analysis attempts to find out: a) what 
proportion of a population will survive past a certain time; b) those that survive, 
at what percentage will they die or fail; c) whether multiple causes of death or 
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failure be taken into account; and d) how particular circumstances or 
characteristics increase or decrease the probability of survival. 
Assuming 𝑻  is a continuous random variable with probability density 
function f(t) and cumulative distribution function 𝑭(𝒕) = 𝑷𝒓{𝑻 <= 𝒕}, giving the 
probability that the event has occurred by duration t, so the survival function is 
as follows: 
𝑺(𝒕) = 𝑷𝒓{𝑻 > 𝒕} = 𝟏 − 𝑭(𝒕) = ∫ 𝒇(𝒙)𝒅𝒙
∞
𝒕
                                           (4.2) 
This function gives the probability that the event of interest has not 
occurred by duration 𝑡. 
An alternative characterization of the distribution of 𝑇  is given by the 
hazard function, defined as: 
𝝀(𝒕) = 𝐥𝐢𝐦
𝒅𝒕→𝟎
𝐏𝐫 {𝒕<𝑻≤𝒕+𝒅𝒕|𝑻>𝒕}
𝒅𝒕
                                                                  (4.3) 
The numerator of this expression is the conditional probability that the 
event will occur in the interval (𝒕, 𝒕 + 𝒅𝒕) given that it has not occurred before, 
and the denominator is the width of the interval. The conditional probability in 
the numerator may be written as the ratio of the joint probability that 𝑻 is in the 
interval (𝒕, 𝒕 + 𝒅𝒕) and 𝑻 > 𝒕, to the probability of the condition 𝑻 > 𝒕. The former 
may be written as 𝒇(𝒕)𝒅𝒕 for small 𝒅𝒕, while the latter is 𝑺(𝒕) by definition: 
𝝀(𝒕) =
𝒇(𝒕)
𝑺(𝒕)
                                                                                        (4.4) 
Noted that – 𝒇(𝒕) is the derivative of 𝑺(𝒕), the equation above could be 
rewritten as: 
𝝀(𝒕) = −
𝒅
𝒅𝒕
𝒍𝒐𝒈[𝑺(𝒕)]                                                                         (4.5) 
Therefore, if we can integrate from 𝟎 to 𝒕 and introduce the boundary 
condition 𝑺(𝟎) = 𝟏 (because the event will not occur for sure by a duration of 0), 
a formula for the probability of surviving to duration t could be obtained as: 
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𝑺(𝒕) = 𝒆𝒙𝒑 {−∫ 𝝀(𝒙)𝒅𝒙
𝒕
𝟎
}                                                                   (4.6) 
The integral in curly brackets is called the cumulative hazard, which might 
be considered as the sum of the risk a bank faces going from duration 𝟎 to 𝒕. 
In the following step, let 𝝁 denote the mean or expected value of 𝑻, then 
it can be calculated by the density function 𝒇(𝒕) by definition: 
𝝁 = ∫ 𝒕𝒇(𝒕)𝒅𝒕
∞
𝟎
                                                                                 (4.7) 
Considering that – 𝒇(𝒕) is the derivative of 𝑺(𝒕), and 𝑺(𝟎) = 𝟏&𝑺(∞) = 𝟎, 
so: 
𝝁 = ∫ 𝑺(𝒕)𝒅𝒕
∞
𝟎
                                                                                 (4.8) 
In other words, the mean is simply the integral of the survival function. 
In practice, suppose we have n units with lifetimes governed by a survivor 
function 𝑺(𝒕) with associated density 𝒇(𝒕) and hazard 𝝀(𝒕), and suppose unit 𝒊 is 
observed for a time 𝒕. If the unit not survived at 𝒕𝒊 , its contribution to the 
likelihood function is the density at that duration: 
𝑳𝒊 = 𝒇(𝒕𝒊) = 𝑺(𝒕𝒊)𝝀(𝒕𝒊)                                                                       (4.9) 
If the unit is survived at 𝒕𝒊, the probability of this event is: 
𝑳𝒊 = 𝑺(𝒕𝒊)                                                                                       (4.10) 
 Note that both types of contribution share the survivor function 𝑺(𝒕𝒊). Let 
𝒅𝒊 denote a non-survivor indicator, then the likelihood function could be written 
as: 
𝑳 = ∏ 𝑳𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 = ∏ 𝝀(𝒕𝒊)
𝒅𝒊𝑺(𝒕𝒊)𝒊                                                             (4.11) 
After take log, we obtain the log-likelihood function for censored survival 
data: 
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𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑳 = ∑ {𝒅𝒊𝒍𝒐𝒈𝝀(𝒕𝒊) − 𝚲(𝒕𝒊)}
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏                                                       (4.12) 
where 𝚲(𝒕𝒊) stands for the cumulative hazard. 
4.3.3.3 Empirical model 
Survival analysis is used to estimate the relationship between securitization 
ratio and the likelihood of bank failure. Survival analysis is concerned with 
studying the time between a treatment’s initial application and a subsequent 
event (such as bank failure), so it is possible to test the long-term impact of 
securitization. The survival analysis technique has been widely applied in banking 
research. Cole and Gunther (1995) employ survival analysis to study the 
determinants of bank failure. Recently, Berger and Bouwman (2013) used survival 
analysis to estimate the relationship between a bank’s capital and its likelihood 
of survival. The Cox proportional hazards model is specified as follows: 
𝒍𝒐𝒈 (
𝝀𝒊(𝒕𝒊|𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝝀𝟎(𝒕)
) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝁𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕(4.13) 
where 𝝀𝒊(𝒕𝒊|𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) is the hazard function for securitizers under 
the event of bank failure, 𝝀𝟎(𝒕) is the average survival time of the entire sample, 
𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 is the vector of total securitization ratio, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is the vector 
of bank-specific control variables, 𝝁𝒊 is the individual differences that not related 
to time variables, and 𝜺𝒊,𝒕 is the disturbance term. This study also uses the logit 
model to check the robustness of the results of survival analysis.   
The 2007-09 financial crisis significantly changed the macroeconomic 
environment, e.g., it suddenly dried out the liquidity in the market. The 
withdrawal of repurchase agreements may trigger a securitized-banking run 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The significant reduction in securitization in the 
market, may in turn, decrease the impact of securitization. Thus, it is expected 
that the impact of securitization on a bank’s likelihood of failure may be 
decreased after the 2007-09 financial crisis. The sample for the study is divided 
into pre- and post-crisis periods. Pre-crisis period covers the years from 2002 to 
2006, while post-crisis period covers the period from 2007 to 2012. All regressions 
are rerun using the before and after 2007 subsamples. 
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4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Preliminary analysis 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics on all variables used in this chapter 
for both securitizers and non-securitizers. Since the results on independent 
variables are the same as that of in Chapter 3, only the number and proportion of 
failed banks on securitizers and non-securitizers are reported in Panel A, Table 
4.1, and the differences between securitizers and non-securitizers in terms of 
failed banks in Panel B. Within each group, the sample is also divided into pre- 
and post-crisis periods. Statistics show that 331 banks securitized their assets and 
3 (0.91%) of them went failure before the breakout of the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
After the breakout of the crisis, there were 17 (5.74%) securitizers failed. A similar 
picture can be seen for non-securitizers. Before 2007, results show that 70 (0.87%) 
of 8,059 non-securitizers failed while this proportion surges to 7.08% (505 failed 
banks out of a sample of 7,137 non-securitizers) after 2007.  
<Insert Table 4.1 Panel A Here> 
In Panel B, Table 4.1, results also report Student's t-test and Wilcoxon rank-
sum test for the means and medians of the differences, respectively. The breakout 
of the 2007-09 financial crisis witnessed a more significant increase in proportions 
of failed non-securitizers (6.21%) than securitizers (4.84%), and the proportion of 
failed non-securitizers exceeds that of securitizers (by 1.33%). The Student’s t-
test shows that the difference between proportions of failed securitizers and non-
securitizers is statistically significant at 1% level. This result links securitization 
with a higher likelihood of bank failure before 2007. This finding confirms that 
banks with high involvement in the OTD market during the pre-crisis period 
contribute more significantly to the loan quality deterioration (Purnanandam, 
2011).  
<Insert Table 4.1 Panel B Here> 
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4.4.2 A visual demonstration of the association between 
securitization and the likelihood of bank failure 
To begin with the estimation, it is interesting to provide a visual estimation 
to make the hypothesis convincing, that is, bank loan securitization activities do 
have a positive impact on the likelihood of bank failure. A Nelson-Aalen estimator 
(details about this estimator can refer to: Nelson, 1969, 1972; Aalen, 1978) is 
employed to plot the estimated proportion of failed banks through the time period 
for banks with/without loan securitization. From a set of observed survival time 
period (including censored times) in a sample of individuals, Nelson-Aalen 
estimator allows researchers to estimate the proportion of the population of such 
banks which would suffer failure under the same circumstances. The disadvantage 
of this method is that it cannot be used to explore the effects of several variables, 
and this is the reason a Cox model is applied in the following section. The results 
of Nelson-Aalen estimation are reported in Figure 4-1 (1A for total loan 
securitization; 1B for mortgage loan securitization; 1C for non-mortgage loan 
securitization). 
<Insert Figure 4-1A Here> 
<Insert Figure 4-1B Here> 
<Insert Figure 4-1C Here> 
If banks do not choose to securitize loans, before 2006, over 0.5% of the 
population will go bankruptcy, while those banks with loan securitization enjoy a 
zero-failure benefit. From then, however, the proportion of failure in the second 
group dramatically increases to nearly 2.5% and reach to the peak of nearly 12%. 
During the same period, banks without loan securitization only have 8% of the 
observations go bankruptcy. The situation is even worse for banks only securitizing 
non-mortgage loan, the percentage of failed banks is nearly 15%. Securitizing 
mortgage loans seems to be safe, as the proportion of failed banks only exceed 
their comparable group during 2008 to 2010, peaking at 7% (lower than banks 
without mortgage securitization (over 8%)). 
It provides visual evidence to show that bank loan securitization leads to a 
higher possibility of failure. After decomposing loan securitization into mortgage 
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and non-mortgage activities, Figure 4-1B and 4-1C show that mortgage 
securitization seems to be safer, while non-mortgage loan securitization is much 
riskier, respectively. 
4.4.3 The impact of loans securitization on the likelihood of bank 
failure 
Table 4.2 reports the results of the impact of loan securitization on the 
likelihood of bank failure using logit regressions. Similar to chapter 3, the full 
sample is also divided into pre- and post-2007 periods. Bank fixed effects are 
controlled in the Cox model. Instead of coefficients, marginal effects (rounded to 
four decimals) are reported in logit regressions. 
<Insert Table 4.2 Here> 
 Following Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam (2009), this study uses the Cox 
proportional hazards model along with a logistic model to estimate the impact of 
securitization on the likelihood of bank failure. The Cox model is likely to capture 
long-term effect and statistically superior for bankruptcy prediction since it takes 
the time at risk into consideration (see Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 2004). 
The full sample is then divided into pre- and post-2007 periods. Bank fixed effects 
are controlled in the Cox model. Instead of coefficients, marginal effects (rounded 
to four decimals) are reported in logit regressions.  
<Insert Table 4.3 Here> 
Total securitization ratio is found to have a positive and significant impact 
on the likelihood of bank failure, and the results are consistent among all 
regressions. A 1% increase of total securitization ratio leads to a 0.75% (exp(0.561) 
– 1) (column (1)) and 0.39% (column (4)) increase of possibility of bank failure, 
estimated by Cox and logit models, respectively. This finding is consistent with 
the main hypothesis that the involvement of securitization could lead to long-term 
risk. Securitization encourages banks to take on more risk, decrease their efforts 
on screening borrowers, lower borrowing standards, and grant more poor-quality 
loans (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). The possibility of bank failure in turn 
increases because the diversification mechanism of securitization may not enough 
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to cover the potential losses in the long run (Wagner, 2010). That is, the 
diversification effect allows the linked institutions to share the large risk exposure 
but cannot eliminate the riskiness. Meanwhile, benefited from this benefit, 
securitizers become more aggressive in taking risk, which in turn introduces more 
risk into the system. When the riskiness reached to a certain threshold, the 
diversification of securitization cannot smooth out the potential riskiness to face 
the financial shock, leading to a higher likelihood of bank failure. 
After dividing the sample into pre- and post-2007 periods, results show that 
securitization ratio is still positively related to the likelihood of bank failure for 
both sub-sample periods. According to column (2) to (5), an average 1.21% 
increase of possibility of bank failure caused by 1% increase in population means 
of total securitization ratio before 2007, while this marginal effect decreases to 
an average of 0.28% (column (3) and (6)) after 2007. The decreased impact of 
securitization on the likelihood of bank failure may also due to the significant 
decrease in the scale of securitization market caused by the liquidity shortage in 
the secondary market after the breakout of financial crisis.  
In order to check the robustness of the results, a propensity score matching 
based weighted-least-squares estimation is employed for bank failure to address 
the endogeneity problem. It is because the correlations reported so far could be 
a reverse causality. The positive relationship found by the empirical model reports 
that securitization ratios are positively related to the likelihood of bank failure, 
but it can also because the banks realize their likelihoods of failure, and then 
choose to securitize risky assets to remove the riskiness off their balance sheet. 
Therefore, the following robustness checks are conducted. Marginal effects of 
each variable on the likelihood of bank failure are reported in Table 4.4. Results 
are consistent, showing positive and significant impact of securitization ratios on 
the likelihood of bank failure, which confirms the main findings on bank failure in 
Table 4.4.  
<Insert Table 4.4 Here > 
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4.5 Additional analysis 
4.5.1 The impact of mortgage and non-mortgage securitization on 
the likelihood of bank failure 
Mortgage loans can be easily securitized due to the higher quality and 
stronger degree of commoditisation (e.g., mortgage loans enjoy a higher 
standardisation of credit assessment techniques) (Altunbas, Gambacorta, and 
Marques-Ibanez, 2009). The rapid development of the secondary market makes it 
even more convenient to banks to securitize mortgage loans (Frame and White, 
2005). Mortgage securitizers are in turn encouraged to take on more risk and 
reduce their incentives to carefully monitoring loans (Hakenes and Schnabel, 
2010). Non-mortgage securitization requires securitizers to provide higher 
retention of risk exposures6 during the process in order to signal the quality of the 
underlying assets (Guo and Wu, 2014), which forces non-mortgage securitizers to 
keep monitoring loans (Kiff and Kisser, 2010) and be more cautious when granting 
loans (Hattori and Ohashi, 2011). The impact of mortgage securitization on the 
likelihood of bank failure is likely to be more significant than non-mortgage 
securitization. Thus, the hypothesis here is: 
The impact of mortgage securitization on the likelihood of bank failure 
is likely to be more significant, compared with non-mortgage securitization. 
To test this hypothesis, this study breaks down securitization activities into 
mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations. Mortgage loans include 1-4 home 
mortgages, while non-mortgage loans contain all other types of loans, including 
home equity lines, credit card receivables, auto loans, commercial and industrial 
loans, other consumer loans, and all other loans. Then, total securitization ratios 
in all specifications are replaced with mortgage and non-mortgage securitization 
ratios, respectively. The Cox survival analysis results are reported in Table 4.5.  
<Insert Table 4.5 Here> 
                                         
6 It is found in International Monetary Fund (2009) that a minimum retention requirement of 5% could 
be binding for almost all types of asset-backed securities (ABS), but this retention ratio for mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) is below 1%.  
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From Table 4.5, mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations are both found 
to lead to a higher likelihood of bank failure. The marginal impact of mortgage 
securitization is significantly higher than non-mortgage securitization. A 1% 
increase of securitized mortgage loans ratio leads to a 1.04% increase in the 
possibility of bank failure, compare with that of non-mortgage securitization ratio 
is 0.20%. Mortgage securitization is more likely to encourage banks to take on 
more risk and lower the lending standards, which may contribute more 
significantly to the deteriorate of loan qualities in the market and the likelihood 
of bank failure.  
4.5.2 The impact of loan sales on the likelihood of bank failure 
The final test focuses on loan sales. Similar to securitizations, loan sales 
also allow sellers to transfer potential risk to the buyers. However, loan sales 
involve the totality of an originated loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1987) and are 
affected without recourse and bank serves as a pure broker (Greenbaum and 
Thakor, 1987). Loan sales without recourse increase sellers’ incentives to apply 
weaker managerial standards, leading to the deterioration of loan quality 
(Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). Thus, the impact of loans sales on the likelihood 
of failure is expected to be similar to that of securitization: 
Loan sales are likely to increase the likelihood of bank failure. 
Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012), loan sales activity is defined by the 
difference between: 1) the outstanding principal balance of assets owned by 
others, with servicing retained by the bank, and 2) the outstanding principal 
balance of assets sold and securitized by the bank. Loan sales data are collected 
from the Call Report, and the regression results are reported in Table 4.6. 
<Insert Table 4.6 Here> 
According to Table 4.6, the impact of loan sales on the likelihood of bank 
failure is also positive, which is similar to that of securitization. The coefficients 
of loan sale ratio are all positive and statistically significant at 1% level across all 
specifications. In terms of economic impact, a 1% increase of loan sale ratios leads 
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to a 2.6% increase in the possibility of bank failure. This result holds after dividing 
the sample period into pre- and post-crisis periods. Overall, the involvement of 
loan sale activities increases the probability of bank failure. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies how securitization affects the likelihood of bank 
failure. To address the endogeneity problem in securitization, both a Cox survival 
analysis and a propensity score matching based weighted least squares analysis 
are employed. The empirical results are consistent and robust results in all 
specifications, which suggests that loan securitization increases the likelihood of 
bank failure.   
Concerning the severe economic environmental change before and after 
the 2007-09 financial crisis, the full sample is divided into pre- and post-crisis 
periods. Although the empirical regressions show consistent results in both 
periods, a significant economic significance change is spotted after the breakout 
of the 2007-09 crisis. Specifically, the marginal effects of securitization on the 
likelihood of bank failure are rather stable with a small increase.  
In addition, this chapter shows disparate impacts between mortgage and 
non-mortgage securitizations. Both mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations 
significantly increase bank’s possibility of failure, between which the economic 
impact of mortgage securitization is more significant. Last, loan sale activities 
respond to a similar positive impact on the likelihood of bank failure.  
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in this paper. The statistics are based on the panel data including 342 securitizers and 8,483 non-securitizers 
during the period of 2002 to 2012, accounting for total bank-year observations of 3,983. Previous periods are not included because U.S. banks are only required to provide detailed information on their 
securitization activities from June 2001. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Concerning the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the time period is divided into before- and after-2007 
to check the difference. Panel A reports the statistics of bank failures in terms of number of failed banks (failed #) and the proportion of failed banks (failed %) in the total number of banks (bank #). 
Panel B reports the statistics of securitizers and non-securitizers, respectively. Statistics include mean, median, and standard deviation. Panel C shows the comparative statistics of: 1.the difference 
between the pre- and post-crisis periods, where the difference is calculated by the value after 2007 minus the value before 2007; and, 2.the difference between securitizers and non-securitizers, where 
the difference is calculated by the value of securitizers minus the value of non-securitizers. Differences in the number and proportion of failed banks are showed with regards to variable of bank failure, 
while differences in means and medians are showed for the rest of variables. Information on t-test on means and medians are also showed in Panel 4.C. 
Panel A: Statistics for bank failure               
 Securitizers  Non-securitizers 
  before 2007 after 2007  before 2007 after 2007 
statistic bank # failed # failed % Obs. bank # failed # failed % Obs.  bank # failed # failed % Obs. bank # failed # failed % Obs. 
Bank failure 331 3 0.91% 1,534 296 17 5.74% 1,598   8,059 70 0.87% 36,221 7,137 505 7.08% 38,245 
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
Panel B: Difference between securitizers and non-securitizers        
 Difference with the reference of 2007/2008 financial crisis   Difference between securitizers and non-securitizers 
 difference = value after 2007 - value before 2007  difference = value of securitizer - value of non-securitizer 
  Securitizers Non-securitizers  Before 2007 After 2007 
Dependent variable               
statistic Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means Dif % t-test on means 
Bank failure 4.84% a* 6.21% a  0.04% a -1.33% a 
NOTE: * the letter "a" and "b" indicate a significant difference of means and medians at 1% level, respectively.      
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Table 4.2: Baseline model, logit regression 
Table 4.2 shows the results on the impact of bank loan securitization on the likelihood of bank 
failure, which employs the logit model. The sample period is from 2002 to 2012. Control 
variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-
interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding 
company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix 4.A. The sample period is also divided into before- and after-2007 to 
explore the difference referring to the 2007-09 financial crisis. Marginal effects are reported 
instead of coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Dependent Variable Bank failure 
  Logit model 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.0039***  0.0064***  0.0016** 
 (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Total retained interest ratio%t -0.1270  -0.0740***  -0.1162 
 (0.076)  (0.027)  (0.075) 
Bank sizet 0.0015***  0.0005  0.0020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.0077***  -0.0022  -0.0101** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 0.1078*  0.0579**  0.1304 
 (0.060)  (0.026)  (0.118) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 0.0075***  0.0018***  0.0108** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -0.1815  -0.2605  -0.3410* 
 (0.110)  (0.589)  (0.184) 
Local-market powert 0.0081**  -0.0009  0.0124** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.0014*  -0.0020***  -0.0004 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.0049***  0.0009**  0.0082*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Constant -7.722***  -6.039***  -7.090*** 
  (0.41)   (1.70)   (0.46) 
Observations 77,598  37,755  39,843 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2237   0.2478   0.2220 
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Table 4.3: Survival analysis 
Table 4.3 shows the results on the impact of bank loan securitization on the likelihood of bank 
failure using survival analysis. The sample period is from 2002 to 2012. Control variables include 
retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense 
ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and 
metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 4.A. 
The sample period is also divided into before- and after-2007 to explore the difference referring 
to the 2007-09 financial crisis. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Bank Failure 
  Cox model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  full sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.561*** 1.019*** 0.335** 
 (0.23) (0.15) (0.32) 
Total retained interest ratio%t -0.370 -48.354*** -0.161 
 (0.93) (13.43) (0.86) 
Bank sizet 0.108*** -0.038 0.148*** 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.806** -1.363 -0.885** 
 (0.40) (1.23) (0.42) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 8.273** 16.555*** 9.020 
 (3.81) (5.02) (9.65) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 1.185*** 1.367*** 0.951*** 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -29.130** 1.935 -35.379** 
 (14.25) (4.21) (17.46) 
Local-market powert 0.823* 1.076 0.974** 
 (0.46) (1.19) (0.46) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.146 -0.910*** -0.024 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.826*** 0.661** 0.835*** 
  (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) 
Observations 77,598 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2119 0.2367 0.2112 
 
  
116 
 
116 
 
Table 4.4: Weighted-least-squares analysis 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the impact of securitization ratios on the likelihood of bank 
failure using a propensity score matching based weighted-least-squares estimator. The 
regression uses a full sample and a 1:1 matched subsample including securitizers and non-
securitizers with a propensity score distance within 1%. Within each sample, the propensity 
scores are the weights to conduct a least squares estimation. The sample period is from 2002 to 
2012. The sample period is also divided into pre- and post-crisis subsamples. All variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix 4.A. Control variables include retained interest ratio, 
bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing 
loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan 
statistical area dummy. Marginal effects are reported instead of coefficients. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Bank failure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Full sample 1:1 sample before 2007 after 2007 
Total securitization ratio%t 0.0019*** 0.0068*** 0.0015** 0.0049** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
Total retained interest ratio%t -0.0070 -0.0000 -0.0086 -0.0060 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) 
Bank sizet 0.0019*** 0.0003 0.0000 0.0025*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.0107*** -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0140*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 0.0867 0.0601 0.0487 0.0968 
 (0.275) (0.961) (0.199) (0.463) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 0.0530*** 0.0012 0.0464*** 0.0581*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -0.0449 -0.0129 -0.0421 -0.0553 
 (0.038) (0.020) (0.093) (0.048) 
Local-market powert 0.0128*** 0.0045 -0.0022 0.0194*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.0015 0.0001 -0.0023*** -0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Metropolitan statistical area 
dummyt 0.0048*** 0.0020 0.0011* 0.0082*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.0178*** -0.0022 0.0018 -0.0236*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) 
Observations 77,598 6,264 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2031 0.1121 0.2071 0.2032 
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Table 4.5: The analysis on mortgage and non-mortgage 
securitization 
Table 4.5 presents regression results on the impact of mortgage and non-mortgage securitization on the 
likelihood of failure. The Cox model is used in survival analysis. The sample period is 2002-2012. The sample 
is also divided into before- and after-2007 periods to explore the differences referring to the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. Control variables include retained interest ratio, bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity 
ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding 
company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. Bank fixed effects are controlled in Cox model. 
All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 4.A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Bank failure 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
Full 
Sample 
Before 
2007 
After 
2007 
  Cox model 
Mortgage securitization ratio%t 0.711*** 0.974*** 0.570*    
 (0.21) (0.15) (0.32)    
Mortgage retained interest ratio%t 0.286 30.616 0.379    
 (1.14) (10.345) (1.13)    
Non-mortgage securitization ratio%t    0.185** 0.223** 0.119** 
    (0.52) (0.50) (0.45) 
Non-mortgage retained interest 
ratio%t    -1.503 
-
43.997*** -0.981 
    (1.77) (12.27) (1.18) 
Bank sizet 0.109*** -0.035 0.148*** 0.108*** -0.039 0.148*** 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.813** -1.428 -0.887** -0.806** -1.371 -0.886** 
 (0.40) (1.21) (0.42) (0.40) (1.23) (0.42) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 8.155** 6.437** 8.974 8.321** 15.687*** 8.886 
 (3.85) (2.92) (9.64) (4.01) (4.73) (9.61) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 1.191*** 1.377*** 0.953*** 1.181*** 1.367*** 0.949*** 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -28.589** 3.942 
-
35.248** -27.897** 3.620 
-
34.662** 
 (14.02) (8.49) (17.36) (13.92) (3.95) (17.17) 
Local-market powert 0.818* 1.246 0.973** 0.821* 1.090 0.975** 
 (0.46) (1.07) (0.46) (0.46) (1.18) (0.46) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.152 -0.926*** -0.025 -0.143 -0.909*** -0.023 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.827*** 0.667** 0.834*** 0.828*** 0.661** 0.835*** 
 (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) 
       
       
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect No No No No No No 
Observations 77,598 37,755 39,843 77,598 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo-R² 0.2116 0.2347 0.2112 0.2120 0.2367 0.2113 
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Table 4.6: The analysis on loan sales 
Table 4.6 presents regression results of the impact of loan sales on the likelihood of bank 
failure, which uses the Cox model in survival analysis. The sample period is 2002-2012. The 
sample is also divided into before- and after-2007 periods to explore the differences referring 
to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Control variables include bank size, diversification ratio, 
liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, local-market power 
index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. Bank fixed 
effects are controlled in Cox models. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 4.A. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Dependent variable Bank failure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Full Sample Before 2007 After 2007 
Loan sale ratio%t 0.373** 0.913** 0.226** 
 (0.48) (1.36) (0.20) 
Bank sizet 0.109*** -0.056 0.149*** 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) 
Diversification ratio%t -0.810** -1.400 -0.891** 
 (0.40) (1.23) (0.42) 
Bank liquidity ratio%t 8.164** 6.524** 8.696 
 (3.83) (2.89) (9.55) 
Non-interest expense ratio%t 1.190*** 1.360*** 0.957*** 
 (0.27) (0.21) (0.30) 
Non-performing loans ratio%t -28.781** -1.652 -33.887** 
 (14.06) (8.66) (17.09) 
Local-market powert 0.820* 1.178 0.961** 
 (0.46) (1.09) (0.46) 
Bank holding company dummyt -0.152 -0.900*** -0.020 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummyt 0.827*** 0.669** 0.835*** 
 (0.11) (0.29) (0.11) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect No No No 
Observations 77,598 37,755 39,843 
Pseudo-R² 0.3233 0.3464 0.3229 
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Chapter 5 
Bank Loan Securitization and Efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades, securitization has dramatically changed the way 
banks provide liquidity. While it is still debatable on the role of securitization in 
contribution to the risk of financial markets, it is generally belief that as loans 
have become more liquid, the efficiency of the whole financial market has 
increased because the credit supply relies less on bank’s financial conditions 
(Loutskina and Strahan, 2009). It is less clear, however, that this change of the 
special role of banks through securitization has any positive impact on bank’s own 
efficiency or not. Examining the impact of securitization on bank efficiency is thus 
the central focus of this chapter.  
Bank loan securitization is deemed to have two contradictory impact on 
banks (Gande and Saunders, 2012). On the one hand, securitization allows 
originators to transfer asset risks to investors and hence can hold a lower level of 
risk-adjusted capital ratios (Benveniste and Berger, 1987; Berger, Herring, and 
Szego, 1995). Securitization also creates a new source of liquidity by allowing 
banks to convert illiquid loans into marketable securities (Loutskina, 2011). In 
addition, a bank can use loan securitization to achieve optimal assets and 
geographic diversification (Hughes et al., 1999; Berger and DeYoung, 2001). These 
channels provide banks with better risk-management tools and are in turn less 
restricted to traditional sources of funds (Billet and Garfinkel, 2004). On the other 
hand, the existence of loan securitization can reduce securitizers’ incentive to 
carefully screen borrowers (Keys et al., 2010). The long run effect of this moral 
hazard is decreased quality of loan and risk management.  
It is unclear that the result of these competing forces can be efficiency gain 
or efficiency lose for a securitizing bank. The existing literature focus on the 
observable bank performance outcomes and find that securitization decreases 
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bank risk (Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004) and increases bank performance (Casu, 
et al., 2013; Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil, 2014), while bank’s profitability may be 
decreased (Michalak and Uhde, 2010). The announcement of securitization is 
found to be positively associated with wealth gains for stronger banks, and wealth 
loss for weak banks (Lockwood, Rutherford, and Herrera, 1996).  
The main results are summarized as follows. First, bank loan securitization 
is found to increase bank’s efficiency. A one-standard-deviation increase of total 
securitization is associated with an 9.23% increase in the standard deviation of 
bank’s efficiency scores.  
Second, two approaches are used to identify the casual impact of 
securitization on bank efficiency. First, the Heckman self-selection model is 
employed to address the possible self-selection problem. Second, a Difference-in-
Difference (DiD) approach is introduced to explore the association between the 
changes in securitization ratios and bank’s efficiency scores. Following 
Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012), the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 is used as a source of exogenous variation. The bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers triggered a sudden dried-up of secondary market liquidity, which 
impacts more significantly on securitized banks (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The 
differences in bank efficiency between securitized and non-securitized banks are 
reduced in the post Lehman Brothers bankruptcy period.  
Third, the key channels through which bank efficiency benefit from loan 
securitization are through capital relief, risk transferring, liquidity increase and 
diversification increase. The impact of loan securitization on bank efficiency is 
more significant for banks with higher capital ratios, higher level of risks, and 
lower level of liquidities and diversification. These results are consistent with 
previous literature (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Loutskina, 2011; Hartman-
Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi, 2012; Nadaulda and Weisbach, 2012; Jiang, Nelson, 
and Vytlacil, 2014). 
Fourth, the impact of on-mortgage securitization ratio on bank efficiency 
is significant but not mortgage securitization. These results reflect the fact that 
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mortgage loans are backed by real estates, the values of which are not easily to 
be depreciated (Campbell and Cocco, 2015), and are thus expected to be safer 
compared with non-mortgage loans. Securitizing non-mortgage loans is hence 
considered as a more efficient risk transferring.  
Finally, a similar positive impact of loan sales on bank efficiency is 
documented. In practice, banks may choose loan sales rather than securitization 
to pursue higher flexibility and diversification. Loan sales involve the totality of 
an originated loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1990) and are affected without recourse 
(Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987). Thus, loan sales can also reduce banks risk by 
separating the ownership of riskier assets from their balance sheet (Berger and 
Udell, 1993). 
Overall, bank efficiency benefit from loan securitization. This result is 
especially true for banks with higher capital ratios, higher level of default risk, 
and lower level of diversification, who are more likely to benefit from the positive 
impact of bank securitization.  
The results of have extensive implications for regulators and practitioners. 
The positive impact of securitization, particularly the impact of non-mortgage 
loan securitization on bank efficiency, provides evidence on the bright side of 
securitization. Securitization has been blamed for being one of the main triggers 
of the 2007-09 financial crisis, because it deteriorates loan quality in the subprime 
mortgage market (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, 2010; Ghent, 2011). However, 
impeding the development of securitization may not be the right strategy to 
prevent a similar crisis in the future, because a less developed securitization 
market may not be able to supply sufficient credit to the market, and exacerbates 
real shocks in financial markets (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997).  
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5.2 Hypothesis development 
5.2.1 The positive impact of loan securitization on bank efficiency 
Securitization increases bank’s financial flexibility through two channels, 
flexibility increase and diversification increase. First, banks can use securitization 
vehicles such as asset-backed securities (ABSs), collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), or mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) to restructure their portfolios, and 
transfer asset risks to investors. It leads to capital relief effect because of the 
partially transferred credit risk. Originators are thus able to hold a lower level of 
risk-based capital. The regulatory reform in 1990s in the U.S. introduced a risk-
based accord which requires banks to hold a minimum capital level according to 
the perceived risks (Avery and Berger, 1991; Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995; Duffee 
and Zhou, 2001; Calomiris and Mason, 2004; Nicolo and Pelizzon, 2008; Acharya et 
al., 2013). By transferring potential credit risk to security investors, originators 
are able to hold a lower level of risk-based capital. For example, the capital 
adequacy rules developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) 
permit a capital relief for institutions that are able to transfer such risk to others. 
It decreases the impact of capital restrictions on bank’s activities and hence, 
which in turn increases financial flexibility. Traditionally, commercial banks have 
to hold the illiquid loans to maturity. Securitization creates a new source of 
liquidity by allowing banks to convert illiquid loans into marketable securities, 
leading to a liquidity increase effect (Loutskina, 2011). Financial flexibility is in 
turn increased because banks are less dependent on traditional sources of funds.  
The increased financial flexibility may lead to a higher level of efficiency, 
since literature shows that less flexible banks tend to have lower efficiency. On 
one hand, restrictions on bank capital retention could result in additional cost, in 
the form of a higher barrier to entry and greater rent extraction by governments 
(Barth, Brumbaugh, and Wilcox, 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2007). On the other 
hand, restrictions on bank activities can limit the exploitation of economies of 
scope and scale in gathering and processing information about firms, building 
reputational capital and providing various types of services to customers (Barth et 
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al., 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2007). Both restrictions could impede bank’s ability 
to diversify income streams and reduce the franchise value of a bank, which might 
limit the incentive for efficient behavior (Barth et al., 2013). 
Higher flexibility indicates a better reallocation of resources according to 
optimal mix, leading to higher efficiency (Parlour, Stanton, and Walden, 2012) by 
avoiding the underinvestment problem (Froot et al., 1993). Banks with financial 
flexibility can easily access to external capital markets to meet funding needs 
arising from unanticipated earnings shortfalls or new growth opportunities, and 
hence, avoid situations that may lead to suboptimal investment and poor 
performance (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2007; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Byoun, 
2008). Studies also emphasize the importance of obtaining financial flexibility 
through moderate or high liquidity balances (Opler et al., 1999; Billet and 
Garfinkel, 2004; Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 2007; Faulkender and Wang, 
2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Harford et al., 
2008; Riddick and Whited, 2008). Literature also shows that the additional internal 
(Kashyap and Stein, 2000) and external (Campello, 2002) sources of funds can 
partially alleviates the restrictions of funds on bank loan supply. Therefore, 
securitization may increase bank efficiency through the flexibility increase 
channel. 
Second, securitization also provides originators with diversification 
benefits. The pooling process allows bank to construct a low-risk debt security 
from a large pool, creating a risk diversification effect (DeMarzo, 2005). 
Diversifying into other banks’ asset reduces the probability of individual’s failure, 
because it allows originators to diversify idiosyncratic risk carried by the assets 
(Wagner, 2010). Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) point out that the reduction of 
risks and diversification of portfolios is one of the main benefits of securitization. 
Securitization also leads to geographic diversification because originators are able 
to include a great amount of loans which come from different geographic locations 
where default risks are not expected to increase at the same time in the pool. In 
this case, securitization allows originators to smooth out the risk among many 
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investors, where credit risk can be more easily and widely transferred across the 
financial system (Berger et al., 2005). 
Diversification is positively related to bank efficiency because it leads to 
better resource allocation activities (Weston, 1970). Diamond (1984) argues that 
financial intermediation’s cost control can be improved because portfolio 
diversification contributes to a higher asset quality (measured by non-performing 
loans). Berger and Ofek (1995) also find a positive relationship between 
diversification and bank efficiency levels. Regarding to geographic diversification, 
sufficient research (Hughes et al., 1996, 1999; Bos and Kolari, 2005; Deng et al., 
2007) present a positive relationship between it and bank efficiency. Berger and 
DeYoung (2001)’s explanation it that, geographic diversification allows more 
efficient banks to take advantage of their network economies and exploit 
geographic risk diversification, which in turn increases bank efficiency.  
Negative correlation is found between risk level and bank efficiency by 
previous studies. For example, Altunbas et al. (2000) suggest that scale efficiency 
can be significantly reduced when applied risk factors, after investigating a sample 
of Japanese commercial bank between 1993 and 1996. The diversification benefit 
of securitization also allows originators to reduce the risk level by removing part 
of the risky loans off the balance sheet. It allows securitizers to reallocate 
resources to output related activities, leading to higher efficiency. Therefore, the 
first hypothesis is as follows: 
Bank efficiency is positively associated with bank’s loan securitization. 
5.2.2 The negative impact of loan securitization on bank 
efficiency 
Loan securitization can also be negatively associated with bank efficiency, 
due to the information asymmetry problem. Information asymmetry problems of 
securitization can be categorized into two groups. On one hand, the inequality of 
information about managerial actions and uncertain factors that affect security 
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payoffs between originators and investors during the securitization process could 
lead to moral hazard problem (Kahn and Winton, 2004; Acharya and Viswanathan, 
2011; Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski, and Tchistyi, 2012; Chemla and Hennessy, 2014), 
which encourages securitizers to reduce managerial incentives in the transaction 
(Keys et al., 2010). The lax monitoring and screening of originators contribute to 
a gradual deterioration in credit quality of individual assets (Demyanyk and 
Hemert, 2011). Empirical evidence (Keys et al., 2010; Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil, 
2010; Elul, 2011) show that securitized subprime mortgages had default rates 10% 
to 25% higher than similar mortgages that were not securitized. 
On the other hand, hiding information about securities are issued in the 
transaction could result in regulatory arbitrage problem (An, Deng, and Gabriel, 
2011; Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012). In order to pursue higher 
reputations or ratings, originators choose to securitize better loans in the portfolio 
and ignore potential risk left within their balance sheet. Agarwal, Chang and Yavas 
(2012) find banks in prime mortgage market are more likely to sell low-default-
risk loans while retaining higher-default-risk ones in their portfolio, and also that 
issuers could purchase better rating by doing this. In this case, originators are not 
able to realize risk reduction benefits of securitization but in turn hold a higher 
proportion of risky loans. Both information asymmetry problems could lead to a 
loan quality deterioration effects.  
Banks with lower quality of loans can be less efficient because they are not 
able to allocate inputs efficiently according to the costs but forced to concentrate 
assets into risky loans. Studies of bank efficiency provide sufficient evidence to 
show a negative relationship with risk factors (Mester, 1996; Eisenbeis et al., 1999; 
Altunbas et al., 2000; Gonzalez, 2005; Pasiouras, 2008; Chiu and Chen, 2009; Sun 
and Chang, 2011). The explanation is that, loan risk is an essential ingredient in 
bank production, which can be considered as an undesirable output in practice. 
The higher the amount of this output, the lower the bank efficiency is. It may 
because high loan risk is likely to indicate poor risk management (Berger and 
Mester, 1997), which means managers may seek to maximize their own 
compensation and choose inputs or outputs suiting their own preferences, rather 
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than to maximize firm value (Berger, 1995). Therefore, the second hypothesis is 
as follows: 
Bank loan securitization is more likely to decrease bank efficiency. 
5.3 Data and methodology 
5.3.1 Data  
All annual accounting data are collected from the Reports of Income and 
Condition for commercial banks (the Call Report) in the period of 2002-2012. The 
full sample starts from 2002 because U.S. banks are required to provide detailed 
information on their securitization activities from June 2001. Following Bedendo 
and Bruno (2012), small banks (with total assets under $1 billion) are excluded 
from the sample because they are rare securitizers due to the substantial upfront 
costs. The final sample consists of 863 large commercial banks in the U.S., 
including 150 securitizers and 713 non-securitizers, accounting for a total of 5,275 
bank-year observations.  
5.3.2 Variables  
5.3.2.1 Bank efficiency 
This section first uses the data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to 
estimate bank’s efficiency scores. 7  The outputs of the banking industry are 
arguably more likely to be determined by the market (see e.g., Miller and Noulas, 
1996; Topuz, Darrat, and Shelor, 2005; Kumbhakar and Tsionas, 2006). Therefore, 
an input-oriented data envelopment analysis model using the intermediation 
approach are applied. This chapter assumes that banks use three types of inputs: 
                                         
7 DEA model does not require the explicit specifications of the functional form of the underlying 
production relationship, which is popular in banking studies. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide 
a comprehensive survey of related efficiency research in banking. 
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a) customer deposits and short-term funding; b) total costs, defined as the sum of 
interest expenses and non-interest expenses; and c) equity capital to adequately 
account for the impact of risk, to produce the following outputs: a) loans; b) other 
earning assets; and c) non-interest income as a proxy for off-balance sheet 
activities. 8  Descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs used in the DEA 
efficiency measurement are reported in Table 5.1. 
<Insert Table 5.1 > 
In general, a data envelopment analysis model estimates efficiency scores 
from a production set as follows: 
𝑷 = {𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻,𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑻}                                                                     (5.1) 
The technology frontier is therefore defined as: 
𝑷𝑻 = {(𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻,𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑻)|(𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻,𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑻) ∈
𝑷, (𝝈𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻, 𝝈−𝟏𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑻) ∉ 𝑷, ∀ 𝟎 < 𝝈 < 𝟏}                                                         
This is then used to estimate a bank’s input technical efficiency: 
𝜹𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻(𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻𝒊, 𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑻𝒊) ≡ 𝐢𝐧𝐟 {𝝈 > 𝟎|(𝝈𝑰𝑵𝑷𝑼𝑻𝒊, 𝑶𝑼𝑻𝑷𝑼𝑻𝒊) ∈ 𝑷
𝑻   (5.2) 
A bank’s technical efficiency represents the proportion by which input 
quantities can feasibly be reduced without reducing output quantities. Bank 
efficiency scores are measured relative to a common frontier by pooling the data 
across individuals estimated separately for each year. Bank efficiency scores range 
from zero to one, with a higher value indicating a higher level of efficiency. 
5.3.2.2 Independent variables 
The securitization ratio (defined as the ratio of outstanding principal 
balance of assets securitized over total assets) is used to represent a bank’s 
                                         
8 Selected descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs used in the DEA efficiency measurement 
are presented in Appendix B. 
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securitization activity. The signalling theory suggests providing credit 
enhancements could improve securitizers’ managerial efforts (Downing, Jaffee, 
and Wallace, 2009). Thus, use the retained interest ratio is used to control for 
bank’s credit enhancement situation. Retained interest ratio is defined as the 
total amount of retained interest divided by the total amount of securitization 
assets, including the aggregate retained interests into credit enhancements, 
liquidity provisions, and seller’s interest.  
Control variables include a group of bank-specific characteristics. Bank size 
is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. The impact of bank size on 
bank efficiency could be positive, as larger firms are expected to use better 
technology and be more diversified and better managed. However, a negative 
effect may be observed in situations where there will be a loss of control resulting 
from inefficient hierarchical structures in the management of the company. 
Diversification ratio, defined as non-interest income divided by total operating 
income, controls for a bank’s portfolio diversification. Conventional finance 
theory suggests that risk-adjusted returns are higher for a well-diversified 
portfolio, which can in turn increase bank efficiency (Rossi, Schwaiger, and 
Winkler, 2009). Liquidity ratio, measured as liquid assets divided by total assets, 
controls for banks’ liquidity situation. Higher liquidity can give banks more 
flexibility, which can increase efficiency (Jensen, 1986; Myers and Rajan, 1998). 
Non-interest expense ratio is defined as non-interest expenses divided by total 
assets. Non-interest expenses are usually not associated with targeting customers 
to deposit funds, which may decrease bank efficiency. Non-performing loans ratio 
is the total value of loans 90 days past due divided by total assets, reflecting the 
bank’s risk management situation. Berger and DeYoung (1997) provide evidence 
to show that problem loans significantly reduce bank efficiency. Local-market 
power is the bank-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of deposit concentration for 
local markets in which the bank operates (Berger and Bouwman, 2013).  
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5.3.3 Empirical strategy 
The baseline framework uses the following OLS model to estimate the 
impact of loan securitization on bank efficiency: 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊𝒕 +𝜶𝒊 + 𝜸𝒕+𝝁𝒊𝒕 (5.3) 
Where 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable calculated from the 
DEA model, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of bank-specific control variables, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept 
of for each bank, 𝛾𝑡 is the intercept for each year, and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the disturbance term.  
The relationship between securitization ratio and bank efficiency score 
identified by the fixed effects estimator could be endogenous. For example, banks 
with higher efficiency are expected to have higher future profits, and thus greater 
charter value and reputation. Those higher efficiency banks can in turn be 
benefited with a lower lemon discounts when securitizing assets (Campbell and 
Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Therefore, it could be 
that banks with higher efficiency are naturally more active securitizers. It is also 
a rational conjecture that there exist other unobservable factors impacting on 
both securitization ratios and efficiency scores.  
Therefore, two methods are employed to identify the causal effects 
between securitization and bank efficiency. First, the Heckman self-selection 
model is used to address the potential self-selection bias, where introduces three 
sets of exogenous instruments in the Heckman model. The first instrument is the 
annual state-level corporate tax rate, with data obtained from the U.S. Tax 
Foundation website. 9  The analysis also exploits the state-time variations in 
corporate tax rates as an instrument for bank securitization because higher 
corporate tax rate is found to increase bank’s incentive to securitize due to the 
corporate tax exemption of securitized assets (Han, Park, and Pennacchi, 2015).  
The second instrument is the peer liquidity index, conducted based on 
Loutskina’s (2011) liquidity index which captures banks’ incentive to securitize. It 
                                         
9 The data are available at: http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html. 
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is a weighted average of the potential to securitize loans of a given type, based 
on market-wide averages. Following Loutskina (2011), a bank’s loan portfolio is 
decomposed into six groups: 1) home mortgages, 2) multifamily residential 
mortgages, 3) commercial mortgages, 4) agricultural loans, 5) commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans, and 6) consumer credit.10 Liquidity index is defined as: 
𝑳𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒕 = ∑ (
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒕
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒋𝒕
) × (𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒋,𝒊𝒕)
𝟔
𝒋=𝟏    (5.4) 
In this equation, 𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒋𝒕  is the amount of 
economy-wide securitized loans of type 𝒋  at time 𝒕 , 
𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒚 𝑾𝒊𝒅𝒆 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒋𝒕  is the economy-wide total loans outstanding of 
type 𝒋 at time 𝒕, and 𝑳𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆𝒋,𝒊𝒕 is the share of type 𝒋 loans in bank 𝒊 at time 
𝒕.  
Bank 𝒊’s peer liquidity index is then contructed by calculating the average 
of the liquidity indexes all of bank i’s peers, excluding bank 𝒊 itself. A bank’s 
tendency to securitize loans is arguably related to its industry peers’ securitizing 
behaviour because of the herd effect (Chari and Kehoe, 2004). It is unlikely that 
a bank’s industry peers’ securitizing behavior can directly affect the bank’s 
efficiency (other than through the channel of securitization). 
The state-level corporate tax rate does not have a bank-specific 
component, so it only provides the impact of a state’s “average” bank. The peer 
liquidity index provides the impact only based on bank-specific accounting 
information. The cross-product of the state-level corporate tax rate and the peer 
liquidity index is used as a third instrument to capture both characteristics (see 
more empirical research using interaction terms, e.g., Santos and Winton (2008), 
Leary (2009), Foos, Norden, and Weber (2010), Maskara (2010), Benmelech and 
Bergman (2011), He, Qian, and Stahan, (2012), Callen and Fang (2013) among 
others). 
                                         
10 The data used to construct this instrument variable come from the “Financial Accounts of the 
United States” (Z.1) data release. 
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Second, this chapter uses a Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach to 
explore the association between the changes in securitization ratios and bank’s 
efficiency scores. Following Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012), the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 is introduced as a source of exogenous 
variation. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered a wide withdrawal of 
short-term repurchase agreements (repos), and led to a securitized banking run 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The sudden shrunk in the securitization market scale 
could jeopardize bank’s efficiency improving through securitizing assets. Thus, the 
efficiency scores of securitizers is expected to decrease more significantly than 
non-securitizers after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. First, this identification 
strategy uses a subsample including only matched securitizers and non-securitizers 
to test this hypothesis. Propensity scores are assigned for each bank using the 
following bank specific characteristics: capital ratio, bank size, diversification 
ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-performing loans ratio, and 
local-market power. Then each securitizer is matched with the most similar non-
securitizer using nearest-neighbour matching by imposing a 1% tolerance level on 
the maximum propensity score distance. 11  The DID analysis is based on the 
following model: 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊,𝒕 ×
𝑷𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝑳𝒆𝒉𝒎𝒂𝒏 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒓𝒖𝒑𝒕𝒄𝒚𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝝉𝒕 +𝝋𝒊,𝒕                                         (5.5) 
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is to identify securitized banks (one for securitizers 
and zero otherwise), 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑒ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable which set to 
unity after the year of 2008, and zero before 2008, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is the vector of bank 
specific controls, 𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of for each bank, 𝜏𝑡 is the intercept for each 
year, and φi,t  is the error term. The Post Lehman bankruptcy dummy and 
Securitizer Dummy do not appear by itself on the right-hand side of the regression 
                                         
11 The unreported analysis also uses the matched sample to conduct a Propensity Score Matching 
analysis. Results show that the average efficiency scores of securitizers is 0.79, which is 
significantly (at 1% significance level) higher than that of non-securitizers (0.57), supporting that 
securitization is likely to increase bank efficiency.  
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because they would be perfectly collinear with the year and bank fixed effects, 
respectively.  
This chapter also hypothesizes that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
could impact more significantly on those banks with higher securitization 
incentives. Following Loutskina (2011), 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 is 
used to identify banks’ incentives to securitize. The 90% distribution threshold12 
of the 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 is used to define the most affected 
securitizers. Following Berger and Bouwman (2013), the year of 2005 is used as 
the normal period and use 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 values of 2005 
to define the size distribution of liquidity index. Then the use 
of 𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝟏𝟎% 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒔  dummy is to identify the most active securitizers. 
𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝟏𝟎% 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒔  dummy is set to unity if a securitizer’s 
𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒏 𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒇𝒐𝒍𝒊𝒐 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 value is larger than 90% distribution of all 
securitizers, and zero otherwise. Then 𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚  are replaced by 
𝑻𝒐𝒑 𝟏𝟎% 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒓𝒔 𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚 in Equation (5) and run the regression using a 
subsample including only securitized banks. 
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.2 shows summary statistics (means, medians, and standard 
deviations (SD)) on all variables for securitizers and non-securitizers. Student's t-
test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians 
between securitizers and non-securitizers are also presented. Letters of “a” and 
“b” represent a 1% statistical significance level for means and medians, 
respectively.  
                                         
12 The robustness tests consider various other bank size thresholds (e.g., 95%, 98%). The results 
are qualitatively similar. 
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<Insert Table 5.2 Here> 
Results show a higher average efficiency score for securitizers (0.55) 
compared with that of non-securitizers (0.43). Both differences in means and 
medians of efficiency scores between securitizers and non-securitizers are 
statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that securitized banks are likely to 
be more efficient. On average, 13.74% of securitizers’ total assets have been 
securitized during 2002 to 2012. The median of securitization ratio is 0.14 and the 
SD is 37.56, suggesting that some banks are more active and massive securitizers. 
The signalling theory suggests that securitizers can use credit enhancements to 
signal the quality of the assets being securitized (Demiroglu and James, 2012). 
7.08% of the securitized assets are backed by credit enhancements. Literature also 
suggest securitization provides banks with capital relief (Martín-Oliver and 
Saurina, 2007), diversification (DeMarzo, 2005), and liquidity increase (Loutskina, 
2011) benefits. Securitizers are more likely to be related to higher capital ratio 
(11.23% vs. 10.60%)13, larger in total assets ($6.2 billion vs. $2.4 billion) and lower 
liquidity (20.86% vs. 21.59%) than non-securitizers. Securitization process requires 
a substantial amount of upfront costs (e.g., consultancy and organizational costs, 
payments to rating agencies, underwriting fees, and legal expenses). Securitizers 
are in turn associated with higher operating costs (Gorton and Souleles, 2005). 
The average non-interest expense ratio is higher for securitizers (3.53%) than non-
securitizers (2.86%). The securitized assets are also required a certain amount of 
lemon discount by the investor. Larger banks with higher reputation or market 
powers are more likely to be benefit from a lower lemon discount (Campbell and 
Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). Results also support that 
securitizers are likely to be larger (with total assets of $6.4 billion vs. $2.4 billion) 
with higher market power (6.47 vs. 1.79).  
                                         
13 The two numbers stand for securitizers’ and non-securitizers’, respectively. 
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5.4.2 The impact of securitization on bank efficiency 
Results of the baseline regression using OLS and endogeneity analyses using 
Heckman self-selection model, propensity score matching, and panel Heckman 
self-selection model, are reported in Table 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, respectively. The 
first-step results of Heckman self-selection model, using instruments of 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 −
𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 , 𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙 , and 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆 −
𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒕𝒂𝒙 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 ×  𝒑𝒆𝒆𝒓 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙, are reported in column (2), 
(4) and (6), respectively.  
<Insert Table 5.3 Here> 
<Insert Table 5.4 Here> 
<Insert Table 5.5 Here> 
<Insert Table 5.6 Here> 
Total securitization ratio is significantly (at the 1% statistical significance 
level) related to the increase of bank efficiency scores, suggesting the 
involvement of securitization is likely to increase bank efficiency. A one-standard-
deviation increase in total securitization ratio leads to an increase of 9.23% of a 
standard deviation in bank’s efficiency scores. Securitization provides securitizers 
with capital relief and liquidity increase, which in turn increases the flexibility of 
banks and positively impacts on bank’s efficiency. This finding is also confirmed 
by the Heckman self-selection analysis, where an average 17.04% of standard 
deviation increase in bank’s efficiency score due to a one-standard-deviation 
increase of total securitization ratio. Also, all instruments are statistically 
significant in the first step of Heckman self-selection model, suggesting the 
instruments are all valid. 
Results on control variables are largely consistent with previous literature. 
Retained interest ratios, on average, are found to have a positive impact on bank 
efficiency. As expected, larger size and higher capital and non-performing loans 
ratios are associated with lower bank efficiency scores, while higher 
diversification and liquidity ratios are related to higher efficiency scores. 
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A Difference-in-Difference (DiD) analysis is also used, using the bankruptcy 
of the Lehman Brothers in 2008 as the exogenous shock. On the one hand, it is 
expected that the dramatic dive in securitization market scale to significantly 
decrease securitizers’ efficiency improving through securitization. Thus, the 
coefficient of interest (𝜷𝟏) in Equation (5) is expected to be negative. On the 
other hand, the impact of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on most active 
securitizers could be more significant. Results are reported in Table 5.7. In 
general, the change in efficiency scores of securitizers is lower than that of non-
securitizers, suggesting the contribution of securitization to bank’s efficiency 
improving decreased significantly after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. 
Similar results are reported for banks with the highest securitization incentives 
and other securitizers. Overall, the DiD framework support the main findings. 
<Insert Table 5.7 Here> 
Additionally, this chapter provides a split sample analysis to support the 
DiD results by comparing the impact of securitization on bank’s efficiency score in 
pre- (2002-2006) and post-crisis (2007-2012) periods. Results are reported in Table 
5.7. In both specifications, securitization ratios are positively and significantly 
related to bank’s efficiency scores in both periods. Interestingly, there is a 
decrease in the economic impact of securitization on bank’s efficiency scores. 
Before 2007, a one-standard-deviation increase of total securitization ratio is 
associated with an increase of 17.82% of a standard deviation in bank’s efficiency 
scores, while this impact decreases to 12.49% after the breakout of the 2007-09 
financial crisis. 
<Insert Table 5.8 Here> 
5.4.3 Additional analysis 
The main findings suggest a positive association between securitization 
ratios and the increase of bank’s efficiency scores. The hypothesis is that the 
efficiency improving effects of securitization may be related to flexibility and 
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diversification increase. To shed more lights on this argument, the additional 
analysis explores the co-variations between securitization ratio and several bank-
specific characteristics in the first additional analysis. The empirical models are 
specific as follows: 
𝑬𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟐𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊𝒕 ×
𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝑪𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒔𝒊𝒕 +𝜷𝟒𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶𝒊 + 𝜸𝒕+𝝁𝒊𝒕                                                          (5.6) 
In equation (5.6), 𝜷𝟑 is the coefficient of interest, which can be considered 
as the additional impact of securitization caused by the corresponding bank 
characteristic. First, securitization provides banks with capital relief benefit 
which allows securitized banks to hold a lower level of capital buffer. Banks with 
higher level of regulatory capital ratios are thus able to benefit more from this 
off-balance-sheet transaction. Thus, the efficiency scores of banks with higher 
capital ratios are expected to be more significantly improved by securitization. 
This regression uses 𝒄𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 to represent bank’s capital levels and expect 
𝜷𝟑 to be positive. 
Second, securitization allows banks to shift potential risk to security 
investors through true sales of the underlying assets. Banks with higher balance-
sheet risk can in turn benefit more from securitization to decrease the potential 
risk. Hence, the efficiency improving impact of securitization is expected to be 
more significant for banks with higher risk. This regression uses 𝑳𝒐𝒈𝒁 to represent 
bank risk. Since a higher value of 𝑳𝒐𝒈𝒁 indicates a lower level of bank risk, the 
expectation is that 𝜷𝟑 to be negative. 
Third, securitization allows banks to transfer illiquid assets on the balance 
sheet into marketable securities (Loutskina, 2011). Banks with insufficient 
liquidities can in turn benefit more from the extra liquidity provided by 
securitization and pursue other more profitable projects. The impact of 
securitization on efficiency scores for banks with lower liquidity levels is expected 
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to be more significant. In this regression, 𝒍𝒊𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 is used to represent 
bank’s liquidity level, and the expectation is that 𝜷𝟑 to be negative. 
Last, securitization increases bank’s diversification by allowing securitizers 
to take advantage of network economies and exploit geographic diversification. 
Less diversified banks are more likely to be the beneficiaries of securitization to 
improve efficiency through diversification. The impact of securitization on 
efficiency for banks with unfavourable level of diversification is thus expected to 
be more significant. This specification uses 𝒅𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐 to represent 
bank’s diversification situation, which means 𝜷𝟑 is expected to be negative. All 
results of the co-variations between securitization ratios and bank characteristics 
are reported in Table 5.9. Overall, results are in the line with the hypotheses and 
support the argument that the efficiency improving effect of securitization may 
be associated with flexibility and diversification improvement. 
<Insert Table 5.9 Here> 
5.4.4 The impact of mortgage and non-mortgage loan 
securitization on bank efficiency  
Results so far suggest the efficiency improving of securitization is likely to 
related to risk transferring. To shed more light on risk transferring, it would be 
informative to explore the possible differences between mortgage and non-
mortgage securitization. Mortgage loan are backed by real estates which are not 
easily depreciated (Campbell and Cocco, 2015). Mortgage loans are widely 
considered as safer than non-mortgage loans. Thus, securitizing risky assets (e.g., 
non-mortgage loans) is a more efficient risk transferring (Minton et al., 2004). 
Non-mortgage securitization is expected to be more significantly related to the 
increase of bank’s efficiency scores. To test the hypothesis, another additional 
analysis breaks down securitization into mortgage and non-mortgage 
securitizations. Mortgage loans include 1-4 home mortgages, while non-mortgage 
loans contain all other types of loans, including home equity lines, credit card 
receivables, auto loans, commercial & industrial loans, other consumer loans, and 
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all other loans. Total securitization ratio is thus replaced by mortgage and non-
mortgage securitization ratios in both OLS and Heckman self-selection models. 
Results on mortgage and non-mortgage securitization ratios are reported in Table 
5.10. 
<Insert Table 5.10 Here> 
Empirical results show that mortgage securitization ratio is not significantly 
related to bank’s efficiency scores (column (1)), and non-mortgage securitization 
ratios are significantly associated with the increase of bank’s efficiency scores 
(column (2)). This finding is in the line with the expectation that non-mortgage 
securitization is likely to be more significant related to bank’s efficiency than 
mortgage securitization. This finding holds after controlling for self-selection bias 
using Heckman self-selection model.  
5.4.5 The impact of loan sale activities on efficiency scores 
Finally, the additional analysis focuses on examining the impact of loan 
sales. In practice, loan sales are related to a lower level of fixed upfront costs 
(Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995). Banks that intend to pursue additional flexibility 
may choose loan sales rather than securitization. Loan sales involve the totality 
of an originated loan (Gorton and Haubrich, 1987) and are affected without 
recourse (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987). Thus, loan sales can also reduce banks 
risk by separating the ownership of riskier assets from their balance sheet (Berger 
and Udell, 1993). The impact of loan sale ratios on bank efficiency scores is 
expected to be positive as securitization ratios. Following Bedendo and Bruno 
(2012), loan sales are defined by the difference between: 1) the outstanding 
principal balance of assets owned by others with servicing retained by the bank, 
and 2) the outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitized by the bank. 
Loan sales data are collected from the Call Report, and the regression results are 
reported in Table 6.10. 
<Insert Table 5.10 Here> 
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Results show that the impact of loan sales on bank efficiency is positive in 
all specifications. The coefficients of loan sale ratios are all positive and 
significant (at least at the 5% level). A one-standard-deviation increase of loan 
sale ratios is associated with an increase of 7.22% and an average of 11.06% in the 
standard deviation of bank’s efficiency scores estimated by OLS and Heckman self-
selection models, respectively. All instruments in the first-step of Heckman self-
selection models are all statistically significant, suggesting the instruments are all 
valid. Overall, the empirical results show a similar efficiency improving effect of 
loan sales. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically examines the impact of securitization on bank 
efficiency. The identification strategy applies a two-stage approach using U.S. 
large commercial bank data during 2002 to 2012. In the first step, a DEA model is 
employed to calculate bank efficiency scores, which are then regressed against 
securitization ratios and control variables in the second step. A positive and 
significant relationship between securitization ratio and bank’s efficiency scores 
is identified.  
To address the endogeneity problem in securitization, the identication 
analysis first employs a Heckman self-selection model by introducing three 
instruments, i) state-level corporate tax rate; ii) peer liquidity index; iii) state-
level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index; in both analyses. By using a 
Difference-in-Difference analysis, empirical results also support the main findings. 
The additional analysis first examines the co-variations between 
securitization ratios and several bank-specific characteristics. Results show that 
securitization impacts more significantly on those banks with higher capital ratios, 
bank risks, and lower liquidity ratios. The second analysis examines the difference 
between mortgage and non-mortgage securitization. Mortgage loans are 
considered as safer compared with non-mortgage loans. Securitizing non-mortgage 
loans are likely to be a more efficient risk transferring, and thus more significantly 
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impacts on bank’s efficiency. Empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. The 
final analysis examines the impact of loan sales, and results show a similar impact 
of loan sale ratios on bank’s efficiency scores. 
Stringent capital regulation is implemented mainly to reduce bank risk and 
risk-taking incentives (Kahane, 1977), but bank efficiency can be decreased 
because of the financial restrictions. This chapter of research suggests that the 
rapid development of off-balance sheet activities, including securitization and 
loan sales, provides commercial banks with an alternative way to regain better 
efficiency. The results also suggest that simply employing the capital to asset ratio 
as the measurement of capital regulation is not sufficient, especially if the 
residual asset quality is not considered. Commercial banks can still take on more 
risk using securitization. In the presence of capital arbitrage, securitizers can 
become even riskier and less efficient when facing strict regulation on capital, 
increasing the likelihood of failure (Koehn and Santomero, 1980).   
141 
 
141 
 
Table 5.1: Bank inputs and outputs 
Table 5.1 reports the summary statistics of inputs and outputs used in the DEA model, in order to calculate bank efficiency scores. Three inputs are 
considered in the model, including: a) customer deposits and short-term funding; b) total costs, defined as the sum of interest expenses and non-
interest expenses; and c) equity capital, to adequately account for the impact of risk (Berger, 2007). Three outputs include: a) loans; b) other 
earning assets; and c) non-interest income as a proxy for off-balance sheet activities. This table presents descriptive statistics for: (i) all sample 
banks (863), (ii) securitizers (banks with securitized loans) (141), and (iii) non-securitizers (banks without securitized loans) (722). Mean, Median, 
and SD stand for mean, median, and standard deviation values of the individual bank time-series observations, respectively. The last two columns 
report the comparison analysis of variables between securitizers and non-securitizers. Difference in means is calculated as the difference between 
securitizers' and non-securitizers' means in absolute (abs) values, with the p-values of the t-test on the equality of means reported in the last 
column. 
Variable 
All Banks Securitizers Non-securitizers Difference in Means 
mean median SD mean median SD mean median SD (abs) p-value 
Inputs ($ billion)                
Customer deposits and short-term funding 12.76  1.68  70.52  72.64  11.10  186.65  4.22  1.50  11.84  68.42  0.00  
Total costs 1.03  0.11  5.40  6.13  1.15  14.08  0.31  0.10  0.97  5.82  0.00  
Equity capital 1.97  0.23  10.08  11.19  2.06  2.06  0.66  0.20  1.95  10.53  0.00  
Outputs ($ billion)                
Loans 10.43  1.49  49.36  57.71  11.16  127.38  3.69  1.32  10.48  54.02  0.00  
Other earning assets 16.72  2.03  92.95  96.10  17.34  246.06  5.41  1.82  15.06  90.70  0.00  
Non-interest income 0.39  0.02  2.15  2.44  0.41  5.58  0.10  0.02  0.43  2.34  0.00  
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Table 5.2: Summary statistics 
Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable (bank efficiency scores), securitization ratios, and control variables used in 
the regression analysis. Following Bedendo and Bruno (2012) to include all domestic commercial banks with total assets of more than $1 billion 
over the time period, because banks smaller than $1 billion are rarely active securitizers (e.g., Minton et al., 2004; Martin-Oliver and Saurina, 
2007). The statistics are based on the panel data of 863 banks, including 141 banks with securitized loans and 722 without, during the period of 
2002 to 2012, accounting for a total of 5,275 bank-year observations. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 5.A. Descriptive statistics of 
mean, median, and standard deviation are presented for securitizers and non-securitizers, respectively. The differences between securitizers 
and non-securitizers are also reported. Tests on means and medians use Student's t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum, respectively. Letters of "a" and 
"b", in the last column, indicate a significant difference of means and medians at 1% level, respectively. 
 Securitizers  Non-securitizers  
Differences in means (i) and medians 
(ii) 
Variables mean median SD obs.  mean median SD obs.  (i) (ii) t-test 
Dependent variable             
Efficiency score 0.55 0.50 0.21 658  0.43 0.41 0.13 4,617  0.12 0.00  a, b 
Securitization regressors            
Total securitization ratio% 13.74 0.14 37.56 658  - - - -  - - - 
Bank-specific control variables            
Total retained interest ratio% 7.08 0.00 17.03 658  - - - -  - - - 
Capital ratio% 11.23 9.60 5.61 658  10.60 9.55 5.61 4,617  0.63 0.00  a 
Bank size 15.64 16.15 0.82 658  14.68 14.47 0.74 4,617  0.96 0.62  a 
Diversification ratio% 0.44 0.34 0.31 658  0.19 0.16 0.16 4,617  0.25 0.05  a, b 
Liquidity ratio% 20.86 19.23 12.29 658  21.59 19.89 12.56 4,617  -0.73 0.59  a, b 
Non-interest expense ratio% 3.53 2.90 2.08 658  2.86 2.66 1.33 4,617  0.67 0.00  a, b 
Non-performing loans ratio% 0.36 0.10 0.55 658  0.13 0.02 0.30 4,617  0.23 0.01  a, b 
Local-market power 6.47 2.43 8.01 658   1.79 0.22 4.07 4,617   4.69 0.00  a 
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Table 5.3: Baseline framework, OLS estimation 
This table presents the baseline results on the impact of loan securitization on bank 
efficiency scores, using OLS estimator. Both bank and year fixed effects are controlled 
in the regression. The sample period is 2002-2012. All control variables have been 
lagged for one year. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by banks, 
where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 5.A. 
Dependent Variable Bank efficiency scores 
Total securitization ratiot-1 0.080** 
 (0.03) 
Total retained interest ratiot-1 0.045* 
 (0.03) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -1.260*** 
 (0.24) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.066 
 (0.05) 
Diversification ratiot-1 2.876 
 (1.83) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.045 
 (0.05) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.015 
 (0.02) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 0.036 
 (1.08) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.137 
 (0.14) 
Constant 0.555*** 
  (0.03) 
Bank fixed effects Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes 
Observations 4399 
Adjusted-R² 0.1838  
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Table 5.4: Heckman self-selection model 
This table presents regression results on the impact of loan securitization on bank 
efficiency scores, using Heckman self-selection methods. The sample period is 2002-
2012. Three instruments are introduced in Heckman model: 1) state-level corporate 
tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity 
index. Main results are reported in Panel A, while the firs-step results of Heckman 
self-selection model are reported in Panel B. All control variables have been lagged 
for one year. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by banks, 
where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Table 5.A. 
Panel A: Main Results 
Dependent Variable   
 (1) (2) (3) 
Instrument Tax Rate Peer Liquidity Interaction 
Total securitization ratiot-1 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.148*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Total retained interest ratiot-1 -0.264** -0.233*** -0.245*** 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -2.201*** -2.235*** -2.329*** 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.170** -0.176*** -0.188*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Diversification ratiot-1 13.666* 11.821 12.215 
 (8.10) (7.92) (8.11) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 -0.010 0.004 -0.008 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.053 0.072** 0.065** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 -0.990 0.118 0.383 
 (2.26) (2.12) (2.17) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.796*** -0.895*** -0.898*** 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) 
Constant 1.292*** 1.270*** 1.297*** 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.277*** -0.273*** -0.279*** 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4399 4399 4399 
Adjusted-R² 0.2401  0.2433  0.2182  
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Table 5.4: Heckman self-selection model 
Panel B: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model 
Dependent Variable Total securitization dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -1.351* -1.106* -1.448** 
 (0.79) (0.54) (0.56) 
Bank sizet-1 0.695*** 60.26*** 60.26*** 
 (0.19) (4.35) (4.35) 
Diversification ratiot-1 -58.874 0.915*** 0.879*** 
 (43.59) (0.15) (0.15) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.024 -0.276 -0.259 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 2.380*** 12.50*** 12.80*** 
 (0.68) (1.97) (1.98) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 20.096*** 10.11 9.075 
 (7.61) (6.91) (6.96) 
Local-market powert-1 6.461*** 3.173*** 3.271*** 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
Constant -2.422*** -2.433*** -2.174*** 
  (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4399 4399 4399 
Adjusted-R²/Pseudo-R² 0.2207  0.2425  0.2433  
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Table 5.5: Panel Heckman self-selection model 
This table presents the regression results on the impact of loan securitization on bank 
efficiency scores, using the Chamberlain-Mundlak approach (Mundlak, 1978; 
Chamberlain, 1982). The sample period is 2002-2012. Inverse Mills ratios are calculated 
using three instruments: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; 3) 
state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. To deal with the possible time 
series issue, all the control variables have been lagged for one year. T-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by banks, where *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All variable definitions are 
presented in Appendix 5.A. The first-step results are reported in Appendix 5.C. 
Dependent Variable Bank efficiency scores 
Total securitization ratiot-1 0.071** 0.090*** 0.086*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Total retained interest ratiot-1 0.032 0.038 0.037 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -1.306*** -1.292*** -1.292*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.086* -0.078* -0.079* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Diversification ratiot-1 2.781 2.502 2.562 
 (1.77) (1.76) (1.73) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.099*** 0.075** 0.075** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.026 0.019 0.018 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 -0.305 -0.678 -0.654 
 (1.10) (1.12) (1.13) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.209 -0.331** -0.321** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Inverse Mills Ratio (State-level corporate tax rate) -0.050***   
 (0.01)   
Inverse Mills Ratio (Peer liquidity index) -0.018***  
  (0.01)  
Inverse Mills Ratio (State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index) -0.079*** 
   (0.02) 
Constant 0.771*** 0.396** 0.948*** 
  (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) 
Mean value of control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4399 4399 4399 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4257 0.4202 0.4299 
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Table 5.6: Propensity score matching estimation 
Table 5.6 presents the results using propensity score matching (PSM) approach. Panel 
A shows the probit regression estimating of the propensity to securitize. The 
dependent variable is total securitization dummy which equals to one for banks with 
securitized assets, and zero otherwise. Panel B reports the propensity score matching 
estimates of the treatment effect of total securitization on banks' efficiency scores. 
Results show the balancing is good for all covariates (abs(bias)<5%). All explanatory 
variables are lagged one year. The reported standard errors are clustered at the bank 
level. *, **, *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Determinants of Banks' Propensity Scores 
Dependent Variable Total securitization dummy   
Capital Ratio -2.693***   
 (0.70)   
Bank Size 56.51***   
 (3.98)   
Diversification Ratio 1.217***   
 (0.13)   
Liquidity Ratio -0.298   
 (0.22)   
Non-Interest Expenses 10.66***   
 (1.83)   
Non-Performing Loans 15.61*   
 (6.34)   
Local Market Power 3.874***   
 (0.44)   
Constant -10.86***   
  (0.63)     
Observations 5275     
Likelihood -1276.5704     
        
Panel B: Treatment Effects     
  Efficiency Scores 
 Treated Controls Difference (SD) 
Average treatment effect on the treated 0.6007  0.5819  0.0189*** 
    (0.06) 
Matched observations: 822 
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Table 5.7: Difference-in-Difference analysis 
The DiD framework used the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers in 2008 as an 
exogenous shock (see Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia, 2012 for similar practice). Post-
Lehman bankruptcy dummy equals to one from the year 2008 onwards, and zero before 
2008. Column (1) and (2) report the results using a subsample of matched securitizers 
with non-securitizers based on bank-specific variables and constrain the matching to 
the same year. Securitizers serve as the control group in the matched sample. The 
sample period is from 2002 to 2012. Column (3) and (4) report the results using a 
subsample including only securitizers. Banks with higher liquidity and potential to 
securitize loans are defined as the treatment group, while banks with lower liquidity 
and potential to securitize loans are the control group. The potential to securitize loans 
is measured by the liquidity index proposed by Loutskina (2011). Top 10% securitizers 
dummy is set to unity if a securitizer’s liquidity index value is larger than 90% 
distribution of all securitizers, and zero otherwise, based on the value of 2005.  Bank 
and year fixed effects are both included.  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
Dependent variable Bank efficiency scorest 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Securitizer dummyt × Post-
Lehman bankruptcy dummyt 
-0.011*** -0.015***    
(0.00) (0.00)    
Top 10% securitizers dummyt × 
Post-Lehman bankruptcy 
dummyt 
   -0.006*** -0.007*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) 
Total retained interest ratiot 0.055**   0.055** 
 
 (0.02)   (0.02) 
Capital Ratiot -1.699***   -1.703*** 
 
 (0.32)   (0.32) 
Bank sizet  -0.095   -0.095 
 
 (0.06)   (0.06) 
Diversification ratiot 7.367**   7.436** 
 
 (3.56)   (3.55) 
Bank liquidity ratiot 0.196***   0.195*** 
 
 (0.06)   (0.06) 
Non-interest expense ratiot 0.030   0.031* 
 
 (0.02)   (0.02) 
Non-performing loans ratiot 2.548*   2.546* 
 
 (1.49)   (1.48) 
Local-market powert -0.051   -0.056 
 
 (0.19)   (0.19) 
Constant 0.658*** 0.714***  0.587*** 0.714***  
(0.01) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.04) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 2,174 2,174   1,087 1,087 
Adjusted-R² 0.2465 0.4294   0.1466 0.4310 
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Table 5.8: Co-variations between securitization ratios and bank-
specific characteristics 
Table 5.8 presents regression results on the relationship between cross products of 
securitization ratios and capital ratio, LogZ, liquidity ratio, and diversification ratio, 
and bank efficiency scores. The regression uses the interaction term to explore the 
possible mechanisms that securitization can impact on bank efficiency scores. Both 
bank and year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by banks. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 
5.A. 
Dependent Variable Bank efficiency scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total securitization ratio × Capital Ratiot 0.147***   
 
 (0.05)   
 
Total securitization ratio × LogZt -0.562***  
 
 
 (0.15)  
 
Total securitization ratio × Bank liquidity ratiot -1.280***  
 
 
 (0.26)  
Total securitization ratio × Diversification ratiot -0.335** 
 
 
 
 (0.17) 
Total securitization ratiot 0.083*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.082** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Capital Ratiot -0.012*** -1.254*** -1.346*** -1.263*** 
 (0.00) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) 
LogZt  0.009**  
 
 
 (0.00)  
 
Bank liquidity ratiot 0.064* 0.037** 0.063*** 0.045** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Diversification ratiot 0.309*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.028*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Total retained interest ratiot 0.042 0.044* 0.044* 0.045* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank sizet -0.093** -0.077 -0.074 -0.067 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Non-interest expense ratiot -0.424 -0.751* -0.752 -0.784** 
 (0.38) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
Non-performing loans ratiot 0.176 0.550* 0.625* 0.122 
 (1.01) (0.99) (0.96) (1.00) 
Local-market powert -0.238 -0.274 -0.285 -0.251 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Constant 0.668*** 0.819*** 0.815*** 0.758*** 
  (0.22) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4399 4399 4399 4399 
Adjusted-R²/Pseudo-R² 0.1268  0.2671  0.2125  0.3770  
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Table 5.9: Mortgage and non-mortgage securitization estimation 
Table 5.9 presents regression results on the impact of loan securitization on bank efficiency scores using 
both OLS and Heckman self-selection methods. The sample period is 2002-2012. Three instruments are 
introduced in Heckman model: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; 3) state-level 
corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. Results on mortgage securitization are reported in Panel A and 
non-mortgage securitization in Panel B. Only the second-step results are reported in Heckman model. The 
first-step results are reported in Appendix 5.D. To deal with the possible time series issue, all control 
variables have been lagged for one year. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by 
banks, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All variable 
definitions are presented in Appendix. 
Panel A: Mortgage securitization estimation  
Dependent Variable Bank efficiency scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Heckman self-selection 
Mortgage securitization ratiot-1 -0.254 -0.007 -0.035 -0.025 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) 
Mortgage retained interest ratiot-1 -0.046* -0.837*** -0.578*** -0.586*** 
 (0.03) (0.23) (0.13) (0.14) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -1.224*** -2.085*** -1.842*** -2.034*** 
 (0.24) (0.27) (0.17) (0.19) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.065 -0.357*** -0.291*** -0.314*** 
 (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) 
Diversification ratiot-1 2.460 18.687 12.951 13.216 
 (1.99) (12.28) (8.60) (8.68) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.050 0.013 0.055 0.036 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.003 0.000 0.039 0.033 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 0.351 -1.426 4.464** 4.663** 
 (1.05) (3.80) (2.23) (2.25) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.145 -1.517*** -1.049*** -1.026*** 
 (0.15) (0.40) (0.20) (0.20) 
Constant 0.553*** 1.646*** 1.333*** 1.369*** 
 (0.03) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 0.257***   
  (0.05)   
Inverse Mills Ratio 2   2.291***  
 
   (0.18)  
Inverse Mills Ratio 3     0.536*** 
        (0.04) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,399 4,399 4,399 4,399 
Adjusted-R²/Pseudo-R² 0.2075  0.3633  0.3736  0.3425  
Note: Inverse Mills Ratio 1, 2, and 3 are estimated using the instrument of state-level corporate tax rate, 
peer liquidity index, and State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index, respectively. 
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Table 5.9: Mortgage and non-mortgage securitization estimation 
Panel B: Non-mortgage securitization  
Dependent Variable Bank efficiency scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Heckman model 
Non-mortgage securitization ratiot-1 0.110*** 0.156*** 0.166*** 0.161*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Non-mortgage retained interest ratiot-1 0.009** -0.004 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -1.268*** -2.258*** -2.340*** -2.435*** 
 (0.25) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.069 -0.103 -0.124** -0.136** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Diversification ratiot-1 2.791 12.366* 10.873 11.149 
 (1.87) (7.51) (7.60) (7.66) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.043 0.025 0.030 0.019 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.012 0.075** 0.087*** 0.081*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 0.121 -2.219 -0.984 -0.657 
 (1.08) (2.14) (2.05) (2.07) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.131 -0.683*** -0.854*** -0.834*** 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) 
Constant 0.558*** 1.225*** 1.245*** 1.264*** 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 0.137***   
   (0.05)   
Inverse Mills Ratio 2  2.014***  
    (0.19)  
Inverse Mills Ratio 3   0.473*** 
        (0.04) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,399 4,399 4,399 4,399 
Adjusted-R²/Pseudo-R² 0.2155  0.2252  0.2821  0.2143  
Note: Inverse Mills Ratio 1, 2, and 3 are estimated using the instrument of state-level corporate tax rate, 
peer liquidity index, and State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index, respectively. 
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Table 5.10: Loan sales estimation 
This table presents regression results on the impact of loan securitization on bank efficiency scores. using 
both OLS and Heckman self-selection methods. The sample period is 2002-2012. Three instruments are 
introduced in Heckman model: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; 3) state-level 
corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. The first and second step results are reported in the left and 
right columns within the instrument groups, respectively. To deal with the possible time series issue, all 
control variables have been lagged for one year. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by banks, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All 
variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
Dependent Variable Bank efficiency scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS Heckman self-selection 
    
1st 
step 
2nd 
step 
1st 
step 
2nd 
step 
1st 
step 
2nd 
step 
Total securitization ratiot-1 0.022*  0.030**  0.037***  0.034*** 
 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Capital Ratiot-1 
-
0.656*** -0.537 -1.338*** 0.747 -1.417*** -0.266 -1.496*** 
 
(0.14) (0.63) (0.21) (0.49) (0.18) (0.56) (0.18) 
Bank sizet-1 -0.051 0.687*** -0.252*** 0.486*** -0.264*** 0.515*** -0.268*** 
 
(0.05) (0.18) (0.08) (0.18) (0.07) (0.18) (0.06) 
Diversification ratiot-1 2.984 -51.299 15.570 -52.299 12.463 -48.523 12.186 
 
(1.84) (42.56) (9.65) (42.60) (8.73) (42.63) (8.16) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.086 0.119 0.017 0.327 0.034 0.304 0.030 
 
(0.05) (0.23) (0.09) (0.23) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 0.011 3.144*** 0.037 
-
3.919*** 0.053 
-
3.186*** 0.051 
 
(0.02) (0.75) (0.04) (0.41) (0.04) (0.37) (0.03) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 -0.369 
38.289**
* -1.011 
44.114**
* 2.525 
42.788**
* 3.227 
 
(0.95) (6.87) (3.13) (6.39) (2.28) (6.45) (2.13) 
Local-market powert-1 -0.129 6.674*** -1.113*** 4.093*** -1.156*** 4.784*** -0.979*** 
 
(0.15) (0.46) (0.33) (0.51) (0.21) (0.50) (0.19) 
Constant 
0.471*** 
-
2.561*** 1.333*** 
-
2.522*** 1.278*** 
-
2.263*** 1.243*** 
 
(0.03) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.259***   
   
  
(0.05)   
   
Peer liquidity index   2.318*** 
   
 
   (0.18) 
   
Corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity 
index 
 
   
 
0.540*** 
 
  
   
 
(0.04) 
 
Inverse Mills Ratio   -0.321***  -0.303***  -0.279*** 
   
(0.06)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 
Adjusted-R²/Pseudo-R² 0.3051 0.3129 0.3773 0.3704 0.3705 0.3176 0.3696 
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Chapter 6 
Results Review and Conclusions 
6.1 Review results on the impact of securitization 
on bank risk: A short- and long-term explanation 
Ambiguous results exist in securitization literature. While classic theories 
suggest securitzation is likely to lead to a risk reduction effect, some recent 
studies report that banks can take on more risk through securitization. The 
empirical results from chapter 3 and 4 provide a possible explanation. Results of 
chapter 3 report that bank securitization leads to bank risk decrease effect, while 
empirical evidence from chapter 4 finds a bank failure increase effect. This 
disparate can be explained by a short-term risk reduction and long-term bank 
failure increase effect.  
6.1.1 Short- and long-term effect 
Regarding to short-term effect, the focus of analysis is the potential impact 
of securitization on bank risk of structuring and operating this transaction action 
until the objectives are met14. It can be interpreted as follows: short-term effect 
is usually accompanied with a predefined target of the executor, and outcome can 
be evaluated right after the action.  
The traditional “hold-to-maturity” banking model determines that 
commercial banks could face liquidity shortage. Loan securitization modifies the 
functioning of banks from a traditional “hold-to-maturity” to an “originate-to-
distribute” model, which in turn increases bank’s liquidity, and decreases the cost 
of capital (Pennacchi, 1988). Meanwhile, commercial banks can also shed off the 
undesirable risk they do not wish to bear and transfer the credit risk to security 
                                         
14 This is not a direct definition in finance, but it is a similar statement in the field of social science 
(e.g., refers to the report of U.S. Department of Energy in August 1997, reference DOE/EH-
413/9708. 
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investors. All the benefits above are the pre-set goals to be accomplished after 
securitization, which are also their prior concerns during the transaction.  
However, the risk reduction effect is more likely to be a short-term benefit 
that may not be able to retain for a long time after the securitization transaction 
is terminated. Issuers could choose to use the benefits acquired from 
securitization to invest in other riskier fields. With the possibility to transfer or 
share risk, they could be much more aggressive in risk taking, which would possibly 
increase bank risk in the long run. The greater risk-taking capacity leads to an 
increased demand for new assets to fill the expanding balance sheets and an 
increase in leverage. As shown in Shin (2009), banks would search for borrowers 
that they can do. However, when they have exhausted all good borrowers, they 
need to scour for other borrowers who even could be worse ones. Thus, the seeds 
of the subsequent downturn in the credit cycle are sown, and they will lead to 
real risk with time flowing. Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) argue that securitization 
may be a crucial factor that softening the short-term policy, which leads to higher 
possibility of risk-taking behaviour for commercial banks. 
Meanwhile, some banks are becoming more and more mere originators of 
loans and distributors of their risk (Martin-Oliver and Saurina, 2007). They 
anxiously pursue the short-term benefits of securitization and sometimes grant 
loans in the aim of securitizing them out: the loans are packaged into a bundle of 
other mortgages, given a risk assessment by rating agency and sold out. Therefore, 
securitization could introduce in more potential problems into the banking system, 
which in turn increases the long-term risk of banks. 
Similarly, the focus of the analysis of long-term effect is the risk remaining 
on the site after the action has been taken, or to say, the residual risk. It can be 
translated as long-term effect considers the ignored potential risk or uncertainty 
in a particular action. Therefore, higher level of ignorance of the potential risk 
and uncertainty is related to higher possibility of long-term risk. In the case of 
securitization, the likelihood of bank failure increase effect could indicate a long-
term impact on bank risk. 
Securitization is associated with information inequality between originators 
and security buyers. Hiding either hard or soft information from the originators on 
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the quality of underlying loans introduces in higher uncertainty in the transaction. 
This information asymmetry is not likely to be solved by the market within a short 
period. For example, hiding soft information makes it possible for issuers to 
securitize the worse assets as the good ones to outside investors. It means that, 
within a short time period, this action, in fact, decreases bank risk. Although in 
the long run, this effect will introduce in more risk to the system and eventually 
positively impact on individual bank risk, it will not be aware of by the public 
shortly. Issuers could also choose to hide hard information to securitize better 
assets in order to retain their lending ability with good ratings (the regulatory 
arbitrage theory). In this case, the residual portfolio risk could be worse because 
of the “illusion of risk transferring”, but this situation could be only known by the 
public for the following periods when new ratings coming. Several studies provide 
empirical evidence to support this argument. For example, Demyanyk and Hemert 
(2011) argue that problems in the subprime mortgage market in 2007-09 financial 
crisis are apparent before the actual crisis erupted in 2007, at least by the end of 
2005. In fact, loan quality had been worsening for almost five year in a row at that 
point according to their research, but investors are only able to aware of it after 
2007. However, the problem is only aware of by the public and authorities after 
2007 when the financial crisis broke out. 
The information asymmetry encourages securitized banks to act recklessly, 
which in turn decreases incentives of originators to carefully screen borrowers and 
monitor loans. Parlour and Plantin (2008) argue that even without actual 
securitization, or to say risk sharing, issuers are still greatly discouraged from 
effective monitoring. In this case, the potential risk which banks assume to 
securitize out stays inside. With the potential risk accumulating, the stability of 
the banking system decreases which in turn increases the likelihood of bank 
failure. A best example is the collapse in 2007 to 2008 of overnight wholesale 
market. It is widely agreed in academia that the securitization of mortgage loans 
played a key role in the subprime lending crisis (Kashyap et al., 2008; 
Brunnermeier, 2009). 
Securitization could also soften the standard of regulation. Loutskina (2011) 
argues that securitization can even weaken the ability of the monetary authority 
to affect banks' lending activity. As security market, such as mortgage market, is 
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not a “perfect” one (Gerardi, Rosen and Willen, 2010), regulations from 
authorities are very important for both issuers and investors. Therefore, all the 
types of impact of securitization above are related to the definition of long-term 
effect. 
6.1.2 The link between short- and long-term impact of 
securitization 
It is notable that there is a link between short- and long-term impact of 
loan securitization on bank risk. Anxiously pursuing the short-term benefits of 
securitization makes the issuers to ignore the possible uncertainty and potential 
risk, and even lack of incentive to carefully screen borrowers and monitor the 
loans. Issuers have the belief that all the potential risk can be shared through 
securitization transaction. In practice, securitization gathers different institutions 
and hundreds of thousands of investors, which in turn provides an illusion that: 
the higher the level of risk is diversified, the lower the possibility of bank risk. 
However, as the residual risk accumulated, bank failure occurs, and even the 
banking system collapses.  
Securitization may also increase systemic risk even if banks’ individual risk 
does not increase by shedding idiosyncratic exposures. Nijskens and Wagner (2011) 
argue that the idiosyncratic share in a bank’s risk can be lowered if banks chose 
to hedge the potential undiversified exposures by buying protection, while 
simultaneously buying other credit risk by selling protection. In this case, banks 
may end up being more correlated with each other, which may amplify the risk of 
systemic crisis in the financial system (Elsinger et al., 2006; Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2007; Wagner, 2008) since it increases the likelihood that banks incur 
losses jointly (a situation experienced in the current crisis). 
Results in Chapter 3 and 4 suggest a short-term risk reduction and long-
term bank failure increase effect. The explanations are as follows. Securitization 
creates a more efficient risk sharing through diversification. The pooling and 
traching of securitization create low-risk and highly liquid securities to attract 
investors (DeMarzo, 2005). Securitizers thus may easily shift their credit-risk 
exposures to the counter parties through true sales (Humphreys and Kreistman 
157 
 
157 
 
1995; Kramer 2003). In practice, some risk can also be transferred out of the 
banking system through securitization, for example to hedge funds and equity 
investors, creating an even larger number of investors to share the potential risk. 
Thus, securitization could reduce bank risk by substituting large potential 
exposures to direct borrowers with smaller and more diversified exposures and 
smoothing out the risks among many investors (Duffie, 2007).  
In the long run, however, securitizers may decrease their efforts on 
screening borrowers, lower borrowing standards, and grant more poor-quality 
loans considering the potential risk can be easily transferred to the investors 
(Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). The reckless behaviour links securitizers with 
aggressive risk taking and greater retentions of risky assets (Acharya and Johnson, 
2007). The increased risk on the balance sheet may also increase their cost of 
financing. In response, securitizers may choose to securitize better assets rather 
than risky assets (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013), and left with insufficient 
capital buffer to survive a severe event (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). The 
development of complex structured credit products makes it more difficult for 
most investors and rating agencies to analyse the potential risks and fair values of 
securitized assets (Griffin and Tang, 2009). Thus, the potential risk increase is not 
likely to be recognized within a short period. When the diversification mechanism 
of securitization is not able to cover the losses, a majority bank failure could 
breakout (Wagner, 2010). 
6.1.3 Contribution 
These results provide direct empirical evidence on the impact of 
securitization on bank risk. Previous studies on securitization and bank risk pay 
more attentions on the theoretical basis, providing both risk reduction (Benveniste 
and Berger, 1987; Pennacchi, 1988) and risk increase theories (Kobayashi and 
Osano, 2012; van Oordt, 2014). Empirical examinations of securitization provide 
evidence with the impact on bank performance (Guner, 2006; Casu et al., 2012), 
or specific on the impact of CMBS (Titman and Tsyplakov, 2010; An, Deng, and 
Gabriel, 2011), CLOs (Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina, 2012), subprime 
mortgage loans (Keys, Seru, and Vig, 2012), and asset-backed commercial papers 
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(Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez, 2013) on bank performance and managerial 
efforts.  
To author’s best knowledge, there is no direct empirical evidence to test 
the impact of the involvement of securitization on bank risk. Thus, this study 
reconciles the conflicts of theories and find a short-term risk reduction and long-
term bank failure increase effect of securitization. Part of the bank failure 
increase arguments is related to the rapid development of complex structured 
credit products. Higher complexity of securitization makes investors and rating 
agencies more difficult to analyse the potential risks and fair values (Griffin and 
Tang, 2009). Securitizers can in turn take advantage of the private information to 
take on more risk and decrease their monitoring efforts. Recent literature show 
higher complexity in securitization transactions can significantly decrease loan 
performance (Furfine, 2015) and increase default rates (Ghent, Torous, and 
Valkanov, 2014). This study adds more evidence to this group of studies by 
providing a positive association between a higher complexity of securitization and 
the likelihood of failure. 
This research also extends the understanding of the impact of securitization 
on bank behaviour. Previous literature finds that securitization leads to a 
decreased cost of capital (Berger, Herring, and Szego, 1995; Carlstrom and 
Samolyk, 1995; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Nicolo and Pelizzon, 2008; Nadauld and 
Weisbach, 2012), a higher level of diversification (Allen and Carletti, 2006; Rossi, 
Schwaiger, and Winkler, 2009), and a higher level of liquidity (Loutskina, 2011; 
Casu et al., 2013). Thus, securitization is beneficial to securitizers because it 
relieves underinvestment problems (Lockwood, Rutherford, and Herrera, 1996) 
and increases profitability (Schliephake and Kirstein, 2013). However, 
securitization may also encourage banks to take advantage of the asymmetric 
information and decrease managerial efforts (Parlour and Plantin, 2008; 
Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011; Ahn and Breton, 2014; Wang and Xia, 2014). Thus, 
securitization can also undermine the loan quality in the market (Jones, 2000; 
Berndt and Gupta, 2009; Mian and Sufi, 2009; Purnanandam, 2011; Rosch and 
Scheule, 2012; Carbo-Valverde, Marques-Ibanez, Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2012). 
This research provides a link between the disparate behaviours. 
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Finally, the empirical results may shed some light on the ongoing discussion 
of the role of securitization in changing the banking models and contributing to 
the 2007-09 global financial crisis. The implication of the results on the different 
impact of securitization on bank risk in the short and long term may suggest that 
the examination of bank risk should not only be focused on balance sheet ratios 
but also on the managerial system. 
6.2 Recent development 
Studies and practice on securitization have experienced a good period after 
the 2007-09 financial crisis. After the research on the impact of securitization on 
the banking system, the attention nowadays has been moved to the mechanism. 
The main mechanism has been identified by the literature is the contagion effect 
which caused by the interconnection among financial institutions. This connection 
leads to the commonality of asset holdings of different banks (Wagner, 2010) and 
increases the likelihood of banks to respond to external shocks in similar patterns 
(Cai, Saunders, and Steffen, 2015). When the magnitude of the external shock 
exceeding a certain threshold, the internal linkage among institutions triggers the 
contagion effects.  
Another strand of research focuses on the so-called macro-prudential 
framework to address or prevent similar crisis to happen again. For example, 
Brunnermeier and Sannikov’s (2017) model studies the equilibrium dynamics of an 
economy with financial frictions and argue that macro-prudential policies will 
increase the stability of the financial system. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1-A: Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable     
Z-score Z-score is banks’ distance to insolvency, which 
equals to the return on assets plus the capital 
asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of 
asset returns. 
Independent variables 
    
Total Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of toal amount 
of assets securitized over total assets. 
Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount 
of mortgage assets securitized over total assets. 
Non-Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount 
of non-mortgage assets securitized over total 
assets. 
Total Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from 
all retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all 
securitized assets. 
Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from 
all retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all 
securitized mortgage assets. 
Non-Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from 
all retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all 
securitized non-mortgage assets. 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Diversification Ratio Noninterest income divided by total operation 
income. 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid assets divided by total assets. 
Non-Interests Expenses Ratio Noninterest expense divided by total assets. 
Non-Performing Loans Ratio Loans past due 90 days divided by total assets. 
Local-Market Power The sum of the squares of each portfolio in every 
bank. 
Bank Holding Company Dummy Bank holding company dummy equals to one if the 
bank belongs to a bank holding company, and zero 
otherwise. 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Dummy Metropolitan statistical area dummy equals to one 
if the bank locates in metropolitan area, and zero 
otherwise. 
Instruments           
Peer Liquidity Index Peer liquidity index is the average of liquidity 
indexes of a bank’s peers. Liquidity index is 
proposed by Loutskina (2011) to effectively 
capture banks’ potential ability to securitize 
loans. 
State-level corporate tax rate State level corporate tax rate 
Peer Liquidity Index × State-level Corporate Tax Rate The cross product of peer liquidity index and 
state-level corporate tax rate.  
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Appendix 1.B: Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1.0000            
(2) 0.0205*** 1.0000           
(3) 0.0116*** 0.1838*** 1.0000          
(4) -0.0661*** 0.0736*** 0.0954*** 1.0000         
(5) 0.0768*** 0.2032*** 0.1332*** 0.2721*** 1       
(6) 0.0617*** -0.0068 -0.0043 -0.0538*** 0.0741*** 1      
(7) 0.0101** 0.1629*** 0.0583*** -0.1337*** 0.5157*** -0.0929*** 1     
(8) -0.031** 0.0649*** 0.0410*** -0.0486*** 0.0242*** -0.0573*** 0.0702*** 1    
(9) -0.0011*** 0.0472*** 0.0641*** 0.2172*** 0.1844*** 0.0737*** -0.0169*** 0.0328*** 1   
(10) -0.0638*** -0.0408*** -0.0041 0.1920*** 0.0584*** 0.0131*** -0.1042*** -0.0180*** 0.0257*** 1  
(11) -0.0246*** 0.0235*** 0.0302*** 0.2723*** 0.0982*** -0.1124*** 0.0807*** -0.0383*** -0.0268*** -0.0337*** 1 
Note: Variables are numbered as follows: (1) Z-score, (2) Total securitization ratio; (3) Total retained interests; (4) Bank size; (5) Diversification 
ratio; (6) Liquidity ratio; (7) Non-interests expense ratio; (8) Non-performing loans ratio; (9) Local-market power index; (10) BHC dummy; (11) 
MSA dummy. 
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Appendix 1.C: All first-step results 
Appendix 3.C shows all first-step results of Heckman and 2SLS regressions. Results on securitization activities using Heckman and 2SLS regressions are reported in Panel A and B, respectively. First-step 
results of Heckman regression on loan sales, mortgage, and non-mortgage securitizations are reported in Panel C, D, and E, respectively. Instrumental variables include: 1) state-level corporate tax 
rate; 2) peer liquidity index; and, 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. Bank characteristics include bank size, diversification ratio, liquidity ratio, non-interest expense ratio, non-
performing loans ratio, local-market power index, bank holding company dummy and metropolitan statistical area dummy. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.A. 
Panel A: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on securitization      
Dependent Variable Securitization Ratio 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.352*** 0.331*** 0.346***  0.428*** 0.410*** 0.418***  0.275*** 0.254*** 0.696*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) 
Diversification ratio% 0.082 0.196* 0.152*  0.172* -0.039 -0.025  0.279** 0.404*** 0.011* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.01) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -3.839 -3.399 -3.621  -3.431 -2.802 -2.863  -4.275 -4.023 -0.073 
 (9.70) (9.33) (9.68)  (13.18) (12.77) (13.30)  (14.41) (13.53) (0.05) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 1.005*** 0.786*** 1.003***  1.136*** 0.918*** 1.137***  0.907*** 0.668*** 0.874** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.19) (0.17) (0.50) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 3.325*** 3.533*** 3.299***  22.301*** 26.834*** 23.695***  3.528*** 3.702*** 2.579** 
 (0.71) (0.71) (0.71)  (5.06) (5.15) (5.13)  (0.74) (0.73) (1.32) 
Local-market power 0.004 0.186 0.119  0.176 0.501* 0.326  -0.229 -0.124 0.019 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)  (0.28) (0.26) (0.27)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.02) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.038 -0.025 -0.038  -0.135* -0.147** -0.136*  0.043 0.066 -0.012*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy -0.014 -0.060* -0.021  -0.079 -0.120** -0.091  0.023 -0.013 -0.003* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.206***    0.009***    0.004***   
 
(0.10)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index 0.023***    0.023**    0.022***  
 
 (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index 0.001***    0.001***    0.001*** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -6.832*** -6.521*** -6.748***  -7.883*** -5.816*** -7.705***  -7.513*** -5.576*** -5.799*** 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.23) (0.17) (0.22)  (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.3587  0.3227  0.4487   0.4514 0.3959 0.2434   0.3436 0.3902 0.2632 
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Appendix 1.C: All first-step results 
Panel B: First-step results of 2SLS model on securitization       
Dependent Variable Securitization Ratio 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.462*** 0.484*** 0.462***  0.693*** 0.770*** 0.696***  0.331*** 0.336*** 0.332*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)  (0.21) (0.24) (0.21)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Diversification ratio% 0.013** 0.015** 0.008*  0.019** 0.010*** 0.011*  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.08) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -0.042 -0.049* -0.043  -0.067 -0.029* -0.073  -0.008 -0.007 -0.086 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.01) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 0.449 0.241** 0.447  0.869* 0.387** 0.874**  -0.086 -0.084 0.238 
 (0.32) (0.14) (0.31)  (0.50) (0.22) (0.50)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 0.112** 0.117* 0.113**  2.520** 2.646** 2.579**  0.238 0.126 0.105** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (1.31) (1.36) (1.32)  (0.19) (0.08) (0.05) 
Local-market power 0.010 0.029 0.013  0.013 0.059 0.019  0.104* 0.107** 0.011 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***  -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.012***  0.006 -0.006 -0.010** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy -0.002 -0.002** 0.003**  0.002*** 0.003** -0.003*  0.007** 0.002** -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.236***    0.008***    0.009**   
 (0.07)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index 0.171**    0.023***    0.035**  
 
 (0.16)    (0.03)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index 0.025***    -0.101***    -0.063*** 
   (0.01)    (0.03)    (0.02) 
Constant -0.097*** -0.076*** -0.091***  -0.122*** -0.077*** -0.653***  -0.067*** -0.053*** -0.107** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.24)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Adjusted-R² 0.2900  0.2689 0.2895   0.1491 0.2720 0.2473   0.2013 0.2623 0.2718 
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Appendix 1.C: All first-step results 
Panel C: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on loan sales      
Dependent Variable Loan Sales Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.315*** 0.281*** 0.304***  0.319*** 0.288*** 0.303***  0.278*** 0.243*** 0.271*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio% -0.183*** -0.030 -0.072  -0.185** -0.062 -0.045  -0.110 0.056 -0.021 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Bank liquidity ratio% 2.913 2.815 2.913  1.511 2.541 2.610  3.827 2.797 3.119 
 (6.25) (5.95) (6.18)  (8.48) (8.41) (8.65)  (9.44) (8.62) (9.14) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 0.665*** 0.387*** 0.668***  0.656*** 0.469*** 0.667***  0.583*** 0.190 0.585*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.13)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 3.314*** 4.036*** 3.364***  79.146*** 101.047*** 86.513***  2.372*** 2.911*** 2.375*** 
 (0.98) (1.00) (0.99)  (15.29) (16.14) (15.64)  (0.91) (0.94) (0.91) 
Local-market power -0.479*** -0.397*** -0.368***  -0.219 -0.087 -0.079  -0.762*** -0.708*** -0.674*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Bank holding company dummy 0.386*** 0.414*** 0.391***  0.253*** 0.270*** 0.259***  0.493*** 0.525*** 0.497*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy -0.042*** -0.090*** -0.053***  -0.036 -0.077*** -0.048*  -0.029 -0.073*** -0.038** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.007***    0.010***    0.005***   
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index  0.027***    0.026***    0.025***  
 
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.001***    0.001***    0.001*** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -5.670*** -5.209*** -5.515***  -5.908*** -5.364*** -5.638***  -5.139*** -4.714*** -5.036*** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.3506  0.3173  0.3621    0.3306  0.3076  0.3521    0.3680  0.3449  0.3063  
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Appendix 1.C: All first-step results 
Panel D: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on mortgage securitization     
Dependent Variable Mortgage Securitization Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.242*** 0.218*** 0.235***  0.250*** 0.234*** 0.240***  0.233*** 0.201*** 0.228*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio% 0.026 0.172** 0.121  0.037 0.136 0.142  0.030 0.216* 0.120 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -4.037 -3.569 -3.879  -5.093 -4.167 -4.478  -3.001 -2.980 -3.287 
 (7.49) (7.17) (7.44)  (9.39) (9.28) (9.44)  (12.63) (11.50) (12.25) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 0.137 -0.126 0.144  -1.139 -1.194 -1.062  0.430* 0.168 0.436* 
 (0.27) (0.30) (0.27)  (0.85) (0.84) (0.84)  (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 1.601*** 1.865*** 1.593***  1.928 3.044* 2.128  1.634*** 1.931*** 1.603*** 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.47)  (1.60) (1.66) (1.60)  (0.51) (0.52) (0.50) 
Local-market power -0.256* -0.189 -0.156  -0.124 -0.038 -0.005  -0.373** -0.313* -0.277 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Bank holding company dummy 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.132***  0.101** 0.115** 0.105**  0.153*** 0.184*** 0.155*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy 0.115*** 0.072*** 0.108***  0.084** 0.045 0.071*  0.144*** 0.097*** 0.139*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.005***    0.008***    0.005***   
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index  0.025***    0.020***    0.028***  
 
 (0.00)    (0.01)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.001***    0.001***    0.001*** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -5.333*** -5.012*** -5.240***  -5.444*** -5.119*** -5.260***  -5.228*** -4.854*** -5.177*** 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.2350  0.2744  0.2612    0.2233  0.2761  0.2521    0.3226  0.3739  0.3463  
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Appendix 1.C: All first-step results 
Panel E: First-step results of Heckman self-selection model on non-mortgage securitization    
Dependent Variable Non-mortgage Securitization Dummy 
 full sample  before 2007  after 2007 
Bank size 0.358*** 0.346*** 0.358***  0.351*** 0.343*** 0.350***  0.346*** 0.334*** 0.348*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Diversification ratio% -0.280*** -0.180* -0.257***  -0.429*** -0.369** -0.407***  -0.182 -0.054 -0.167 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Bank liquidity ratio% -1.948 -1.743 -1.874  -3.190 -2.875 -3.120  0.929 0.215 0.786 
 (10.05) (9.81) (10.09)  (11.36) (11.33) (11.43)  (20.31) (18.97) (20.27) 
Non-interest expense ratio% 1.056*** 0.789*** 1.050***  1.173*** 0.836*** 1.156***  0.912*** 0.688*** 0.909*** 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.12)  (0.17) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
Non-performing loans ratio% 12.222*** 12.547*** 12.128***  46.207*** 47.124*** 45.217***  9.356*** 9.579*** 9.236*** 
 (1.60) (1.61) (1.60)  (6.79) (6.73) (6.72)  (1.67) (1.69) (1.67) 
Local-market power 0.194 0.412*** 0.242  0.166 0.426* 0.204  0.200 0.401** 0.245 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)  (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)  (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Bank holding company dummy -0.049 -0.050 -0.053  -0.119** -0.129** -0.121**  0.035 0.042 0.028 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Metropolitan statistical area dummy 0.006 0.004 0.013  -0.012 -0.003 -0.003  0.016 0.012 0.025 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.001***    0.001**    0.001***   
 (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Peer liquidity index  0.026***    0.018**    0.033***  
 
 (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.001***    0.001**    0.001** 
   (0.00)    (0.00)    (0.00) 
Constant -6.695*** -6.695*** -6.727***  -6.491*** -6.507*** -6.540***  -6.627*** -6.691*** -6.691*** 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)  (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 69,258 69,258 69,258  29,638 29,638 29,638  39,620 39,620 39,620 
Pseudo-R² 0.2855  0.2273  0.2757    0.2355  0.1949  0.2526    0.2613  0.2324  0.3063  
  
167 
 
167 
 
Appendix 2.A: Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable     
Bank Failure Bank failure dummy, which equals to one if the 
bank failed or is acquired by another bank under 
the government assistance in the sample and zero 
otherwise. 
Independent variables 
    
Total Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount 
of assets securitized over total assets. 
Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount 
of mortgage assets securitized over total assets. 
Non-Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount 
of non-mortgage assets securitized over total 
assets. 
Total Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from 
all retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all 
securitized assets. 
Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from 
all retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all 
securitized mortgage assets. 
Non-Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from 
all retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all 
securitized non-mortgage assets. 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Diversification Ratio Noninterest income divided by total operation 
income. 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid assets divided by total assets. 
Non-Interests Expenses Ratio Noninterest expense divided by total assets. 
Non-Performing Loans Ratio Loans past due 90 days divided by total assets. 
Local-Market Power The sum of the squares of each portfolio in every 
bank. 
Bank Holding Company Dummy Bank holding company dummy equals to one if the 
bank belongs to a bank holding company, and zero 
otherwise. 
Metropolitan Statistical Area Dummy Metropolitan statistical area dummy equals to one 
if the bank locates in metropolitan area, and zero 
otherwise. 
Instruments           
Peer Liquidity Index Peer liquidity index is the average of liquidity 
indexes of a bank’s peers. Liquidity index is 
proposed by Loutskina (2011) to effectively 
capture banks’ potential ability to securitize 
loans. 
State-level corporate tax rate State level corporate tax rate 
Peer Liquidity Index × State-level Corporate Tax Rate The cross product of peer liquidity index and 
state-level corporate tax rate.  
 
  
168 
 
168 
 
Appendix 2.B: Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) 1.0000            
(2) 0.0068* 1.0000           
(3) 0.0002 0.1838*** 1.0000          
(4) 0.0249*** 0.0736*** 0.0954*** 1.0000         
(5) -0.0208*** 0.2032*** 0.1332*** 0.2721*** 1       
(6) -0.0427*** -0.0068 -0.0043 -0.0538*** 0.0741*** 1      
(7) 0.0687*** 0.1629*** 0.0583*** -0.1337*** 0.5157*** -0.0929*** 1     
(8) 0.0386*** 0.0649*** 0.0410*** -0.0486*** 0.0242*** -0.0573*** 0.0702*** 1    
(9) -0.0024 0.0472*** 0.0641*** 0.2172*** 0.1844*** 0.0737*** -0.0169*** 0.0328*** 1   
(10) -0.0077** -0.0408*** -0.0041 0.1920*** 0.0584*** 0.0131*** -0.1042*** -0.0180*** 0.0257*** 1  
(11) 0.0326*** 0.0235*** 0.0302*** 0.2723*** 0.0982*** -0.1124*** 0.0807*** -0.0383*** -0.0268*** -0.0337*** 1 
Note: Variables are numbered as follows: (1) Failure dummy, (2) Total securitization ratio; (3) Total retained interests; (4) Bank size; (5) Diversification ratio; 
(6) Liquidity ratio; (7) Non-interests expense ratio; (8) Non-performing loans ratio; (9) Local-market power index; (10) BHC dummy; (11) MSA dummy. 
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Appendix 3.A: Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variable     
Bank Efficiency Score Bank efficiency scores range from zero to one, derived 
from a data envelopment analysis (DEA) model using 
three inputs and outputs (summary statistics for inputs 
and outputs are reported in Table 5.1). A higher score 
indicates a higher level of efficiency, and vice versa. 
Independent variables 
    
Total Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount of 
assets securitized over total assets. 
Mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount of 
mortgage assets securitized over total assets. 
Non-mortgage Securitization Ratio The outstanding principal balance of total amount of 
non-mortgage assets securitized over total assets. 
Total Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from all 
retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all securitized 
assets. 
Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from all 
retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all securitized 
mortgage assets. 
Non-Mortgage Retained Interests Ratio The total dollar amount of credit exposure from all 
retained interest only strips, all other credit 
enhancements, unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitized, and ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as securities or loans on 
related assets, divided by the total of all securitized 
non-mortgage assets. 
Capital Ratio Capital divided by total assets. 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Diversification Ratio Noninterest income divided by total operation income. 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid assets divided by total assets. 
Non-Interests Expenses Ratio Noninterest expense divided by total assets. 
Non-Performing Loans Ratio Loans past due 90 days divided by total assets. 
Local-Market Power The sum of the squares of each portfolio in every bank. 
  
170 
 
170 
 
Appendix 3.B: Correlation matrix 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) 1              
(2) 0.2618*** 1             
(3) 0.1818*** 0.2976*** 1            
(4) 0.2164*** 0.9529*** -0.0059 1           
(5) 0.2490*** 0.3521*** 0.0435*** 0.3550*** 1          
(6) 0.0809*** 0.0304** 0.1084*** -0.0026 0.4596*** 1         
(7) 0.1568*** 0.1284*** 0.0072 0.1321*** 0.2228*** 0.0016 1        
(8) -0.2796*** 0.1747*** -0.0245 0.1908*** 0.0948*** -0.0268 0.0471*** 1       
(9) 0.2845*** 0.1685*** 0.1899*** 0.1162*** 0.2119*** 0.1128*** 0.1057*** 0.0677*** 1      
(10) 0.4961*** 0.3493*** 0.2345*** 0.2914*** 0.3231*** 0.1039*** 0.1756*** 0.1911*** 0.4800*** 1     
(11) 0.0423*** -0.0503*** 0.0102 -0.0559*** -0.0140 0.0325** -0.0547*** -0.1229*** 0.0216 0.0481*** 1    
(12) 0.1102*** 0.4163*** 0.0436*** 0.4222*** 0.2664*** -0.0136 0.0976*** 0.2384*** 0.0171 0.4695*** -0.0470*** 1   
(13) 0.1777*** 0.2839*** 0.1206*** 0.2591*** 0.1979*** 0.0412*** 0.1687*** 0.1346*** 0.2252*** 0.2592*** -0.1320*** 0.2237*** 1  
(14) 0.2310*** 0.1295*** 0.2557*** 0.0545*** 0.1472*** 0.1367*** 0.0293** -0.0131 0.4272*** 0.3771*** -0.0036 0.0435*** 0.1806*** 1 
Note: Variables are numbered as follows: (1) Bank efficiency scores, (2) Total securitization ratio; (3) Mortgage securitization ratio; (4) Non-mortgage 
securitization ratio; (5) Total retained interests; (6) Retained interests on mortgage loans; (7) Retained interests on non-mortgage loans; (8) Capital ratio; (9) 
Bank size; (10) Diversification ratio; (11) Liquidity ratio; (12) Non-interests expense ratio; (13) Non-performing loans ratio; (14) Local-market power index. 
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Appendix 3.C: Panel Heckman model, first-step results 
This set of tables shows the results of cross-sectional Probit regressions in the first-step of Chamberlain-Mundlak approach (Mundlak, 1978; Chamberlain, 1982) which is the instrumental variable approach. In the first step, the main 
concern it to calculate the self-selection bias control variable, inverse Mills ratio. The dependent variable is total securitization dummies and the independent variables are bank specific control variables in every sample year during 
2002 to 2012, respectively. Three instruments are applied in the research, including state-level corporate tax rates in the U.S. (Panel A), peer liquidity index (Panel B), and the interaction term of them (Panel C). Securitization 
dummies are defined equaling to one if the bank has securitized loans, and zero otherwise. Corporate tax rates data are collected from Tax Foundation of U.S. which is available at: 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html, while liquidity index is calculated based on Equation (4), of which the data are collected from “Financial Accounts of the United States” (Z.1) data release. Bank specific 
control variables include: 1. capital ratio (capital divided by total assets); 2. bank size (the natural logarithm of total assets); 3. diversification ratio (noninterest income divided by total operation income); 4. liquidity ratio (liquid 
assets divided by total assets); 5. non-interest expense ratio (noninterest expense divided by total assets); 6. non-performing loans ratio (loans past due 90 days divided by total assets); and, 7. local-market power (the sum of the 
squares of each portfolio in every bank). Likelihood ratios of every regression are reported instead of adjusted R-squared. T-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, where *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Panel A: instrument: corporate tax rate               
Dependent variable Total Securitization Dummy 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Capital Ratio -9.545** -9.067* -6.744* -2.546 -0.887 -1.345 -3.129 -2.053 -2.107 -1.742 
 (3.40) (3.55) (3.39) (2.13) (1.70) (1.89) (2.76) (2.75) (3.22) (2.73) 
Bank Size 68.99*** 58.96*** 71.15*** 62.16*** 69.32*** 66.37*** 44.68*** 38.41** 47.62*** 37.78** 
 (13.49) (13.31) (15.53) (14.15) (14.66) (14.66) (13.28) (13.41) (13.31) (12.82) 
Diversification Ratio 0.598 1.535** 1.449** 1.277** 1.047* 1.241** 1.318** 0.945* 1.133** 1.638*** 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.55) (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.874 -0.737 -1.082 -0.801 -0.0785 -0.751 -0.776 0.00293 -0.746 -0.198 
 (0.65) (0.68) (0.86) (0.82) (0.87) (0.93) (0.77) (0.73) (0.75) (0.73) 
Non-Interest Expenses 14.74* 2.372 8.322 10.55 12.30 11.14 13.89* 6.134 6.083 0.702 
 (6.70) (6.46) (6.91) (6.70) (7.37) (7.58) (5.95) (6.65) (6.86) (6.50) 
Non-Performing Loans 49.95 60.08 71.32 16.44 34.96 36.18 32.07 7.970 8.501 20.87 
 (28.89) (31.59) (39.29) (34.66) (35.68) (31.09) (19.31) (17.06) (16.47) (16.96) 
Local Market Power 2.392 3.246* 5.449** 4.586** 5.686*** 4.899** 3.822* 4.118** 3.186* 2.442 
 (1.49) (1.56) (1.67) (1.47) (1.53) (1.53) (1.52) (1.52) (1.45) (1.47) 
Corporate tax rate 0.595** 0.705** 0.352*** 0.089 0.114 0.202** 0.185 0.108** 0.615** 0.581*** 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) 
Constant -12.98*** -11.92*** -13.29*** -11.36*** -12.95*** -12.62*** -9.293*** -8.005*** -8.686*** -7.366*** 
  (2.14) (2.08) (2.47) (2.21) (2.31) (2.38) (2.09) (2.04) (2.03) (2.01) 
Observations 406 423 441 471 489 508 507 495 507 525 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3378 0.4046 0.4777 0.3947 0.4269 0.4286 0.3768 0.2575 0.2780 0.2709 
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Appendix 3.C: Panel Heckman model, first-step results 
Panel B: instrument: peer liquidity index               
Dependent variable Total Securitization Dummy 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Capital Ratio -3.393 -1.650 -3.095 -1.900 -0.512 0.203 -1.257 -1.188 -2.314 -1.696 
 (2.10) (1.55) (2.06) (1.71) (1.54) (1.33) (1.85) (2.20) (2.92) (2.83) 
Bank Size 64.43*** 61.08*** 70.03*** 62.59*** 67.79*** 64.56*** 41.28** 39.55** 48.05*** 38.49** 
 (14.00) (13.30) (15.71) (14.16) (14.82) (14.44) (13.38) (13.40) (13.35) (12.89) 
Diversification Ratio -0.744 1.048 1.172 0.990 0.169 0.994 1.033* 0.755 0.761 1.284** 
 (0.71) (0.59) (0.64) (0.55) (0.67) (0.59) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48) (0.49) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.477 -0.507 -0.802 -0.665 0.105 -0.630 -0.495 0.0414 -0.645 -0.104 
 (0.64) (0.65) (0.85) (0.82) (0.87) (0.92) (0.76) (0.73) (0.76) (0.74) 
Non-Interest Expenses 29.25*** 9.198 11.85 13.21 21.11* 12.41 13.48* 6.712 8.684 3.199 
 (8.59) (6.96) (7.66) (7.07) (8.94) (7.77) (5.46) (6.56) (6.94) (6.67) 
Non-Performing Loans 44.06 42.48 58.73 11.97 14.71 36.70 21.42 1.695 2.514 13.66 
 (26.59) (28.70) (37.96) (35.21) (40.10) (31.38) (20.78) (17.89) (17.27) (18.07) 
Local Market Power -0.416 1.152 4.154* 3.990** 4.799** 3.776* 2.315 3.195* 2.554 1.850 
 (1.65) (1.63) (1.68) (1.50) (1.58) (1.59) (1.67) (1.56) (1.52) (1.55) 
Peer Liquidity Index 3.476* 1.153*** 0.756 0.393*** 1.377*** 0.490* 1.011*** 0.295* 0.349 0.306* 
 (1.60) (0.90) (0.87) (0.39) (0.89) (0.59) (0.64) (0.22) (0.27) (0.26) 
Constant -12.33*** -11.14*** -12.63*** -11.35*** -12.86*** -11.98*** -8.610*** -7.956*** -9.012*** -7.731*** 
  (2.09) (2.01) (2.39) (2.16) (2.26) (2.26) (2.00) (2.00) (2.02) (1.99) 
Observations 406 423 441 471 489 508 507 495 507 525 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3471 0.3886 0.4781 0.3986 0.4400 0.4288 0.3888 0.2665 0.2876 0.2779 
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Appendix 3.C: Panel Heckman model, first-step results 
Panel C: instrument: corporate tax rate * peer liquidity index             
Dependent Variable Total Securitization Dummy 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Capital Ratio -7.499** -3.247 -4.228 -2.186 -1.001 -0.122 -2.034 -1.389 -2.649 -1.892 
 (2.74) (1.95) (2.39) (1.76) (1.62) (1.39) (2.03) (2.27) (2.95) (2.91) 
Bank Size 63.80*** 57.94*** 68.75*** 62.41*** 67.88*** 64.73*** 41.82** 39.51** 48.03*** 38.48** 
 (13.92) (13.61) (15.81) (14.16) (14.78) (14.44) (13.32) (13.42) (13.35) (12.90) 
Diversification Ratio -0.861 0.751 1.034 0.955 0.255 0.884 0.921 0.705 0.759 1.296** 
 (0.64) (0.59) (0.64) (0.55) (0.62) (0.59) (0.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) 
Liquidity Ratio -0.541 -0.419 -0.784 -0.664 0.105 -0.588 -0.518 0.062 -0.635 -0.1 
 (0.66) (0.67) (0.85) (0.82) (0.87) (0.92) (0.76) (0.73) (0.76) (0.74) 
Non-Interest Expenses 29.35*** 10.93 13.04 13.41 20.33* 13.41 14.84** 7.069 8.612 3.054 
 (7.98) (6.88) (7.63) (7.07) (8.54) (7.89) (5.59) (6.59) (6.94) (6.67) 
Non-Performing Loans 40.57 42.86 58.06 11.05 13.22 33.46 20.4 0.993 2.561 14.14 
 (28.85) (29.40) (38.27) (35.26) (40.92) (32.15) (20.96) (17.99) (17.30) (18.03) 
Local Market Power 0.186 1.184 4.269** 4.053** 5.167*** 3.882* 2.424 3.243* 2.671 1.953 
 (1.61) (1.60) (1.64) (1.48) (1.57) (1.57) (1.64) (1.55) (1.50) (1.54) 
Peer Liquidity Index × Tax Rate 1.181** 0.636* 0.301 0.127** 0.329*** 0.176* 0.315*** 0.091 0.090** 0.0749 
 (0.37) (0.32) (0.25) (0.11) (0.20) (0.16) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant -11.91*** -10.79*** -12.40*** -11.30*** -12.74*** -12.01*** -8.615*** -7.932*** -8.962*** -7.695*** 
  (2.11) (2.04) (2.41) (2.16) (2.27) (2.26) (2.00) (2.00) (2.02) (1.99) 
Observations 406 423 441 471 489 508 507 495 507 525 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3164 0.2899 0.5366 0.3699 0.3225 0.5797 0.2533 0.1331 0.2864 0.2732 
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Appendix 3.D: Heckman model, first-step results (mortgage and non-mortgage securitization) 
This table presents the first-step results of the Heckman self-selection model for mortgage and non-mortgage securitizations. The sample period is 2002-2012. Three instruments 
are introduced in Heckman model: 1) state-level corporate tax rate; 2) peer liquidity index; 3) state-level corporate tax rate × peer liquidity index. To deal with the possible time 
series issue, all control variables have been lagged for one year. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by banks, where *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 5.A. 
Dependent Variable Mortgage securitization dummy Non-mortgage securitization dummy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -2.975** -3.230*** -3.746*** -2.660** -0.471 -1.105 
 (1.09) (0.90) (0.91) (0.83) (0.54) (0.58) 
Bank sizet-1 66.06*** 67.22*** 67.31*** 39.99*** 41.05*** 40.92*** 
 (5.45) (5.45) (5.46) (5.09) (5.12) (5.13) 
Diversification ratiot-1 0.939*** 0.490** 0.494** 1.317*** 0.736*** 0.672*** 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) 
Bank liquidity ratiot-1 0.146 0.247 0.231 -1.261*** -1.034*** -0.995** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Non-interest expense ratiot-1 -6.213* -1.985 -2.101 13.40*** 18.21*** 18.87*** 
 (2.46) (2.53) (2.54) (2.03) (2.10) (2.12) 
Non-performing loans ratiot-1 -2.385 -12.18 -12.51 12.68 -1.692 -5.148 
 (7.75) (8.32) (8.33) (7.47) (8.42) (8.66) 
Local-market powert-1 4.343*** 3.707*** 3.837*** 3.118*** 0.804*** 1.017 
 (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.52) (0.59) (0.58) 
Constant -11.47*** -11.99*** -11.94*** -9.050*** -8.835*** -8.748*** 
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.80) (0.78) (0.79) 
State-level corporate tax rate 0.782***    0.269***   
 (0.07)    (0.06)   
Peer liquidity index 0.398***    0.955***  
 
 (0.09)   
 (0.16)  
State-level corporate tax rate × Peer liquidity index   0.107***  
 0.280*** 
      (0.02)     (0.04) 
Observations 4,399 4,399 4,399 4,399 4,399 4,399 
Pseudo-R² 0.3330  0.3471  0.3633  0.3448  0.3691  0.2065  
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Figure 1-1 
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Figure 2-1: ABS Outstanding in U.S. 
 
Source: SIFMA Database (2013), US ABS Issuance and Outstanding 1997-2012  
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Figure 2-2: A standard process of securitization 
 
Source: Gorton and Souleles (2005) 
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Figure 2-3: A representative securitization deal 
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Figure 4-1: Nelson-Aalen Estimation of the Hazard Function – Total 
Loan Securitization 
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Figure 4-2: Nelson-Aalen Estimation of the Hazard Function – 
Mortgage Loan Securitization 
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Figure 4-3: Nelson-Aalen Estimation of the Hazard Function – Non-
Mortgage Loan Securitization 
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